'Axis of evil' rhetoric based on irrefutable logic

Francis Fukuyama, The Daily Yomiuri, Asia News Network, Tokyo

U.S. President George W. Bush's reference to an "axis of evil" during his Jan. 29 State of the Union address immediately raised outrage from the three countries named as part of the axis -- Iraq, Iran and North Korea -- as well as expressions of concern from U.S. allies, from Western Europe to Japan and South Korea.

The U.S., it is feared, is running off again unilaterally, a rogue "cowboy" about to take destabilizing military action against 'enemies" while refusing to take part in peaceful cooperative projects like combating global warming or promoting the development of poor countries. It brings to mind former U.S. president Ronald Reagan's famous reference in the 1980s to the Soviet Union as an "evil empire," also denounced at the time as a simplistic and dangerous expression of American moralism.

Yet within a decade of Reagan's remark, the Soviet Union had indeed imploded, largely because its own inhabitants agreed with his judgment about the evilness of their regime. Reagan was able to see a simple truth that eluded sophisticated foreign policy experts. Could something similar be going on with Bush?

There must be a well-thought-out logic behind his rhetoric, which is not as dangerous as many assume, but also one that needs to be taken very seriously by both U.S. allies and opponents.

The Sept. 11 attacks demonstrated the U.S.' extreme vulnerability to what are now labeled "asymmetric threats" from terrorist groups, and the need to at times act preemptively to defeat them. But the war in Afghanistan demonstrated something else: The U.S. has an unprecedented advantage in political, military and economic power that can be used to dramatic effect.

When military action began in early October, many argued that the U.S. would get bogged down in Afghanistan. Yet, within three months, the U.S. intervention brought about a complete regime change in Afghanistan and eliminated that country as a base for al-Qaeda terrorist operations, at the cost of a single combat casualty. The "revolution" in military affairs has finally borne fruit. Using advanced sensors and navigation systems, the U.S. can bring pinpoint fire on remote targets halfway around the world. No other country in the world comes close to having this capability.

This demonstration of military power is, of course, why many of the U.S.' friends, not to mention its opponents, are worried. It does indeed open up military options in places like the Gulf and the Korean Peninsula, but it does not necessarily presage unilateral attacks on the countries that are the "axis of evil."

The one country on that list that the U.S. is in fact likely to move against is Iraq. A strong case can be made tying Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's government to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and a foiled plot by convicted terrorist Ramzi Youssef to blow up a dozen jetliners across the Pacific in 1995.

Such a U.S. intervention would not be easy. Unlike Afghanistan, a new campaign against Iraq would find the U.S. bereft of allies. Within the Middle East, Washington's Arab friends have expressed open opposition. The operation would not have the support of Saudi Arabia (which was a crucial staging ground for the Gulf War) and would have to be carried out from Kuwait and Turkey. Russia and China are not enthusiastic, and the Europeans have all expressed skepticism about the need for military action.

A lot of this opposition will melt away under the right circumstances. Arab regimes like those in Egypt and Saudi Arabia are most worried about an unsuccessful intervention that, like the 1991 Gulf War, leaves Saddam in place while exposing them to anti-American hostility from their own people. If the U.S. could change the regime in Baghdad as quickly as it changed the one in Kabul, much of this opposition would turn to quiet support.

The political calculation about whether to proceed against Iraq rests on the likelihood of military success for a renewed campaign. The military power demonstrated in Afghanistan changes the equation, though by how much is difficult to say. Pentagon may be studying this question very carefully and that if it comes up with a reasonable battle plan there may well be a new war.

This conclusion is upsetting to many. But if Saddam is not evil and dangerous, who is? The leader has launched two unprovoked wars against his neighbors, used poison gas against his own people, run one of the most repressive police states in the world, and likely possesses biological and nuclear weapons.

What about Iran and North Korea? Here I think the Bush administration's calculation is very different.

Iran stands out because it is clearly on the route toward democratic change. There are hard-line factions within the government; there is also clear popular opposition to the theocratic regime.

The question for the U.S. is: If you want to encourage democratic change in a country like Iran, do you make diplomatic openings to the existing regime? Or do you stand resolutely against the conservatives, and give Iranians some motivation for changing their policies and ultimately their regime? The latter would be the smarter policy, and that a similar calculation underlies Iran's inclusion in the "axis of evil."

The White House has been flooded with messages of support from ordinary Iranians since Bush's address, in contrast to Tehran's frosty official reaction. The conservatives in Iran have thus been put on notice that the U.S. expects change, but will not necessarily exert military pressure.

This leaves North Korea. Pyongyang also runs a repressive police state that has been responsible for starving its own people, and has been acquiring weapons of mass destruction as well as the missiles with which to deliver them. It thus qualifies as "evil."

Yet North Korea is much less likely than Iraq to initiate terrorist attacks on the U.S. or other countries, and has enormous military forces poised across the border from South Korea. South Korea has actively been seeking rapprochement with the North. And its administration has been very upset with Washington for taking a more belligerent line.

I suspect that, as with Iran, Bush's mention of North Korea was intended not as a precursor of military action, but rather as a signal to Pyongyang that the U.S. has new options and that it could not expect to play its old game of extracting aid by ratcheting up tensions any longer. If Seoul wants to play "good cop," Washington will play the "bad cop," a partnership that is more likely to produce a tractable North Korea than Kim's "sunshine policy" is on its own.

The "axis of evil" speech will mark a major turning point in U.S. foreign policy and the beginning of a more active phase of its involvement in world politics. While the U.S. will find less international support in this phase than in the initial "war against terrorism," it still cannot act alone.

The level of support it receives for action against Iraq will depend on the diplomacy in which it engages following Bush's visit to Asia. What is denounced by some as "unilateralism" could better be described by others as "leadership," that is, the shaping of the international environment in ways more conducive to long-term peace and stability.

The Sept. 11 attacks indicated that a passive policy that did nothing to clean up festering pockets of instability does not necessarily produce security, and that there are times when bolder action is required.