Australia-Australia ties: Surviving through a crisis

Australia-Australia ties: Surviving through a crisis

Siswo Pramono, Graduate Program, School of Social Sciences,
The Australian National University, Canberra

Indonesian-Australian relations have endured three years of
crisis. The formative events in the deterioration of ties include
the Asian economic meltdown, the East Timor crisis, the Afghani
and Iraqi refugee crisis, and last but not least the Sept. 11
terrorist attacks that triggered the U.S.-led invasion of
Afghanistan. Each event has brought consequences for Indonesian-
Australian relations.

The friendship between former Australian prime minister Paul
Keating and former president Soeharto greatly contributed to the
previous stability of the partnership, to the extent that then
foreign minister Gareth Evans assumed "only a very large storm
would seriously disturb it". The Asian economic crisis proved to
be a storm of sufficient size.

In 1998, the crisis brought down both Soeharto and Indonesia's
political posturing. Soeharto was a leviathan nurtured by the
West's Cold War politics. He interpreted the concentric circle of
Indonesian foreign policy from the perspective of a Javanese
prince, that Indonesia (ie. Java) was pusering bumi, a center of
political gravity, which was vital to the interests of the
Western powers, including Australia. It was during his time in
power that Indonesia assumed a vital leadership role in the South
East Asian region and beyond.

The ensuing Indonesian leaders -- B.J. Habibie, Abdurrahman
Wahid and Megawati Soekarnoputri -- have been preoccupied with
the struggle for the survival of the country and their respective
terms in office. As a result, Indonesia has lost its confidence
and determination in the conduct of foreign policy.

Paul Keating was a leader at a time when Australia was
considered, in the words of Samuel P. Huntington (1996), a "torn
state": A Western country in Asia, confused about where to stand.
For Keating, geopolitical matters, and hence a true Australian
identity, had to be pursued through a republican form of
government, by breaking away from the British monarchy. He then
sought to strengthen Australia's links with Asia, particularly
Indonesia.

The former journalist Ratih Hardjono attempted to show in her
1993 book, White Tribe of Asia, that Australia had an identity of
its own, one that was no longer dependent on England and Europe.
She also implied that the Hawke/ Keating approach to regional
security respected the vital regional role assumed by Indonesia.
This Australian approach to security was in fact influenced by
the Asian way of promoting consensus rather than "drastic
measures."

The "drastic measure" was introduced by John Howard in his
East Timor policy. Australia's "military intervention", following
the total destruction of Dili in 1999, was a turning point in the
"normal" relations between Indonesia and Australia. If, for more
than a century, Australia believed the myth that threats (the
"yellow peril", military invasion, etc.) came from the north, it
was now Indonesia who believed the threat could come from the
south. Australia's modern armed forces, designed for a forward
defense, proved to have better maneuvering capacity than that of
the poorly armed TNI, which is designed for internal security.

For many in Indonesia, neglecting the fact that Australian
involvement in East Timor was supported by the international
community and undertaken in careful consultation with the
Indonesian government, the East Timor case marked the demise of
the friendly Hawke/Keating's regional security approach and the
birth of the more assertive "Howard doctrine".

For John Howard, a monarchist who believes that Australia is a
Western civilization with strong links to North America,
Australia's security must be based on a traditional Anglo-
American alliance. Australian values are not Asian values.
Therefore, as experts have pointed out, Howard would not strive
for a good relationship with Indonesia at the expense of
jeopardising Australian values.

Australia's assertiveness has caused anxiety among
Indonesians, particularly Australia's growing reliance on
military means. While the wound of East Timor was still bleeding,
Australia deployed naval and air forces as close as 30 nautical
miles off Java in an attempt to "blockade" the incoming Afghani
and Iraqi refugees (or illegal immigrants in Australia's terms)
from the Indonesian archipelago. Worse, Australian unilateralism,
rather than "consensual bilateralism", which spearheaded its
policy on the Tampa case, was considered by Indonesia as a
diplomatic fait accompli.

As Australia resorted again to military means by joining the
war in Afghanistan, the impact of Sept. 11 has complicated
further the fragile bilateral relationship. Unconsciously,
opinion makers in both countries have misled the two societies
and caused hostility between Australia, which is Western, and
Indonesia, which is Asian and Islamic. While the two countries
are committed to combating terrorism, each has accused the other
of not acting appropriately.

Consequently, three decades of stable bilateral ties have
given way to fragile, if not dangerous, relations. Nonetheless,
it is wrong to assume that the future of the bilateral
relationship is bleak. On the contrary, Indonesia and Australia
are now moving from decades of stable but suppressed relations
into an era of dynamic, honest and egalitarian ties.

As new surprises are likely to arise, the two countries must
formulate a better strategy to strengthen their long-standing
ties.

While identity matters, it must be viewed in a more positive
way. The protracted debate about Western and Asian ways is no
longer relevant. Anti-Western and anti-Asian mentalities equally
represent a backwardness that must be abolished. The main issue
now is how to live with this difference, how to accept it as an
opportunity for multiculturalism, and how to use it as the
foundation of a more pluralistic bilateral relationship.

These pluralistic relations must be based on practicalities
rather than sentiments. While working to ease many potential
difficulties, each country must formulate policies toward the
other based on openness, in a concerted effort to build a more
constructive agenda.

Positive thinking would help to frame a more optimistic
foreign policy. For instance, from now on, it is time to see the
East Timor case not as a loss for Indonesia and a gain for
Australia, but as a united step to promote human rights,
democracy and peace in the region.

All in all, Indonesian-Australian relations have not escaped
controversies, disputes and crisis, but these must not prevent
the two sides from developing a broader and deeper engagement.
Indonesia is now engaging in "total diplomacy" to help free
itself from the multi-dimensional crisis. Australia is
implementing "positive realism" to assert its constructive role
in the region and beyond. With a little more creativity, both
sides could match the two approaches in the pursuit of shared
interests, mutual respect and common understanding.