Asia: The past and next 50 years

Asia: The past and next 50 years

This is the second of two articles based on a paper presented
by Robert A. Scalapino, a Robson Research Professor of Government
Emeritus at the University of California, Berkeley, U.S.A. at a
seminar on Sept. 18, 1996 to commemorate the silver anniversary
of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies.

JAKARTA: What lies ahead? Predictions concerning the future
should be made with great trepidation, given the many variables,
not least of which are the decisions that will be made by
individuals and groups in leadership roles. Those who assume that
all such decisions will be based upon accurate data, or be
rational in terms of national interests are optimists in the
extreme.

In the political field, differences of system are virtually
certain to continue. The thesis that liberal democracy will carry
all before it is untenable. First, democracy like other systems
faces a number of problems: money-politics with its attendant
corruption; striking a balance between the right to oppose and
the right to govern and between freedom and responsibility; the
special issue of the media, now a part of governance in an open
society by virtue of shaping public attitudes; and finally, the
capacity to maintain sufficient stability to enable further
economic growth. Most of these issues, it should be reiterated,
are by no means unique to the democratic system, but whatever the
system, they must be faced. No system is guaranteed permanence,
including democracy.

One system, however, seems likely to disappear, namely,
Leninism. Already, one sees many signs of its demise. Leninism
was only practicable in societies desperately behind in
developmental terms and thus prepared to seek the total
mobilization of resources via economic policies stressing
centralization and exclusiveness, enforced by a political
dictatorship. Yet with interdependence now surging forward, such
policies are highly unrealistic, a fact almost universally
recognized. The fall of Leninism, however, does not guarantee the
triumph of democracy. More likely, the old Leninist societies
will be transformed into authoritarian-pluralist systems, as now
seems underway.

Thus, for the foreseeable future, Asia will continue to have
significant political variations rather than a uniform political
order. Irrespective of system, certain critical political issues
lie ahead. First, how is power to be allocated within the state
as among center, region and locality? The demand for greater
authority at local and regional levels is certain to grow as a
result of an expanding diversity and the demand for a greater
share of governmental resources to handle local problems.
Decentralization, occasionally challenged, will be the dominant
trend.

The state will face another internal competitor in the form of
the civil society. As economic, social and religious
organizations acquire additional resources and membership
commitment, pressures on the political system will multiply.
Values, including political values, will increasingly be supplied
by sources other than the state, often creating a struggle for
authority. The state will respond by seeking to uphold the
banners of nationalism against both domestic competitors and the
encroachments of internationalism.

In this setting, political instability will be recurrent, but
it will rarely reach a regime-threatening level. Whether the
system be authoritarian or democratic, a greater degree of
flexibility will exist, enabling adjustment to crisis. However,
the role of personalities will remain important as institutions
only slowly gather legitimacy. In authoritarian systems, times of
succession will often evoke crises. In democratic systems,
gridlock will be a threat. The premium will be upon leaders able
to convey complex issues to their citizenry in understandable
terms, and political parties that are inclusive, broadening
political participation at the grass-roots.

The prospects for the economic future of Asia are no less
complex. Increasingly, political legitimacy will be measured in
terms of performance in the economical realm, and it is
appropriate to have high hopes for most Asian societies. Growth
will be dominant feature, albeit, at gradually reduced rates. An
increasing number of Asian states will enter the ranks of
advanced industrial nations -- South Korea and Taiwan, followed
by certain members of ASEAN. By the mid-21st century, Asia will
be at the center of global economic activity. Advances in science
and technology, wherever their source, will quickly be applied by
leading Asian societies. Internationalizing industrial
production, the transition of advanced societies to a service
orientation, and an intense competition for external capital will
remain dominant trends. Urbanization will also accelerate.
Megacities will grow in size and in numbers, bringing serious
problems to one's doorstep -- congestion, crime, housing.

Most importantly, despite obstacles, regional and global
economic institutions will be strengthened, with more decision-
making authority vested in them together with monitoring and
enforcement mechanisms of greater potency. NETs will also
continue to proliferate. Asianization will thus move ahead. These
developments will pose serious problems in the allocation of
authority between nation-state, region, and globe, and one can
expect recurrent crises over this issue.

Nor will the rich-poor gap be close despite general
improvements in livelihood. Indeed, it is probable that both
within given state and among them, that gap will increase even
though various measures will be taken to reduce poverty. Further,
the recognition of environmental and resource problems has come
at a late point in Asia as elsewhere. Population increases will
continue over the next fifty years in most parts of Asia despite
the introduction of various measures for control. Japan is the
first exception and it will be followed by a few others, but not
by the largest nations of the region, China, India and Indonesia,
in coming decades.

The combination of continued rapid economic growth and
populational gains will make energy and food central problems
along with that of environmental preservation. Indeed, these
issues will be paramount security as well economic concerns and
ones to which there are no easy answers. For example, in very few
countries is agriculture a preferred occupation today. Another
problem certain to grow is that of migration, both within and
across national borders.

