Asia: The past and next 50 years

This is the second of two articles based on a paper presented by Robert A. Scalapino, a Robson Research Professor of Government Emeritus at the University of California, Berkeley, U.S.A. at a seminar on Sept. 18, 1996 to commemorate the silver anniversary of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies.

JAKARTA: What lies ahead? Predictions concerning the future should be made with great trepidation, given the many variables, not least of which are the decisions that will be made by individuals and groups in leadership roles. Those who assume that all such decisions will be based upon accurate data, or be rational in terms of national interests are optimists in the extreme.

In the political field, differences of system are virtually certain to continue. The thesis that liberal democracy will carry all before it is untenable. First, democracy like other systems faces a number of problems: money-politics with its attendant corruption; striking a balance between the right to oppose and the right to govern and between freedom and responsibility; the special issue of the media, now a part of governance in an open society by virtue of shaping public attitudes; and finally, the capacity to maintain sufficient stability to enable further economic growth. Most of these issues, it should be reiterated, are by no means unique to the democratic system, but whatever the system, they must be faced. No system is guaranteed permanence, including democracy.

One system, however, seems likely to disappear, namely, Leninism. Already, one sees many signs of its demise. Leninism was only practicable in societies desperately behind in developmental terms and thus prepared to seek the total mobilization of resources via economic policies stressing centralization and exclusiveness, enforced by a political dictatorship. Yet with interdependence now surging forward, such policies are highly unrealistic, a fact almost universally recognized. The fall of Leninism, however, does not guarantee the triumph of democracy. More likely, the old Leninist societies will be transformed into authoritarian-pluralist systems, as now seems underway.

Thus, for the foreseeable future, Asia will continue to have significant political variations rather than a uniform political order. Irrespective of system, certain critical political issues lie ahead. First, how is power to be allocated within the state as among center, region and locality? The demand for greater authority at local and regional levels is certain to grow as a result of an expanding diversity and the demand for a greater share of governmental resources to handle local problems. Decentralization, occasionally challenged, will be the dominant trend.

The state will face another internal competitor in the form of the civil society. As economic, social and religious organizations acquire additional resources and membership commitment, pressures on the political system will multiply. Values, including political values, will increasingly be supplied by sources other than the state, often creating a struggle for authority. The state will respond by seeking to uphold the banners of nationalism against both domestic competitors and the encroachments of internationalism.

In this setting, political instability will be recurrent, but it will rarely reach a regime-threatening level. Whether the system be authoritarian or democratic, a greater degree of flexibility will exist, enabling adjustment to crisis. However, the role of personalities will remain important as institutions only slowly gather legitimacy. In authoritarian systems, times of succession will often evoke crises. In democratic systems, gridlock will be a threat. The premium will be upon leaders able to convey complex issues to their citizenry in understandable terms, and political parties that are inclusive, broadening political participation at the grass-roots.

The prospects for the economic future of Asia are no less complex. Increasingly, political legitimacy will be measured in terms of performance in the economical realm, and it is appropriate to have high hopes for most Asian societies. Growth will be dominant feature, albeit, at gradually reduced rates. An increasing number of Asian states will enter the ranks of advanced industrial nations -- South Korea and Taiwan, followed by certain members of ASEAN. By the mid-21st century, Asia will be at the center of global economic activity. Advances in science and technology, wherever their source, will quickly be applied by leading Asian societies. Internationalizing industrial production, the transition of advanced societies to a service orientation, and an intense competition for external capital will remain dominant trends. Urbanization will also accelerate. Megacities will grow in size and in numbers, bringing serious problems to one's doorstep -- congestion, crime, housing.

Most importantly, despite obstacles, regional and global economic institutions will be strengthened, with more decision- making authority vested in them together with monitoring and enforcement mechanisms of greater potency. NETs will also continue to proliferate. Asianization will thus move ahead. These developments will pose serious problems in the allocation of authority between nation-state, region, and globe, and one can expect recurrent crises over this issue.

Nor will the rich-poor gap be close despite general improvements in livelihood. Indeed, it is probable that both within given state and among them, that gap will increase even though various measures will be taken to reduce poverty. Further, the recognition of environmental and resource problems has come at a late point in Asia as elsewhere. Population increases will continue over the next fifty years in most parts of Asia despite the introduction of various measures for control. Japan is the first exception and it will be followed by a few others, but not by the largest nations of the region, China, India and Indonesia, in coming decades.

The combination of continued rapid economic growth and populational gains will make energy and food central problems along with that of environmental preservation. Indeed, these issues will be paramount security as well economic concerns and ones to which there are no easy answers. For example, in very few countries is agriculture a preferred occupation today. Another problem certain to grow is that of migration, both within and across national borders.

