Behind the New York Agreement on West Papua

John Saltford, Alumni, Department of Political and Asian Studies, University of Hull, United Kingdom, johnsaltford@hotmail.com

The opinion piece by the Dupito Simamora, an Indonesian diplomat to the United Nations, on revisiting the 1962 New York Agreement (The Jakarta Post, Aug. 19) was very interesting. I also fully agree with him that it is time to review the issue in a "comprehensive and objective manner".

However, to assist with the process of this objective review one needs to look at what the New York Agreement actually guaranteed. One can then compare this with what took place and so come to a conclusion as to whether it was such a success story for the UN. Or, as others claim, was the agreement's implementation just a crudely manipulated stunt that fundamentally ignored the rights guaranteed to the West Papuans by the UN, Indonesia and the Netherlands?

The first point is that there are arguments on both sides of the debate over whether West Papua should have gone to Indonesia in 1949. However, in a sense these arguments are irrelevant because the UN-brokered New York Agreement, signed by Indonesia and the Netherlands, guaranteed the West Papuan people the right to self-determination, i.e. it was for them, and no one else, to decide whether they were Indonesian or an independent state.

Under Article 2 of the Agreement, the Dutch handed over West Papua to a temporary UN authority (UNTEA) on Oct. 1, 1962. After seven months the UN then transferred control to Jakarta prior to any act of self-determination.

On the UN's record during its seven month administration of West Papua (Oct. 1, 1962-May 1, 1963), perhaps a couple of comments from the UN officials who were actually there will suffice. The first was made in a confidential letter by the UNTEA Divisional Commissioner for Merauke in December 1962:

"If the date [of our departure] is advanced or if the Agreement is changed doing away with a plebiscite, I do not expect widespread disturbances because we have sufficient forces to control the situation -- a whiff of grapeshot can easily control the situation if that is what UNTEA wants."

The second remark was by the Merauke Commissioner's colleague in charge of Biak:

"I have yet to meet any thinking, sober, generally responsible Papuan who sees any good in the coming link with Indonesia ... Unwelcome as the anxiety and resistance of thinking Papuans maybe it is of course hardly surprising if one is not under pressure to close one's eyes to what is in fact happening to this people at the hands of the three parties to the Agreement."

Whatever one makes of these comments, they hardly describe a situation that today's UN would want to use as a model for future operations.

But returning to the New York Agreement, if one is to pass judgment on its implementation, it is necessary to consider four key articles

Under Article 16, a number of UN experts were to remain in the territory following the transfer of administrative responsibility to Indonesia. Their primary task was to advise and assist the Indonesians in their preparations for Papuan self-determination that was to take place before the end of 1969. But these experts were never deployed because Indonesia objected.

Under Article 22, the UN and Indonesia had to guarantee fully the rights, including the rights of free speech, freedom of movement and of assembly of the Papuans.

These rights were not upheld, even during the UN administration, and with no UN staff in the territory once Jakarta took over, Indonesia was free to act as it pleased. The official 1969 UN report actually admits that the article had not been fully implemented adding "the [Indonesian] Administration exercised at all times a tight political control over the population".

Under Article 17, one year prior to self-determination, the Secretary-General was to appoint a representative who would lead a team of UN officials, including those already stationed in the territory. Their task was to continue and build on the work outlined in Article 16 and remain until the act of self- determination was complete.

A Bolivian diplomat, Ortiz Sanz, was appointed but, as he made clear in his official report, the non-implementation of Article 16 meant that there was no experienced UN staff in the territory for him to lead. Instead he had to make do with a newly arrived team of 16 who were supposed to assist and observe an act of self-determination in a vast territory covering 160,150 square miles.

Under Article 18, all adult Papuans had the right to participate in an act of self-determination to be carried out in accordance with international practice.

This central tenet of the agreement was never implemented. The UN effectively stood by as Indonesia selected 1,022 West Papuans to vote publicly and unanimously in favor of integration with Indonesia. The final wording of the UN report says only that the procedure had been carried out in accordance with "Indonesian", and not "international" practice as specified in the article.

As the writer Simamora concedes, retired UN under-secretary- general Narasimhan Chakravarty has been quoted saying that the Act of Free Choice was "just a whitewash." But what Simamora does not mention is that Narasimhan also adds: "The mood at the UN was to get rid of this problem as quickly as possible ...Nobody gave a thought to the fact that there were a million people there who had their fundamental rights trampled ... How could anyone have seriously believed that all voters unanimously decided to join his (Soeharto's) regime? "

Does Simamora seriously believe this? It certainly appears so. But when has a 100 percent vote of this kind ever been considered as anything but a sham? The answer of course is never. Those 1,022 "representatives" represented nothing but the official will of Jakarta.

Importantly, Narasimhan's claims are backed up repeatedly in recently de-classified documents emerging from the archives of the UN and elsewhere. In one example, a 1968 U.S. Embassy telegram reports that UN representative Ortiz Sanz "concedes that it would be inconceivable from the point of view of the interests of the UN as well as Indonesia, that a result other than the continuance of West (Papua) within Indonesian sovereignty should emerge".

In a further example, a 1969 British document notes that the UN Secretariat in New York "appear only too anxious to get shot of the problem as quickly and smoothly as possible." Another British official at the time commented, "Privately, however, we recognize that the people of West Irian have no desire to be ruled by the Indonesians ... and that the process of consultation did not a allow a genuinely free choice to be made."

To conclude, there is certainly a case for the UN to answer and a review would be the fairest way of doing it. It is surely in the best interests of West Papua, the UN and even Indonesia, that the full facts surrounding the Act of Free Choice be revealed. There is nothing to be gained from maintaining a distorted version of history that can only further distort current efforts to solve the West Papuan issue peacefully.

The writer's forthcoming book is The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover of West Papua 1962-1969 published by Routledge-Curzon.