Basic preconditions for legal aid institutions
Basic preconditions for legal aid institutions
Public debate on conflict of interest evolved as soon as
Golkar announced its plan to set up a legal aid institution early
this month. Sociologist Kastorius Sinaga warns the nation's
dominant political organization against the trap of treating
legal aid as a political commodity.
JAKARTA (JP): As was recently reported by the mass media,
Golkar, the ruling political organization, is expected to
establish a new legal aid institution in the near future. In the
interim both positive and negative views regarding the plan have
arisen. Some observers look on this matter from an upbeat point
of view, reasoning that by establishing a new legal aid
institution Golkar is proving that it wants to reach down to the
poor and help them defend their legal rights without charging
anything in return.
Aside from this positive viewpoint, however, many have put
forward some critical questions. Will Golkar -- which represents
the core of the state's power and has a close relationship with
the state bureaucracy -- really be able to provide legal aid for
the powerless?
Frequently, this majority political group experiences
pressures from government officials or institutions due to the
rapid pace of economic development, a process which normally
tends to exacerbate the exploitation of the powerless majority in
society. Will Golkar -- which is in effect a true political party
based on membership -- provide legal aid free of charge for those
layers of society which otherwise could not afford it,
irrespective of their political affinity or views?
The answer to these questions can only be assessed, in part,
by scrutinizing the world of legal aid services in Indonesia in
particular and the basic preconditions required by this sector in
general.
Compared to the situation prevailing in other countries, the
practice of legal aid services does not have the benefit of a
long tradition in Indonesia. Up to the mid-1970s there were only
a few legal aid institutions in Indonesia. This was due to the
lack of political support on the macro level as well as the lack
of idealistic lawyers who were willing to share their
professional expertise with the poor.
Despite the challenging circumstances caused by the
deterioration of the legal system in Indonesia, exemplified
particularly in the form of extra-judicial practices in various
spheres, most of the legal aid institutions existing at that time
were founded by universities. Those institutions tended to
function more as vehicles to provide training opportunities for
law students. The most popular legal aid institution, which was
independently formed, is the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation
(YLBHI).
In 1978, following a presidential speech, the "Eight Channels
of Distribution" were announced by the government with the main
goal of achieving a more just and more egalitarian society. For
the first time the Indonesian government recognized the principle
of equal opportunities to obtaining legal justice for all. This
policy has led to the founding of numerous legal aid institutions
in Indonesia, particularly by government-sponsored social and
mass organizations.
It is probably justified to say that by establishing legal aid
institutions that were affiliated with existing social
organizations at the time the government actually wanted to
provide an alternative legal aid scheme and simultaneously
strengthen the counter-movement against YLBHI's activities.
However, those government-sponsored legal aid institutions did
not function as expected. Most of the lawyers who worked for
those institutions also had their own law firms and did not have
sufficient time, or idealism, to devote themselves to legal aid
services that were oriented towards helping the poor and
powerless.
Apart from this, the poor people who seek justice through
legal aid tend to refrain from consulting legal aid centers that
are so closely related to the government, for the simple reason
that they regard their lawyers as representatives of the
government and therefore the poor are less inclined to trust
them. As a result, the independent YLBHI, which was founded and
run by such widely known human rights fighters as Adnan Buyung
Nasution and T. Mulya Lubis gradually gained the greatest
popularity among the powerless. Such a condition could be said to
have been the unintended result of the heavy political
engineering efforts launched by the state.
Surely we should welcome Golkar's increasing concern towards
the poor majority in this country as indicated by its effort to
establish a new legal aid center to fight for the legal rights of
the powerless. However, to achieve that goal, some preconditions
should be mentioned.
First, legal conflicts, particularly between the state and
society in the context of development, reflect not merely
judicial aspects but also political ones, including those related
to the execution of power in the field. This means that
litigation activities made through legal aid services should be
supplemented with non-litigation efforts aimed at strengthening
the power controls at all levels.
Second, the aim of the legal aid institutions in question must
go beyond "professional charity" and be directed towards the
advancement of the sense of respect for justice and for human
rights by raising the level of "legal consciousness" or regard
for the law among both government officials and ordinary
citizens.
Third, legal security is among the basic human rights. Legal
assistance, therefore, should be given without respect of
religion, descent, ethnic background, political views and
affinity and socio-cultural background.
I think Golkar should take into account these basic
preconditions. Otherwise time and the society may well determine
that by establishing a new legal aid center Golkar merely wanted
to treat legal aid as a political commodity.
The writer is lecturer at the Post-graduate Program of Social
and Political Sciences of the University of Indonesia, Jakarta.