Australia and Indonesia: Mutual confusion

Australia and Indonesia: Mutual confusion

By Dewi Anggraeni

MELBOURNE (JP): Picture the following events:
Australia's media reported on atrocities in East Timor. Its prime
minister pushed for a referendum. Very little moved.

The United States stirred and suggested that the referendum
was a good idea. The suggestion struck a responsive chord and
Indonesia's President agreed to hold the referendum.

Australia's prime minister announced proudly that it was his
letter to Indonesia's President that finally convinced him.

The referendum was conducted successfully, meaning no violence
occurred the whole day. After that, however, violence returned
with a vengeance for weeks on end. International media,
Australia's included, reported the atrocities.

In Indonesia, only Australia was targeted as a hostile
country.

The United States defense secretary came to Indonesia, and
without using euphemistic terms, launched the threat that unless
its military acceded to the United Nations' demands, the country
would suffer dire consequences. Strong words. The naive and the
innocent waited with baited breath for a retaliation from
Indonesia, such as threats to sever diplomatic ties at least.

Hello, they are still waiting.

In the meantime, Australia's involvement in the International
Force for East Timor (Interfet) runs the risk of pushing the
federal budget into a deficit next financial year. What is more,
the cost estimation seems to keep moving heavenward.

Days before Interfet left Darwin, Chris Richardson of Access
Economics put the cost at US$750 million, stating a daily cost of
US$1 million. At the end of September, after at least two weeks
of ground operations, Richardson revised his figures, saying they
could peak at US$2.7 billion a year.

Then this week, local media reported that Australia was
planning to sell some defense properties to offset the costs of
underwriting most of the East Timor peacekeeping exercise.

What is going on here? Is Australia overreaching in its
foreign policy capabilities?

To some Indonesians, Australia's enthusiasm comes across as a
little boy in a big wide world who keeps trying to claim credit
for what the big brother is achieving.

To others, Australia is showing its arrogance toward Indonesia
by pontificating and bullying. Sadly, not many see Australia's
good faith.

Of course, there is political expediency in the equation. No
one in the world's political game is so pure, or naive rather, to
be without self-serving, immediate political motives.

However, what might take some convincing for those suspecting
the Indonesians is political expediency is only one aspect of the
whole gamut of involvement.

Australia was drawn into the East Timor affair almost by the
forces of nature, or in a more mundane manner of speaking, by
default.

Australia has had East Timorese communities living in its
major cities since 1975, when many refugees began arriving.

It was in Australia's Northern Territory city of Darwin that
the first significant point of communication between Australia
and East Timor was established: the Fretilin clandestine radio.

While the bulk of population was maybe somewhat indifferent
then, there was enough sympathy to go around. The soldiers who
assisted the East Timorese in World War II were not only still
alive, but active in different sectors of society. Some brought
their East Timorese wives home.

Around the same time when the first refugees arrived, five
Australian journalists were killed in Balibo during the period
when Indonesian soldiers were marching into the territory. The
case was never solved to the satisfaction of either Australia or
Indonesia.

For over two decades, both Australian Labor and Coalition
governments maintained friendly relations with Indonesia for
economic, security and other political reasons. Yet domestically,
these governments have had to deal with pressures from various
lobby groups -- for human rights and East Timorese causes -- to
keep open negotiations with Indonesia regarding East Timor's
independence.

In addition to that, the media, who many believe to be still
angry about the death of their associates in Balibo, have never
let go of the East Timor issue either.

The Australian community was continuously reminded of the fact
that the United Nations never recognized East Timor as part of
Indonesia, and that the Indonesian Military (TNI), and later its
trained militia, allegedly continued human rights violations in
the territory.

In the months leading up to the referendum, and every day
after the referendum itself, the Australian public were exposed
to images of atrocities allegedly committed by the military and
the militia against the innocent population of East Timor.

Newspapers and news magazines dedicated large sections to the
topic, with graphic pictures and stirring headlines.

This unfortunately became a source of suspicion and
irritation, not only to the Indonesian government and its
military, but also to a fair section of the community for
different reasons.

Most of the Indonesian public mostly saw very different
images and commentary regarding the events in East Timor. They
heard of how the government took care of those who had to flee
the troubled region, which, by the way, was true but were never
revealed to the international community.

The Indonesian public was shielded from the graphic images of
East Timor that were so freely shown outside.

It is worth noting that Indonesians, who have been suffering
from widescale political turmoil and an extended economic crisis,
do not see East Timor as the only problem the nation has to
overcome.

So even those who have access to images and commentary
available to those outside the country, are more astounded than
touched by them.

This has been especially acute with many Muslims who feel that
the international community, especially Australia, has only been
concerned about human rights violations in East Timor, while
those in Aceh, where the victims are Muslims, have mostly been
overlooked.

Even more offensive to them is the tendency on the part of
some lobby groups to simplify a complicated affair. Many in
these groups speak of a victimization of Indonesia's minority
Christians by the majority Muslim, pointing to harassment and
murders of priests and nuns in East Timor as examples.

They obviously have not done their homework because in various
parts of Java, Aceh and Ambon, a great number of Muslim clerics
were also murdered.

What stands out here, however, is that many Indonesians
attribute malice to Australia, where there is hardly any. The
truth is, many Australians who care about human rights are not
fully informed on the full extent of the political problems in
Indonesia.

But then neither are Indonesians fully aware of Australia's
political map.

Much to the leaders' chagrin, Australia has always been
regarded as much less important than the United States vis-a-vis
Indonesia's role on the world political stage. This is amply
shown by the lack of angry reaction to U.S. Defence Secretary
William Cohen, whose message to Indonesia was infused with more
threats than Australia's John Howard's meek desire to be deputy
sheriff to the U.S.

Indonesian analyst Hadi Soesastro could not put it more aptly
at the recent Indonesia Update conference in Canberra, when he
expressed incredulity that Howard would volunteer for such a
role.

"If I remember correctly from the days I used to watch Wild
West films, the deputy sheriffs are always the ones killed
first," he said.

No wonder many Indonesians do not understand Australia. What
do they see? Good faith, naivete or hubris?

The writer is a Melbourne-based journalist and novelist.