Avoid past mistakes if military option inevitabel

Avoid past mistakes if military option inevitabel

Sidney Jones, Indonesia Project Director, International Crisis Group,
Jakarta

The government may have given Free Aceh Movement (GAM) an
ultimatum on Monday to lay down its arms and accept autonomy or
else, but in fact the "or else" has already begun. Both sides are
mounting attacks, armed clashes are frequent, and there are no
monitors in the field to document what's going on. The question
is not whether military operations will begin in two weeks but
whether those underway will be significantly increased.

GAM bears a significant share of the blame, though by no means
all of it, for the unraveling of the Dec. 9 agreement. But
International Crisis Group (ICG) has repeatedly warned that a
military approach alone will not solve this conflict and indeed
may strengthen support for GAM, especially if civilian casualties
are high. There is a flicker of hope that negotiations will
resume, but if, in the end, they collapse, it does not mean that
the use of force will be any more successful in ending the
rebellion.

At the same time, no government willingly tolerates a
guerrilla movement on its soil. If the Megawati government cannot
persuade GAM, through negotiation or co-optation, to abandon its
armed struggle, the brakes on the military will come off.

In that case, the government will need to avoid repeating the
mistakes it has made in the past in conducting security
operations, if it is going to have any chance of rebuilding
credibility and trust in Aceh.

Ten steps the government might consider are as follows:

* Publish rules of engagement.

Civilians, not just soldiers, should understand clearly what
the rules of engagement are, and these should be published in the
national and local media and disseminated as widely as possible
through other means.

* Don't use Mobile Brigade (Brimob)

Over the last three years in Aceh, Brimob has developed an
unenviable reputation for abusive behavior. Its members tend to
be younger, with less training and experience, than soldiers, and
their commanders appear to be unable to prevent their preying on
civilians when they are not engaged in combat. A significant
Brimob presence is likely not only to deepen resentment of the
local population, but also to blur the distinction between the
Army and police. The government should reconsider any plans to
augment Indonesian Military (TNI) forces there with Brimob
troops.

* Give neutral and impartial humanitarian organizations access
to the injured, displaced, and detained and to areas where
conflict has made it difficult for people to obtain basic goods
and services.

* Keep conflict areas open to journalists and independent
observers.

The standard practice for military operations in the past has
been to shut down conflict areas tightly, making it difficult for
journalists and independent observers to go in or for local
people to get information out. The idea of "embedding"
journalists has not taken root in Indonesia. Clearly there are
security risks involved, but transparency should be encouraged
wherever possible.

* Don't use civilian auxiliaries or militias. If military
operations are launched, it should be fully uniformed and
identifiable soldiers who do the fighting. Too often in the
past, the military has made use of local civilians in an effort
to avoid accountability or portray the conflict as tantamount to
a civil war. Not only does this encourage abuse but it also
creates long-term problems with post-conflict reconciliation.

* Keep conduct of military operations subject to regular and
frequent review by civilians. Both the provincial parliament in
Banda Aceh and the national parliament in Jakarta have a role
here in having hearings that involve both government officials
and respected civilians living in affected areas.

* Ensure that the budget and operating expenses for military
operations are fully transparent. The lack of such openness in
the past has led to suspicions of skimming and a belief that one
side benefit of war is profit for some of those concerned. Such
suspicions could be eased by a commitment to a thorough audit by
a neutral accounting body of the costs of the operations.

* Protect human rights and humanitarian workers.

The TNI White Book has made clear that the military believes
that separatists often try to use human rights organizations as a
cover. If law enforcement officials in Aceh have reasonable
grounds for suspecting an individual is engaged in a crime, they
can arrest the suspect and make public the charges. But military
operations must not become a pretext, as they too often have in the past,
for the intimidation, arrest, or even occasionally, killing, of individuals
trying to document rights violations or provide humanitarian assistance to
affected populations.

* Prosecute violators of human rights and international
humanitarian law.

There is no question that GAM is also responsible for serious
abuses and has not effectively disciplined its own ranks. But as
the Indonesian government contemplates launching intensified
operations, it should make a clear commitment to investigate
reports of human rights violations by security forces and
prosecute where appropriate. The recent statement by the Army
chief of staff that those responsible for Papua rebel Theys
Eluay's murder were "heroes" does not inspire confidence.

* Root out corruption in the security forces. GAM apparently
continues to get the majority of its weapons from corrupt sources
within the TNI and police. The Indonesian government could make
major strides toward demilitarization, not just in Aceh but
elsewhere in Indonesia, by stepping up efforts to monitor
inventories of weapons and ammunition and stem the leakage from
military sources.

The Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security stressed
on Monday that the government was undertaking a three-pronged
strategy of humanitarian efforts, law enforcement, and
improvement of local governance. Aceh would benefit from a focus
on these areas. The problem in the past has been that whenever
military force has been added to the mix, all other objectives
have been swamped.