Bali blast: Another investigator's analysis

Hermawan Sulistyo, Researcher and Investigator, Conflict and Peace Research Network (CONCERN-324)

How did the police find Amrozi? It is not a fictitious short story. When the investigators found the registration number of the car (chassis number KA 611286), the detectives traced the owner; the car was registered in Jakarta. The car had been taken to Semarang and sold twice. The vehicle was last registered under the name of a Christian preacher living in the town of Kudus, Central Java.

An order was then issued to arrest the preacher. But, before the squad team dispatched from Semarang arrived in Kudus, local detectives found the hunted L-300 Mitsubishi car in a repair shop in the town. This meant that the chassis number found at the crime scene was fake. Another strategy needed to be adopted.

Meanwhile, a witness reported to the police a suspiciously parked motorcycle at Musholla Al-Ghuroba, a small prayer house located in Sanglah, Denpasar. Forensic scanning showed residues of explosives on the motorcycle. The motorcycle also had three switches and several cut-off cables that could be used as alternative devices in the case of the main remote control device (cell phone Nokia DMC 00455-3) malfunctioning.

I could mention many details of hard evidence, but to make it short, the finding of the motorcycle led detectives to a used car showroom (Mitra Motor). Witnesses recognized a Kijang minivan carrying three people who bought the motorcycle. From the two chains of transactions, the detectives collected the first pieces of information on the three persons, strongly suspected to be perpetrators.

Two of the suspects were determined by their accent to be East Javanese. Later, they were identified as Amrozi and Ali Imron a.k.a. Aliq (Amrozi's younger brother). The third person was Idris, who is still at large. Witnesses helped an artist from Yogyakarta -- selected from 11 artists invited by investigators -- to draw the first three sketches (phantom dummies) of the suspects.

The widely distributed "phantom dummies" were almost raw sketches, just to "satisfy public curiosity about the investigation process", while fine phantom dummies were only used by the detectives to continue their search. But the main question was still unsolved, who were they?

Detectives started again from the crime scene. The L-300 Mitsubishi car is commonly used as public transportation; and public transportation vehicles must have a commercial registration number. After strenuous work to find the number, which is located at the left back side of the main chassis, the detectives found the car was indeed first registered as a public transportation vehicle in Denpasar, the capital of Bali, under registration number KIR DPR 15463.

The car had been sold six times, with the most recent registration recorded in Bangli, with its real chassis number KA 011230 and Bali license plate DK 1324 BS. The detectives traced the ownership of the car, which led them to Amrozi in Lamongan, East Java. This is why one of the first of Amrozi's statements to the artist was "the police are smart, because they could find me here".

In terms of investigation, the arrest of Amrozi was the end.

Next step is to reveal the network and locate other suspects. One may speculate with abundant intelligence information, media reports and "scholarly analyses" to construct a broader picture of terrorist networks.

But improperly questioning the key processes leading to unraveling such a network is like an innocent bystander who does not understand the principles behind a moving chain of events whining about things he does not understand.

It is absolutely impossible for any group of investigators anywhere in the world to let "independent investigators" have access to the investigation process without risking obstruction of the process. An independent investigator crossing the police line tape at the crime scene may damage hard evidence inside the tape drawn of the blast radius. How many "investigators" may be allowed to know the information and have access to evidence?

A simple incident may give some indication of the danger of a piece of information reaching outsiders. When the detectives received information about a house suspected of being used by the perpetrators, they closely watched the house. While surveillance was carefully done, information leaked out to "investigative reporters". Immediately, hundreds of them raided the house. Under such a situation, how could the authorities succeed in chasing the suspects?

Since investigation is just the first stage of the three stages, any constraints, obstacles and obstruction of evidence could harm the next two stages. To avoid such a serious weakness, the investigating team from D Day+1 decided to establish an operations center at Wina Cottages, Kuta. The hotel is only 500 meters from the Hard Rock Hotel, where daily media conferences were held.

At the center, almost 100 detectives and forensic experts worked round-the-clock. Dozens of key witnesses were questioned in the operations room of the hotel; some of them stayed -- or were "courteously detained" -- in rented rooms at the hotel. Three psychologists helped to ease the tension in order to build a conducive rapport during interviews.

At the center, there was a room equipped with a lie detector for questioning key witnesses. Dozens of other witnesses willingly helped the investigators in the main operations room. The main reason for them to help the investigators was that their life has been deeply affected by the bombing. They can all state whether the investigation was made up, engineered or misleadingly covered up by the police.

Up until its closure about a month later, no "investigative reporter" had located the center. Why should I read, watch or listen to media reports when "investigative reporters" did not even know the place existed? Swedish Police Commissioner for Violence Stig Edgvist would be able to speak a bit about the Indonesian investigators at the center of investigation in Wina Cottages, since he had a chance to visit the center.

In conclusion, I can guarantee that the Indonesian Police investigators gave their best performance in the investigation. But this review is only limited to the first stage of the Bali blast case, excluding the second and third stages of the case. We still have to wait and see what ensues to evaluate the second and third stages of the case.

The writer is also the editor of the recently published Bom Bali: Buku Putih Tidak Resmi Investigasi Teror Bom Bali (Bali Bomb: Unofficial White Book of the Investigation into the Bali Bomb Terror). He was chief investigator of the May 1998 riots and other major violent conflicts.