Banish the hope of military reform

Banish the hope of military reform

Kusnanto Anggoro
Senior Researcher
Centre for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS)
Jakarta

As the military's official political role prepares to end in
2004, questions remain as to why the armed forces are withdrawing
from politics and how this will further develop and affect
democratic reform.

While the Indonesian Military (TNI) will remain a power to be
reckoned with, the answers to these questions could very well be
not too positive for democratic consolidation. Perhaps the new
threats to political transition will not come from a direct
involvement of the military in the political process, but from an
antipolitics, yet autonomous military, amid an increasing
militarization of civilian institutions.

Indeed, there are substantial changes which pare down the
TNI's influence.

Since the downfall of Soeharto, active officers have been
prohibited from being elected or appointed to the civilian
government. About 2,000 military representatives have been
removed from central and regional legislatures, as have 3,000 to
4,000 active military officers from the civilian bureaucracy. No
less significant, military officers tried in civilian courts for
human rights abuses subjects them to the rule of law.

In the meantime, there is also an emerging tendency of the
militarization of civilian institutions.

Retired generals in political parties are rising on the
political horizon. The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle
(PDI Perjuangan), the Golkar Party, the National Awakening Party
(PKB) and the National Mandate Party (PAN) have recruited the
generals. Many newly established political parties, such as the
Concern for the Nation Functional Party (PKPB), under the
leadership of former Army chief army Gen. (ret) Hartono, have
emerged out of nowhere.

Many retired generals have also won considerable support as
candidates for the Regional Representatives Councils, and in the
race to select a Golkar presidential candidate, villainous
retired generals reappeared from the woodwork, including Wiranto
and Prabowo Subianto. Meanwhile, senior officers make private
overtures to other candidates as was done in the 1999 elections,
primarily to protect their interests despite the vote's outcome.

The 2004 elections will certainly give more of a militaristic
flavor to government policy. Of course, this is not an indication
that the TNI would again overshadow their civilian counterparts,
nor should it be read as the TNI's grand design to thwart the
democratic process. TNI Headquarters has no official connection
to retired generals any more, although some prominent retired
generals have managed to maintain personal ties with active
generals. In addition, while the military will lose its 38 non-
elected seats in the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) in
2004, its rank and file will not cast their votes in the
elections.

What we see is that the depoliticization of the military is
happening concurrently with the militarization of civilian
institutions. Undoubtedly, this may strengthen the militaristic
predilection in the government. The chief of the Armed Forces is
still a cabinet member, along with the National Police chief.

Throughout 2003, military institutions have appeared to set
the agenda in many policy cases, such as in the draconian Anti-
Terrorism Bill and decisions on emergency rule in Aceh. More
importantly, earlier in the year, generals pushed for a
controversial article in the Military Bill.

Very likely, this militarization tendency will eventually
spread to provincial administrations. Now that the process of
decentralization is well under way, the military's territorial
network could take on a greater significance than ever before.
Initial signs are already ominous. In Central Java, for example,
around half of the 17 members of Muspida, a grouping of top
provincial administrators, are active military officers, and
includes the commanders of the local airfield, mobile brigade,
and military police.

The threat to democracy is that the military leadership may
somehow manipulate it to increase the ambit of its authority
throughout the country. This is plausible, since several figures
in military institutions, including the Ministry of Defense, have
been arguing that the military's role in internal security should
be restored to deal with the threat of separatism and other
security problems. In addition, while the fragmentation of
political power is becoming even more prominent, local politics
will lead to new alliances between regional commanders and
regional power-holders.

Parallel to these developments is the apparent successes of
the TNI at a national level to secure their ideological stance,
historical fixation, corporate interests and, of course,
interests in material power.

Just look at the development of the constitutional amendments.
Especially during the second and third amendments, the military
succeeded in securing their ideological fixations of a unitary
state, total defense and other issues. Inclusion of the Jakarta
Charter in the Preamble (of the 1945 Constitution) failed,
constitutionally maintaining Indonesia as a non-Islamic state.

Even if there was to be another constitutional amendment,
Indonesia will remain a united state (Article 37.5). The Unitary
State of Indonesia under Pancasila (Negara Kesatuan RI
berdasarkan Pancasila) should remain unchangeable.

Article 30 of the amended constitution locks in their doctrine
of total defense (Sistem Hankamrata). All in all, the military
appears to have secured their fixation with the revolutionary
guerrilla doctrine.

At the corporate level, the military appears to be relatively
successful in guaranteeing its impunity and other independent
gestures. The second amendment to the Constitution is non-
retroactivity Article 28I), which thus protects the military from
right abuses it may have committed.

Meanwhile, the report by the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) on
foundations owned by the military were shelved at the House of
Representatives (DPR). In the procurement cases of the Sukhoi
fighters and KAL 35 patrol boats, military authorities dealt
directly with their partners instead of acting merely as
executors of the Ministry of Defense.

Thus, we observe a very interesting trajectory of military
politics in Indonesia. Needless to say, the abolition of military
representation in the legislature is a major step toward
democratic reform. However, this is apparently being balanced out
by a possible increasing role at local levels. There will always
be opportunities through which the military may reassert their
political power.

It is unclear whether the 2004 elections will bring forth a
government that has the intention and capability to further
reform the military. So far, military reform has been internally
induced and as such, it assures nothing as it lacks specifics --
despite the use of terms like "professionalism" and "civilian
supremacy" -- and is simply an attempt to deflect real change in
favor of window dressing.

Everywhere around the globe, the military is, according to
British military historian Michael Howard, "the most conservative
creature in the world" that will only change after it is too
late. Even a widely known reformist general believes that
specific reform measures are a matter for civilian government
alone; that military reform provisions should be part of a
comprehensive and complicated constitutional reform process; and
that entrenched bureaucratic, political and commercial interests
must be reformed before the TNI will consider ceding its power.

Surely, strong and credible political leadership is needed to
impose its will on the military. Unfortunately, this is simply
not on the cards in the 2004 elections. Shall we banish the hope
for military reform?

Kusnanto Anggoro is also a lecturer at the postgraduate studies
program University of Indonesia.