Australia, Indonesia starting again

Australia, Indonesia starting again

By Damien Kingsbury and Scott Burchill

SYDNEY (JP): As a consequence of Indonesia's slaughter of the
civilian population of East Timor, Australia now faces its
greatest diplomatic and defense crisis in living memory.

Three decades of work developing closer economic, political
and defense ties in an effort to enhance the security and
prosperity of both countries has been destroyed within
one week. Australia now stands poised to commit troops to a
territory which since 1985 both Canberra and Jakarta have
regarded as legally belonging to the latter.

Australia's leadership of an imminent multilateral
peacekeeping force in East Timor will completely change the
fundamental basis of its bilateral relationship with Indonesia.

Perhaps what has most shocked Australians, at both a popular
and elite level, is that despite guaranteeing security, the
Indonesian Military (TNI) has actively engaged in a campaign of
mass slaughter and social dislocation in East Timor.

This was initially undertaken by the so-called militias in
East Timor, which were proxies established by the TNI following
President Habibie's announcement earlier this year of a
referendum on self-determination for the territory.

However, it had been clear for months that these
militia were trained, led and supplied by TNI, while the police
entrusted with maintaining law and order turned a blind eye to
their atrocious behavior. Any pretense of the situation being
otherwise was abandoned in the days following the announcement
that the people of East Timor had overwhelmingly rejected
Jakarta's offer of special autonomy within the Republic of
Indonesia.

Chief among the TNI's reasons for its bloody response to the
ballot is the Army's loss of face over the clear rejection of its
24 years of involvement in East Timor. East Timor is also being
used as a lesson to other provinces considering independence, a
policy which is linked to the TNI's self-proclaimed role in
maintaining the unity of the state.

And finally, both TNI and Indonesia's political elites retain
major economic interests in the territory, which they are loath
to relinquish.

The actions of TNI in East Timor show that, following the
upheavals associated with the resignation of president Soeharto,
it is again a unified force intent on imposing its will in
domestic politics. It also shows up the weakness of Habibie as
President, reflecting TNI chief Gen. Wiranto's own "nationalist"
vision for political development in Indonesia -- perhaps we are
witnessing a replay of the events of 1957?

Such a vision appears to include the appointment of
Megawati Soekarnoputri, head of the most popular party from the
recent elections, as a figurehead president, with Wiranto
exercising real political control.

Despite the spectacle of democratization in the June
elections, the idea of a genuinely representative or reformist
government in Indonesia clearly has shallow foundations.
Reflecting the history and style of the major political players,
Indonesia remains the political playground of its elites.

The country's political underdevelopment leaves little space
for meaningful public participation in the political process, and
does not welcome any regional assertions of separation.

Little has changed in Indonesia since the 1950s. Ordinary
Indonesians remain excluded from political participation, while
the unitary state, which is tightly controlled from the center,
remains a precarious construction.

Separatist ambitions continue in Aceh, West Papua,
Ambon, Riau and elsewhere -- even among some in Bali! By denying
groups in the outer provinces any right to determine their own
political destinies, the Javanese are ensuring that Indonesia
remains a fragile entity.

The slaughter in East Timor also represents an enormous moral
and strategic failure for Australia. Three decades of obsequious
fawning and appeasement toward Jakarta have resulted in the
complete collapse of Canberra's foreign and defense policy.

Closer military ties between Australia's armed forces and TNI,
symbolized by joint training exercises and the secretly
negotiated 1997 Australia-Indonesia Security Agreement, have
given Australia no influence whatsoever -- civilizing or
strategic -- over Indonesian security forces. Indonesia's
generals are no longer acceptable partners in any security
alliance, a situation unlikely to change until TNI forswears it's
dual function and is firmly placed under civilian control.

The undue influence of the Jakarta lobby within the foreign
affairs bureaucracy must also come to an end. By placing a
premium on "stability" within the Indonesian archipelago and
deeper economic relations with Jakarta, Canberra ignored the
ethical implications of close ties with a repressive
dictatorship.

The lobby's "big picture" meant ignoring Jakarta's human
rights abuses and public concern about them, distorting the
history of Soeharto's rise to power, and subjugating the legal
rights of the East Timorese.

A normal bilateral relationship now depends on an honest
review of this unfortunate history and the realization that
political and territorial boundaries, even in this part of the
world, are never immutable.

In any account of Australia's future regional relations, it
will have to factor in dealing with what will soon become an
independent East Timor. Australia will sometimes need to tread
lightly in this new relationship for fear of confronting
Indonesia, yet provide as much friendship and financial
assistance as possible. Blood cannot be measured in dollars or
goodwill, but the responsibility born of complicity is great.

Canberra will have an important role to play in brokering
relations between a shattered East Timor and its suspicious giant
neighbor. This will call on Australia's best diplomatic skills
and, if handled poorly as in the past, could lead to further
tragedy in East Timor, not to mention major problems between
Australia and Indonesia.

Handled well, however, it could showcase the more
sophisticated diplomacy Australia deployed in bringing to
fruition the UN settlement of Cambodia's civil war.

It is clear that Australia's relationship with Indonesia has
irrevocably changed. In steering a new direction, one based on
honesty, realism and morality, Australia cannot afford to slip
back into the sycophancy, appeasement and analytical poverty
which characterized the last 25 years.

Dr. Damien Kingsbury is executive officer of the Monash Asia
Institute. Dr. Scott Burchill is an expert on Australian foreign
relations from the school of Australian and International Studies
at Deakin University.