Auditor's findings

Auditor's findings

The most worrisome findings of the Government Finance
Comptroller (BPKP) which were reported to the House of
Representatives last Wednesday were not the many instances of
malfeasance but the underlying trends which show why the anti-
graft drive remains weak. We don't mean, however, to belittle the
significance of the 18,578 instances of irregularities uncovered
in the management of state finances, including state companies,
in fiscal 1995/96, which involved Rp 888.72 billion (US$398
million). Though the amount of money involved in the uncovered
irregularities in 1995/96 decreased from Rp 2.65 trillion in
fiscal 1994/95, the number of irregularities discovered increased
from 15,732.

But the findings also should be seen within the scope of the
auditing work done by the comptroller. Different from the scope
of responsibility of an ordinary auditor, the comptroller is
empowered to conduct not only general audits but also
operational, special and post-audits.

Whatever yardstick is used to assess the comptrollers'
findings, they imply an extensive incidence of irregularities in
the management of state finances. That also has been reflected in
the results of the polls of foreign businesses periodically done
by several international research institutes. However
questionable the methodology used in the surveys, Indonesia is
perceived by many business people as one of the most corrupt
countries in the world.

The government, though, should be commended for allowing the
comptroller to publicly announce the general outlines of its
findings. That, we think, is evidence of the government's
determination to fight corruption.

But the comptroller's qualitative assessment of its findings
reveals more worrisome trends, which, if not dealt with more
seriously, could weaken the anti-graft campaign. One of the most
discouraging trends, as comptroller chief Soedarjono noted, is
the laxity on the part of relevant government agencies to follow
up on the comptroller's findings.

The problem is that the comptroller is not empowered to act on
its findings. It can recommend preventive measures but it can do
nothing if the recommendations are not implemented. The
comptroller can also bring the corruption cases to the Attorney
General's Office, but the process is arduous and not all
instances of irregularities are triable in court.

We are also discouraged by Soedarjono's disclosure that the
mechanism of built-in supervision, as stipulated in Presidential
Instruction No.5/1983, has not been implemented properly due to
the inconducive bureaucratic atmosphere for effective supervision
and a conformist attitude among officials.

The built-in supervision mechanism, if implemented properly,
could have been effective for curbing corrupt practices. In fact,
the mechanism, to a large extent, follows the procedures and
documentation requirements applied by the ISO 9000 series quality
management system. It clearly sets the objectives, defines the
line of responsibility, procedures, processes and the standards
of performance as well as effective reviews and a documentation
system.

But as long as the bureaucratic atmosphere remains unfavorable
for motivating supervisors to execute their responsibilities, the
supervision mechanism will be good only on paper and will remain
a political slogan. In fact, the manner in which the government
handled the instances of malfeasance disclosed by the print media
over the past year did not help boost the morale of supervisors.
Instead, it discouraged idealistic supervisors and strengthened
the conformist attitude among bureaucrats.