With respect to social conditions, several trends, somewhat
contradictory in nature, seem likely. First, within and among
countries, cultural homogenization will accelerate, product of
greater access and mobility. At he same time, ethnic divisions
are likely to remain strong and may even take more militant form.
There are no signs of a diminution of ethnic consciousness. On
the contrary, it is on the rise, partly as an answer to the
question, "Who am I?"

Literacy will continue to increase as education reaches an
ever larger portion of the population. By 2050, Asia should have
a literacy rate above 90 percent. Generational differences will
become more pronounced, complicating familiar relationships.

In sum, most of Asia is still at a relatively early stage of
its domestic revolution. As the revolution advances, it will
share an increasing number of characteristics -- and problems --
with the advanced nations despite certain cultural differences,
among them the loneliness embedded in a materialistic society;
uncertainties concerning the role of the state versus that of the
society; and the conflict between the economic logic of
interdependence and the psychological appeal of separateness.

The latter issue relates to the broader question of future
international relations. Almost certainly, the nation-state will
be forced to share sovereignty in increasing measure with
institutions above it -- regional and global. Indeed, a network
of agreements -- strategic, political and economic -- will
expand, and the signatories to those agreements will be expected
to abide by them, or face penalties. Further, as noted earlier,
greater decision making authority will be given to existing and
future regional and international organizations.

At some point in the not distant future, an official Northeast
Asian Security Dialogue will come into being, and that
association will gradually acquire the right to make decisions.
Meanwhile, ASEAN and its adjunct, the Asian Regional Forum (ARF),
which seeks to encompass Pacific-Asia as a whole, will move in a
similar direction. However, we shall remain strongly dependent
upon the system of ad hoc coalitions described earlier together
with bilateral negotiations to resolve or contain certain issues
that threaten conflict.

As is well known, Asia confronts a number of dangerous,
divisive issues relating to divided states and territorial
disputes. There is no likelihood that most of these will be
resolved quickly or easily. Fortunately, however, the odds
against a major power conflict in Pacific-Asia are high. Given
the advances in weapons of mass destruction on the one hand, and
the growth of economic interdependence on the other, the
destructiveness of a major war to all parties, victor and
vanquished alike, would be enormous.

This certainly does not mean that we have seen the end of
military conflict. The highest probability of conflict, however,
lies in civil strife within certain states. The further risk is
that some such conflicts may become regionalized, as was the case
in connection with Cambodia in the late 1970s. Thus, one central
source of danger is that of failed or failing states. Another
risk is that of accident, or an escalating incident, especially
among neighbors. Another form of violence, terrorism, may well
increase, given the ease with which destructive weapons can come
into the hand of individuals or groups so inclined.

Even with the caveats set forth, is the scenario painted above
too optimistic? No true balance of power in Pacific-Asia exists
today. The United States is the sole global power, and its
commitments in Asia are extensive, but will they continue? At
present, the major states are contending with significant
domestic issues and all have made economic growth the highest
priority. But what of the future? In three or four decades at
most, a major shift in power is likely. China, and in all
probability, Russia will have emerged as major powers in every
sense of the term. The United State will continue to be a major
force, but in relative terms, its power will have declined. Given
its domestic circumstances, will Japan have the desire -- or the
capacity -- to take on a stronger leadership role in the region?

At some point, a central question relating to stability or
upheaval in Asia will be how the major states view their "lost
empires". As it acquires greater military and economic strength,
how will China handle a range of issues, from Taiwan and the
South China Sea atolls to Mongolia and Eastern Siberia,
territories it also claimed in the not distant past? How will a
reinvigorated Russia relate to the new states of Central Asia and
those on its west -- all parts of the USSR until recently? Will
Japan, having acquired its Greater East Asian CoProsperity Sphere
at vastly less cost than the effort of the 1930s and 1940s, seek
to add political and strategic increments to its economic role,
and in what form? The American "lost empire" is a different type.
As noted earlier, U.S. alliances have shifted from those
involving patron-client relations to those demanding partnership
and flexibility. How will the United States adjust to this fact
in the years ahead?

Let me conclude by briefly making the case for cautious
optimism regarding the Pacific-Asian future. For reasons outlined
above, the risks of a major power conflict now or in the
foreseeable future are at their lowest point in the 20th century.
The priority for all nations is upon economic growth, and to this
end, interdependence is rising rapidly. Experimentation with a
wide range of regional and international institutions and
mechanisms in both the economic and the security-political fields
is continuing. Thus, there are a growing number of alternatives
to resolving controversies by force.

Limited wars and domestic conflicts will certainly be a part
of the future. It is legitimate to worry about an intensification
of ethnic divisions and a rising role for militant religions in
politics. These are by no means uniquely Asian phenomena, but
they are a part of the Asian scene. Yet the ascendancy of
extremist leaders or the resort to military coups seems on a
downward slope. And in such events as the Philippine government's
accord with the Moro movement and the willingness of the Indian
government to permit elections in Kashmir, one sees signs of
progress.

Window A: Almost certainly, the nation-state will be forced to
share sovereignty in increasing measure with institutions above
it -- regional and global.

Window B: Limited wars and domestic conflicts will certainly be a
part of the future. It is legitimate to worry about an
intensification of ethnic divisions and a rising role for
militant religions in politics.