'Barbarism' won't win peace

'Barbarism' won't win peace

Andi Widjajanto, Center for International Relations Studies,
University of Indonesia, Jakarta

The renewed, massive military operation in Aceh allows us to
assess the conditions under which the Indonesian Military (TNI)
deals with an asymmetric conflict. Only a comprehensive theory
of asymmetric conflict can guide policymakers in building the
necessary forces to implement effective strategic responses.

Military strategies characteristically include direct attack
and "barbarism". Direct attack means the use of the military to
capture or eliminate an adversary's armed forces, to gain control
of that opponent's values. The main goal is to win the war by
destroying the adversary's military capacity to resist.

"Barbarism" is the systematic violation of the just war
doctrine in pursuit of a military or political objective. Its
most important element is depredations against noncombatants.
Unlike other strategies, barbarism has been used to destroy an
adversary's will and capacity to fight. When will is the target
in a counter-insurgency campaign, the strong actor attempts to
deter would-be insurgents through, for instance, a policy of
reprisals against noncombatants. TNI can also target GAM to
sustain an insurgency by, for example, embedding intelligence
operatives deep inside the bureaucracy.

GAM's strategies will typically include direct defense and
guerrilla warfare strategies.

Direct defense refers to the use of armed forces to thwart an
adversary's attempt to capture or destroy possessions such as
territory, population, and strategic resources. Like direct-
attack strategies, these strategies target an opponent's
military. The aim is to damage an adversary's capacity to attack
by crippling its advancing armed forces. Examples include limited
aims strategies, static defense, forward defense, defense in
depth, and mobile defense.

Guerrilla warfare strategy (GWS) is the organization of a
portion of society for the purpose of imposing costs on an
adversary using armed forces trained to avoid direct
confrontation. These costs include the loss of soldiers,
supplies, infrastructure, peace of mind, and most important,
time. Although GWS primarily targets opposing armed forces and
their support resources, its goal is to destroy not the capacity
but the will of the attacker.

GWS requires two elements: (1) physical sanctuary (e.g.,
swamps, mountains, thick forest, or jungle) or political
sanctuary (e.g., weakly defended border areas or border areas
controlled by sympathetic states), and (2) a supportive
population (to supply fighters with intelligence and logistical
support, as well as reinforcements).

The TNI will most likely lose an asymmetric conflict when they
adopt the wrong strategy vis-a-vis their weaker adversaries.
Same-approach interactions -- whether direct-direct or indirect-
indirect -- favor strong actors because they imply shared values,
aims and victory conditions. Opposite-approach interactions
(direct-indirect or indirect-direct) favor weak actors because
they sacrifice values for time. This results in a significant
delay between the commitment of armed forces and the attainment
of objectives. Time then becomes the permissive condition for the
operation of the political vulnerability.

Assuming that (1) the TNI has been trying to combine both
direct and indirect strategies; and (2) GAM is now employing an
indirect defense strategy, we do not need a Clausewitz to predict
that GAM's military maneuver will be difficult to defeat. Of
course, not all or even most asymmetric conflicts need follow
this pattern, but when they do, and when a resort to arms is the
only viable option, how should the TNI react?

One dangerous response would be a temptation to resort to
barbarism, which appears to them to be an effective strategy for
defeating an indirect defense. But even a snapshot of postwar
histories reveals that, at best, barbarism can be effective only
as a military strategy. If the desired objective is a long-term
political control, barbarism invariably backfires.

The French, for example, used torture to quickly defeat
Algerian insurgents in the Battle of Algiers in 1957. But when
French military brutality became public knowledge, it inspired
political opposition to the war in France and stimulated renewed
and intensified resistance by the non-French population of
Algeria. Within four years, France abandoned its claims in
Algeria even though it had "won" the war. Barbarism thus
sacrifices victory in peace for victory in war.

An ideal TNI strategic response in an asymmetric conflict
therefore demands two central elements: (1) preparation of
political and public tolerance for a long war despite the TNI's
material advantages, and (2) the development and deployment of
armed forces specifically equipped and trained for counter-
insurgency operations.

Without more special operations forces -- the self-reliant and
discriminate armed forces necessary to implement an ideal
counterinsurgency strategy -- what began as a military operation
against GAM, essentially an isolated violent minority, will tend
to escalate into a war against an entire ethnic group.