With respect to social conditions, several trends, somewhat contradictory in nature, seem likely. First, within and among countries, cultural homogenization will accelerate, product of greater access and mobility. At he same time, ethnic divisions are likely to remain strong and may even take more militant form. There are no signs of a diminution of ethnic consciousness. On the contrary, it is on the rise, partly as an answer to the question, "Who am I?"

Literacy will continue to increase as education reaches an ever larger portion of the population. By 2050, Asia should have a literacy rate above 90 percent. Generational differences will become more pronounced, complicating familiar relationships.

In sum, most of Asia is still at a relatively early stage of its domestic revolution. As the revolution advances, it will share an increasing number of characteristics -- and problems -- with the advanced nations despite certain cultural differences, among them the loneliness embedded in a materialistic society; uncertainties concerning the role of the state versus that of the society; and the conflict between the economic logic of interdependence and the psychological appeal of separateness.

The latter issue relates to the broader question of future international relations. Almost certainly, the nation-state will be forced to share sovereignty in increasing measure with institutions above it -- regional and global. Indeed, a network of agreements -- strategic, political and economic -- will expand, and the signatories to those agreements will be expected to abide by them, or face penalties. Further, as noted earlier, greater decision making authority will be given to existing and future regional and international organizations.

At some point in the not distant future, an official Northeast Asian Security Dialogue will come into being, and that association will gradually acquire the right to make decisions. Meanwhile, ASEAN and its adjunct, the Asian Regional Forum (ARF), which seeks to encompass Pacific-Asia as a whole, will move in a similar direction. However, we shall remain strongly dependent upon the system of ad hoc coalitions described earlier together with bilateral negotiations to resolve or contain certain issues that threaten conflict.

As is well known, Asia confronts a number of dangerous, divisive issues relating to divided states and territorial disputes. There is no likelihood that most of these will be resolved quickly or easily. Fortunately, however, the odds against a major power conflict in Pacific-Asia are high. Given the advances in weapons of mass destruction on the one hand, and the growth of economic interdependence on the other, the destructiveness of a major war to all parties, victor and vanquished alike, would be enormous.

This certainly does not mean that we have seen the end of military conflict. The highest probability of conflict, however, lies in civil strife within certain states. The further risk is that some such conflicts may become regionalized, as was the case in connection with Cambodia in the late 1970s. Thus, one central source of danger is that of failed or failing states. Another risk is that of accident, or an escalating incident, especially among neighbors. Another form of violence, terrorism, may well increase, given the ease with which destructive weapons can come into the hand of individuals or groups so inclined.

Even with the caveats set forth, is the scenario painted above too optimistic? No true balance of power in Pacific-Asia exists today. The United States is the sole global power, and its commitments in Asia are extensive, but will they continue? At present, the major states are contending with significant domestic issues and all have made economic growth the highest priority. But what of the future? In three or four decades at most, a major shift in power is likely. China, and in all probability, Russia will have emerged as major powers in every sense of the term. The United State will continue to be a major force, but in relative terms, its power will have declined. Given its domestic circumstances, will Japan have the desire -- or the capacity -- to take on a stronger leadership role in the region?

At some point, a central question relating to stability or upheaval in Asia will be how the major states view their "lost empires". As it acquires greater military and economic strength, how will China handle a range of issues, from Taiwan and the South China Sea atolls to Mongolia and Eastern Siberia, territories it also claimed in the not distant past? How will a reinvigorated Russia relate to the new states of Central Asia and those on its west -- all parts of the USSR until recently? Will Japan, having acquired its Greater East Asian CoProsperity Sphere at vastly less cost than the effort of the 1930s and 1940s, seek to add political and strategic increments to its economic role, and in what form? The American "lost empire" is a different type. As noted earlier, U.S. alliances have shifted from those involving patron-client relations to those demanding partnership and flexibility. How will the United States adjust to this fact in the years ahead?

Let me conclude by briefly making the case for cautious optimism regarding the Pacific-Asian future. For reasons outlined above, the risks of a major power conflict now or in the foreseeable future are at their lowest point in the 20th century. The priority for all nations is upon economic growth, and to this end, interdependence is rising rapidly. Experimentation with a wide range of regional and international institutions and mechanisms in both the economic and the security-political fields is continuing. Thus, there are a growing number of alternatives to resolving controversies by force.

Limited wars and domestic conflicts will certainly be a part of the future. It is legitimate to worry about an intensification of ethnic divisions and a rising role for militant religions in politics. These are by no means uniquely Asian phenomena, but they are a part of the Asian scene. Yet the ascendancy of extremist leaders or the resort to military coups seems on a downward slope. And in such events as the Philippine government's accord with the Moro movement and the willingness of the Indian government to permit elections in Kashmir, one sees signs of progress.

Window A: Almost certainly, the nation-state will be forced to share sovereignty in increasing measure with institutions above it -- regional and global.

Window B: Limited wars and domestic conflicts will certainly be a part of the future. It is legitimate to worry about an intensification of ethnic divisions and a rising role for militant religions in politics.