Bali blast: Another investigator's analysis

Bali blast: Another investigator's analysis

Hermawan Sulistyo, Researcher and Investigator, Conflict and Peace
Research Network (CONCERN-324)

How did the police find Amrozi? It is not a fictitious short
story. When the investigators found the registration number of
the car (chassis number KA 611286), the detectives traced the
owner; the car was registered in Jakarta. The car had been taken
to Semarang and sold twice. The vehicle was last registered under
the name of a Christian preacher living in the town of Kudus,
Central Java.

An order was then issued to arrest the preacher. But, before
the squad team dispatched from Semarang arrived in Kudus, local
detectives found the hunted L-300 Mitsubishi car in a repair shop
in the town. This meant that the chassis number found at the
crime scene was fake. Another strategy needed to be adopted.

Meanwhile, a witness reported to the police a suspiciously
parked motorcycle at Musholla Al-Ghuroba, a small prayer house
located in Sanglah, Denpasar. Forensic scanning showed residues
of explosives on the motorcycle. The motorcycle also had three
switches and several cut-off cables that could be used as
alternative devices in the case of the main remote control device
(cell phone Nokia DMC 00455-3) malfunctioning.

I could mention many details of hard evidence, but to make it
short, the finding of the motorcycle led detectives to a used car
showroom (Mitra Motor). Witnesses recognized a Kijang minivan
carrying three people who bought the motorcycle. From the two
chains of transactions, the detectives collected the first pieces
of information on the three persons, strongly suspected to be
perpetrators.

Two of the suspects were determined by their accent to be East
Javanese. Later, they were identified as Amrozi and Ali Imron
a.k.a. Aliq (Amrozi's younger brother). The third person was
Idris, who is still at large. Witnesses helped an artist from
Yogyakarta -- selected from 11 artists invited by investigators
-- to draw the first three sketches (phantom dummies) of the
suspects.

The widely distributed "phantom dummies" were almost raw
sketches, just to "satisfy public curiosity about the
investigation process", while fine phantom dummies were only used
by the detectives to continue their search. But the main question
was still unsolved, who were they?

Detectives started again from the crime scene. The L-300
Mitsubishi car is commonly used as public transportation; and
public transportation vehicles must have a commercial
registration number. After strenuous work to find the number,
which is located at the left back side of the main chassis, the
detectives found the car was indeed first registered as a public
transportation vehicle in Denpasar, the capital of Bali, under
registration number KIR DPR 15463.

The car had been sold six times, with the most recent
registration recorded in Bangli, with its real chassis number KA
011230 and Bali license plate DK 1324 BS. The detectives traced
the ownership of the car, which led them to Amrozi in Lamongan,
East Java. This is why one of the first of Amrozi's statements to
the artist was "the police are smart, because they could find me
here".

In terms of investigation, the arrest of Amrozi was the end.

Next step is to reveal the network and locate other suspects.
One may speculate with abundant intelligence information, media
reports and "scholarly analyses" to construct a broader picture
of terrorist networks.

But improperly questioning the key processes leading to
unraveling such a network is like an innocent bystander who does
not understand the principles behind a moving chain of events
whining about things he does not understand.

It is absolutely impossible for any group of investigators
anywhere in the world to let "independent investigators" have
access to the investigation process without risking obstruction
of the process. An independent investigator crossing the police
line tape at the crime scene may damage hard evidence inside the
tape drawn of the blast radius. How many "investigators" may be
allowed to know the information and have access to evidence?

A simple incident may give some indication of the danger of a
piece of information reaching outsiders. When the detectives
received information about a house suspected of being used by the
perpetrators, they closely watched the house. While surveillance
was carefully done, information leaked out to "investigative
reporters". Immediately, hundreds of them raided the house. Under
such a situation, how could the authorities succeed in chasing
the suspects?

Since investigation is just the first stage of the three
stages, any constraints, obstacles and obstruction of evidence
could harm the next two stages. To avoid such a serious weakness,
the investigating team from D Day+1 decided to establish an
operations center at Wina Cottages, Kuta. The hotel is only 500
meters from the Hard Rock Hotel, where daily media conferences
were held.

At the center, almost 100 detectives and forensic experts
worked round-the-clock. Dozens of key witnesses were questioned
in the operations room of the hotel; some of them stayed -- or
were "courteously detained" -- in rented rooms at the hotel.
Three psychologists helped to ease the tension in order to build
a conducive rapport during interviews.

At the center, there was a room equipped with a lie detector
for questioning key witnesses. Dozens of other witnesses
willingly helped the investigators in the main operations room.
The main reason for them to help the investigators was that their
life has been deeply affected by the bombing. They can all state
whether the investigation was made up, engineered or misleadingly
covered up by the police.

Up until its closure about a month later, no "investigative
reporter" had located the center. Why should I read, watch or
listen to media reports when "investigative reporters" did not
even know the place existed? Swedish Police Commissioner for
Violence Stig Edgvist would be able to speak a bit about the
Indonesian investigators at the center of investigation in Wina
Cottages, since he had a chance to visit the center.

In conclusion, I can guarantee that the Indonesian Police
investigators gave their best performance in the investigation.
But this review is only limited to the first stage of the Bali
blast case, excluding the second and third stages of the case. We
still have to wait and see what ensues to evaluate the second and
third stages of the case.

The writer is also the editor of the recently published Bom
Bali: Buku Putih Tidak Resmi Investigasi Teror Bom Bali (Bali
Bomb: Unofficial White Book of the Investigation into the Bali
Bomb Terror). He was chief investigator of the May 1998 riots and
other major violent conflicts.