Australia and Indonesia: Mutual confusion
By Dewi Anggraeni
MELBOURNE (JP): Picture the following events: Australia's media reported on atrocities in East Timor. Its prime minister pushed for a referendum. Very little moved.
The United States stirred and suggested that the referendum was a good idea. The suggestion struck a responsive chord and Indonesia's President agreed to hold the referendum.
Australia's prime minister announced proudly that it was his letter to Indonesia's President that finally convinced him.
The referendum was conducted successfully, meaning no violence occurred the whole day. After that, however, violence returned with a vengeance for weeks on end. International media, Australia's included, reported the atrocities.
In Indonesia, only Australia was targeted as a hostile country.
The United States defense secretary came to Indonesia, and without using euphemistic terms, launched the threat that unless its military acceded to the United Nations' demands, the country would suffer dire consequences. Strong words. The naive and the innocent waited with baited breath for a retaliation from Indonesia, such as threats to sever diplomatic ties at least.
Hello, they are still waiting.
In the meantime, Australia's involvement in the International Force for East Timor (Interfet) runs the risk of pushing the federal budget into a deficit next financial year. What is more, the cost estimation seems to keep moving heavenward.
Days before Interfet left Darwin, Chris Richardson of Access Economics put the cost at US$750 million, stating a daily cost of US$1 million. At the end of September, after at least two weeks of ground operations, Richardson revised his figures, saying they could peak at US$2.7 billion a year.
Then this week, local media reported that Australia was planning to sell some defense properties to offset the costs of underwriting most of the East Timor peacekeeping exercise.
What is going on here? Is Australia overreaching in its foreign policy capabilities?
To some Indonesians, Australia's enthusiasm comes across as a little boy in a big wide world who keeps trying to claim credit for what the big brother is achieving.
To others, Australia is showing its arrogance toward Indonesia by pontificating and bullying. Sadly, not many see Australia's good faith.
Of course, there is political expediency in the equation. No one in the world's political game is so pure, or naive rather, to be without self-serving, immediate political motives.
However, what might take some convincing for those suspecting the Indonesians is political expediency is only one aspect of the whole gamut of involvement.
Australia was drawn into the East Timor affair almost by the forces of nature, or in a more mundane manner of speaking, by default.
Australia has had East Timorese communities living in its major cities since 1975, when many refugees began arriving.
It was in Australia's Northern Territory city of Darwin that the first significant point of communication between Australia and East Timor was established: the Fretilin clandestine radio.
While the bulk of population was maybe somewhat indifferent then, there was enough sympathy to go around. The soldiers who assisted the East Timorese in World War II were not only still alive, but active in different sectors of society. Some brought their East Timorese wives home.
Around the same time when the first refugees arrived, five Australian journalists were killed in Balibo during the period when Indonesian soldiers were marching into the territory. The case was never solved to the satisfaction of either Australia or Indonesia.
For over two decades, both Australian Labor and Coalition governments maintained friendly relations with Indonesia for economic, security and other political reasons. Yet domestically, these governments have had to deal with pressures from various lobby groups -- for human rights and East Timorese causes -- to keep open negotiations with Indonesia regarding East Timor's independence.
In addition to that, the media, who many believe to be still angry about the death of their associates in Balibo, have never let go of the East Timor issue either.
The Australian community was continuously reminded of the fact that the United Nations never recognized East Timor as part of Indonesia, and that the Indonesian Military (TNI), and later its trained militia, allegedly continued human rights violations in the territory.
In the months leading up to the referendum, and every day after the referendum itself, the Australian public were exposed to images of atrocities allegedly committed by the military and the militia against the innocent population of East Timor.
Newspapers and news magazines dedicated large sections to the topic, with graphic pictures and stirring headlines.
This unfortunately became a source of suspicion and irritation, not only to the Indonesian government and its military, but also to a fair section of the community for different reasons.
Most of the Indonesian public mostly saw very different images and commentary regarding the events in East Timor. They heard of how the government took care of those who had to flee the troubled region, which, by the way, was true but were never revealed to the international community.
The Indonesian public was shielded from the graphic images of East Timor that were so freely shown outside.
It is worth noting that Indonesians, who have been suffering from widescale political turmoil and an extended economic crisis, do not see East Timor as the only problem the nation has to overcome.
So even those who have access to images and commentary available to those outside the country, are more astounded than touched by them.
This has been especially acute with many Muslims who feel that the international community, especially Australia, has only been concerned about human rights violations in East Timor, while those in Aceh, where the victims are Muslims, have mostly been overlooked.
Even more offensive to them is the tendency on the part of some lobby groups to simplify a complicated affair. Many in these groups speak of a victimization of Indonesia's minority Christians by the majority Muslim, pointing to harassment and murders of priests and nuns in East Timor as examples.
They obviously have not done their homework because in various parts of Java, Aceh and Ambon, a great number of Muslim clerics were also murdered.
What stands out here, however, is that many Indonesians attribute malice to Australia, where there is hardly any. The truth is, many Australians who care about human rights are not fully informed on the full extent of the political problems in Indonesia.
But then neither are Indonesians fully aware of Australia's political map.
Much to the leaders' chagrin, Australia has always been regarded as much less important than the United States vis-a-vis Indonesia's role on the world political stage. This is amply shown by the lack of angry reaction to U.S. Defence Secretary William Cohen, whose message to Indonesia was infused with more threats than Australia's John Howard's meek desire to be deputy sheriff to the U.S.
Indonesian analyst Hadi Soesastro could not put it more aptly at the recent Indonesia Update conference in Canberra, when he expressed incredulity that Howard would volunteer for such a role.
"If I remember correctly from the days I used to watch Wild West films, the deputy sheriffs are always the ones killed first," he said.
No wonder many Indonesians do not understand Australia. What do they see? Good faith, naivete or hubris?
The writer is a Melbourne-based journalist and novelist.