Australia-Australia ties: Surviving through a crisis

Siswo Pramono, Graduate Program, School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University, Canberra

Indonesian-Australian relations have endured three years of crisis. The formative events in the deterioration of ties include the Asian economic meltdown, the East Timor crisis, the Afghani and Iraqi refugee crisis, and last but not least the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks that triggered the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan. Each event has brought consequences for Indonesian- Australian relations.

The friendship between former Australian prime minister Paul Keating and former president Soeharto greatly contributed to the previous stability of the partnership, to the extent that then foreign minister Gareth Evans assumed "only a very large storm would seriously disturb it". The Asian economic crisis proved to be a storm of sufficient size.

In 1998, the crisis brought down both Soeharto and Indonesia's political posturing. Soeharto was a leviathan nurtured by the West's Cold War politics. He interpreted the concentric circle of Indonesian foreign policy from the perspective of a Javanese prince, that Indonesia (ie. Java) was pusering bumi, a center of political gravity, which was vital to the interests of the Western powers, including Australia. It was during his time in power that Indonesia assumed a vital leadership role in the South East Asian region and beyond.

The ensuing Indonesian leaders -- B.J. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Soekarnoputri -- have been preoccupied with the struggle for the survival of the country and their respective terms in office. As a result, Indonesia has lost its confidence and determination in the conduct of foreign policy.

Paul Keating was a leader at a time when Australia was considered, in the words of Samuel P. Huntington (1996), a "torn state": A Western country in Asia, confused about where to stand. For Keating, geopolitical matters, and hence a true Australian identity, had to be pursued through a republican form of government, by breaking away from the British monarchy. He then sought to strengthen Australia's links with Asia, particularly Indonesia.

The former journalist Ratih Hardjono attempted to show in her 1993 book, White Tribe of Asia, that Australia had an identity of its own, one that was no longer dependent on England and Europe. She also implied that the Hawke/ Keating approach to regional security respected the vital regional role assumed by Indonesia. This Australian approach to security was in fact influenced by the Asian way of promoting consensus rather than "drastic measures."

The "drastic measure" was introduced by John Howard in his East Timor policy. Australia's "military intervention", following the total destruction of Dili in 1999, was a turning point in the "normal" relations between Indonesia and Australia. If, for more than a century, Australia believed the myth that threats (the "yellow peril", military invasion, etc.) came from the north, it was now Indonesia who believed the threat could come from the south. Australia's modern armed forces, designed for a forward defense, proved to have better maneuvering capacity than that of the poorly armed TNI, which is designed for internal security.

For many in Indonesia, neglecting the fact that Australian involvement in East Timor was supported by the international community and undertaken in careful consultation with the Indonesian government, the East Timor case marked the demise of the friendly Hawke/Keating's regional security approach and the birth of the more assertive "Howard doctrine".

For John Howard, a monarchist who believes that Australia is a Western civilization with strong links to North America, Australia's security must be based on a traditional Anglo- American alliance. Australian values are not Asian values. Therefore, as experts have pointed out, Howard would not strive for a good relationship with Indonesia at the expense of jeopardising Australian values.

Australia's assertiveness has caused anxiety among Indonesians, particularly Australia's growing reliance on military means. While the wound of East Timor was still bleeding, Australia deployed naval and air forces as close as 30 nautical miles off Java in an attempt to "blockade" the incoming Afghani and Iraqi refugees (or illegal immigrants in Australia's terms) from the Indonesian archipelago. Worse, Australian unilateralism, rather than "consensual bilateralism", which spearheaded its policy on the Tampa case, was considered by Indonesia as a diplomatic fait accompli.

As Australia resorted again to military means by joining the war in Afghanistan, the impact of Sept. 11 has complicated further the fragile bilateral relationship. Unconsciously, opinion makers in both countries have misled the two societies and caused hostility between Australia, which is Western, and Indonesia, which is Asian and Islamic. While the two countries are committed to combating terrorism, each has accused the other of not acting appropriately.

Consequently, three decades of stable bilateral ties have given way to fragile, if not dangerous, relations. Nonetheless, it is wrong to assume that the future of the bilateral relationship is bleak. On the contrary, Indonesia and Australia are now moving from decades of stable but suppressed relations into an era of dynamic, honest and egalitarian ties.

As new surprises are likely to arise, the two countries must formulate a better strategy to strengthen their long-standing ties.

While identity matters, it must be viewed in a more positive way. The protracted debate about Western and Asian ways is no longer relevant. Anti-Western and anti-Asian mentalities equally represent a backwardness that must be abolished. The main issue now is how to live with this difference, how to accept it as an opportunity for multiculturalism, and how to use it as the foundation of a more pluralistic bilateral relationship.

These pluralistic relations must be based on practicalities rather than sentiments. While working to ease many potential difficulties, each country must formulate policies toward the other based on openness, in a concerted effort to build a more constructive agenda.

Positive thinking would help to frame a more optimistic foreign policy. For instance, from now on, it is time to see the East Timor case not as a loss for Indonesia and a gain for Australia, but as a united step to promote human rights, democracy and peace in the region.

All in all, Indonesian-Australian relations have not escaped controversies, disputes and crisis, but these must not prevent the two sides from developing a broader and deeper engagement. Indonesia is now engaging in "total diplomacy" to help free itself from the multi-dimensional crisis. Australia is implementing "positive realism" to assert its constructive role in the region and beyond. With a little more creativity, both sides could match the two approaches in the pursuit of shared interests, mutual respect and common understanding.