Australia, RI still need to overcome distrust

Australia, RI still need to overcome distrust

Hilman Adil, Research Professor, Indonesian Institute of Sciences
(LIPI), Jakarta

In an apparent effort to improve the troubled relationship
between Indonesia and Australia, the visit of Australia's Prime
Minister next month should be assessed in the wider context of
the global situation, and the Asia-Pacific region in particular.

After the crisis in East Timor in 1999, Indonesian-Australian
relations plunged to the lowest point in its history. As
Indonesia canceled official visits by president B.J. Habibie and
other officials and attacks on Australia became common in the
Indonesian media, the Australian government came face-to-face
with the consequences of soured relations with its neighbor.

The business community raised concerns over the future of
bilateral trade. Some academics in Australia questioned the
government's commitment to the Southeast Asian region. Decision-
makers in Canberra pondered the added difficulties that an
openly- hostile Indonesia would add to Australia's already-
delicate regional diplomacy. Countries in Southeast Asia
questioned whether the worsening of Australia's relations with
Indonesia represented a shift in its regional policy.

The Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper, released in
September 1997,listed Indonesia as one of Australia's foremost
bilateral relationships, alongside the United States, China, and
Japan. Thave been many in both countries who have sought to
improve what has been a troubled relationship.

But despite these efforts, Australian attitudes towards
Indonesia are influenced by the fear of a foreign invasion that
has been consistent throughout the nation's history. The
historian Werner Levi once wrote: "In all Australian debates on
foreign relations there has always been an undertone of fear
which breaks out at the slightest provocation. Fear is the
leitmotif of Australian thinking on foreign policy and
Australians never lack a potential aggressor".

Descriptions of Indonesia's 200 million plus population, its
low levels of political and economic development and its status
as the world's largest Muslim nation especially after Sept. 11,
all play deeply on the Australian people fears of Asia.

The images and metaphors used to describe Indonesian society
and assumptions about differences in national character reflect a
persistent negative view of Indonesia. Or as Desmond Ball put it,
but not necessarily in a negative sense: "Although geography has
placed us next door to each other, we are in many significant
respects strangers". Prime Minister John Howard, asserted more
extremely that Australia is "a European, Western civilization
with strong links to North America", Australians no longer have
to fret about whether they are part of Asia.

They can participate in regional affairs on their own terms.
He concluded that a more muscular Australia, confident of its
values and identity and willing to fulfill the responsibility to
defending these values in the Southeast Asia region, has already
proved its bona fides through the East Timor intervention.

This view forms the core of the "Howard Doctrine" and was
reflected in the 1999 white paper on defense. In an interview
published by The Bulletin on Sept. 20, 1999, he sees Australia
acting in a short of "deputy" capacity to the global policeman
role of the United States.

It was a time when Australia was in a self-congratulatory and
self-satisfied mode in the context of its East Timor peacekeeping
operations. On whether Australia should see itself as an Asia-
Pacific country, the coalition government under Howard differed
in its orientation with previous Labor policy which allegedly
distanced itself from its traditional allies, particularly the
U.S.

The Howard government seems more inclined to agree with Samuel
Huntington who went so far as to suggest that Labor's policy was
in danger of turning Australia into a "torn country". According
to Huntington, Australia was disengaging from its Western
orientation and was moving into the Asian sphere.

From the perspective of his "clash of civilizations" thesis,
this meant that Australia was attempting to straddle the
civilization divide and such an approach was bound to bring
significant tensions and conflict.

It is not clear what Prime Minister Howard is trying to
accomplish during his visit, apart from an effort to improve the
troubled relationship between the two countries by removing some
misunderstandings in the past where the politics of identity
played an important role. The question is whether differences in
social-culture which is regarded as a problem could be overcome
by increasing high-level contacts and in deepening the
relationship, or in Gareth Evans' words, putting ballast in the
relationship.

The idea that understanding is related to the dissemination of
information to skeptical circles in both countries and regular
contacts between the political elites, ignores the emotional and
irrational aspects of the politics of identity. It also ignores
the ways in which domestic politics can dissipate the goodwill
built up in the bilateral relationship if situations prescribe
that political capital can be gained by attacking it or
manipulating it.

For example, if political parties or social organizations are
resorting to "patriotic" assertions of national identity.

In this visit the Prime Minister should therefore underline a
relationship which is based on shared interests and mutual
respect. These principles will provide the basis for a realistic
framework for the relationship between Indonesia and Australia,
and offer the best prospects to maximize shared economic
interests, advance both countries' political and strategic
interests, and manage differences in a sensible and practical
way.

These policies and actions are to show Indonesia that the
strategic outcomes the Howard government will pursue are
consistent with Indonesia developing a key role in regional,
economic, and security issues commensurate with its strategic
location in the region.

The foreign policy objective of any Indonesian government has
been the need to become a unified and internally stable country,
which can produce a more productive, realistic, and sustainable
relationship between the two countries.

There is, however, a cluster of opinion in Australia which
believes that Indonesia's obstacle will be the serious internal
problems it is facing: Corruption, unemployment, and political
instability. They also argue that unless Indonesia can overcome
these problems it would be difficult to expect a bright future.

This cluster of opinion which would like to see a prosperous
and internally stable Indonesia argues that in pursuit of these
goals it will also alter the nature of its society and the
regional order.

They point to the growing interdependence and the continued
economic dynamism of the Asia-Pacific region, despite the Asian
crisis, as the most direct route to attaining prosperity and
power. The incentives for Indonesia to foster these
interdependent links are through regimes promoting trade
liberalization, regional stability, and greater understanding.
Asia-Pacific institutions, like APEC, the ASEAN Regional Forum
and others, provided that no other crisis will occur, might all
gain in strength and effectiveness.

These interdependencies and the regimes that advance them are
judged to be more important than the sporadic tensions and
conflicts that flare up in the region.