Auditor's findings

The most worrisome findings of the Government Finance Comptroller (BPKP) which were reported to the House of Representatives last Wednesday were not the many instances of malfeasance but the underlying trends which show why the anti- graft drive remains weak. We don't mean, however, to belittle the significance of the 18,578 instances of irregularities uncovered in the management of state finances, including state companies, in fiscal 1995/96, which involved Rp 888.72 billion (US$398 million). Though the amount of money involved in the uncovered irregularities in 1995/96 decreased from Rp 2.65 trillion in fiscal 1994/95, the number of irregularities discovered increased from 15,732.

But the findings also should be seen within the scope of the auditing work done by the comptroller. Different from the scope of responsibility of an ordinary auditor, the comptroller is empowered to conduct not only general audits but also operational, special and post-audits.

Whatever yardstick is used to assess the comptrollers' findings, they imply an extensive incidence of irregularities in the management of state finances. That also has been reflected in the results of the polls of foreign businesses periodically done by several international research institutes. However questionable the methodology used in the surveys, Indonesia is perceived by many business people as one of the most corrupt countries in the world.

The government, though, should be commended for allowing the comptroller to publicly announce the general outlines of its findings. That, we think, is evidence of the government's determination to fight corruption.

But the comptroller's qualitative assessment of its findings reveals more worrisome trends, which, if not dealt with more seriously, could weaken the anti-graft campaign. One of the most discouraging trends, as comptroller chief Soedarjono noted, is the laxity on the part of relevant government agencies to follow up on the comptroller's findings.

The problem is that the comptroller is not empowered to act on its findings. It can recommend preventive measures but it can do nothing if the recommendations are not implemented. The comptroller can also bring the corruption cases to the Attorney General's Office, but the process is arduous and not all instances of irregularities are triable in court.

We are also discouraged by Soedarjono's disclosure that the mechanism of built-in supervision, as stipulated in Presidential Instruction No.5/1983, has not been implemented properly due to the inconducive bureaucratic atmosphere for effective supervision and a conformist attitude among officials.

The built-in supervision mechanism, if implemented properly, could have been effective for curbing corrupt practices. In fact, the mechanism, to a large extent, follows the procedures and documentation requirements applied by the ISO 9000 series quality management system. It clearly sets the objectives, defines the line of responsibility, procedures, processes and the standards of performance as well as effective reviews and a documentation system.

But as long as the bureaucratic atmosphere remains unfavorable for motivating supervisors to execute their responsibilities, the supervision mechanism will be good only on paper and will remain a political slogan. In fact, the manner in which the government handled the instances of malfeasance disclosed by the print media over the past year did not help boost the morale of supervisors. Instead, it discouraged idealistic supervisors and strengthened the conformist attitude among bureaucrats.