Asia: The past 50 years and next 50 years

Asia: The past 50 years and next 50 years

The following article is based on a paper presented by Robert
A. Scalapino, a Robson Research Professor of Government Emeritus
at the University of California, Berkeley, U.S.A. at a seminar on
Sept. 18, 1996 to commemorate the silver anniversary of the
Centre for Strategic and International Studies. This is the first
of two articles.

JAKARTA: In the broad sweep of history, 50 years is a fleeting
second. Yet we are privileged to live in an unique age when time
has been transformed. In the past 50 years, greater changes have
taken place, both in the nature of societies and in the lives of
individuals, than in any comparable period in human history.

We now know the true meaning of revolution. It cannot be
defined merely as a political act whereby one leadership or one
system is replaced by another. In a more profound sense, a
revolution is a fundamental, accelerating charge in basic
political, economic, and social conditions that affects the life-
style and values of every individual in a given society.

In these terms, ours is a truly revolutionary age, and
Asia-Pacific has been at the vortex of that revolution.
Conditions at the end of World War II are almost unrecognizable
from the perspective of 1996. Let us first examine the political
scene. In 1946, the great majority of Asian societies were still
colonial appendages of Western imperialism. China, wracked by a
lengthy conflict, was about to enter the climactic stage of its
sporadic civil war. Korea had been liberated from Japanese
dominance, but had emerged as a divided state. Japan itself,
devastated by the war, was being pushed onto the democratic road
by American tutors, but predictions concerning its future were
largely gloomy.

Western and Japanese imperialism had bequeathed an Asia whose
people while in close geographic proximity, were half-foreign to
each other. Elites, for the most part, had been educated in
Western ways, or more precisely, the ways of their respective
colonial governors. Except in the case of Korea, the political
values implanted were those of democracy, but the socio-economic
policies currently in operation did not support that political
creed. Hence, a deep contradiction existed virtually everywhere
between the political systems initially and the socio-economic
foundations upon which they rested. Only in India and Sri Lanka
was this contradiction overcome, or more accurately,
accommodated.

Tutelage, however, should be given more credit than the
economic determinists are inclined to do. While many of the early
democracies were overturned, the values that they espoused
remained implanted in portions of the society. Indeed, tutelage
continued via overseas and indigenous educational programs
reaching a significant portion of the young elite. Thus, when the
economic developmental process spawned heightened diversity and a
larger middle class, political pluralism often returned.

Nevertheless, broadly speaking, three political systems exist
in Asia at present; Leninist; authoritarian-pluralist; and
democratic. Four states -- China, North Korea, Vietnam and Laos
-- consider themselves socialist in the Leninist sense, although
in this period of surging nationalism, Marxism-Leninism is
featured less frequently, and in the case of the DPRK, it has
been abandoned in favor of juche, "self-reliance," a doctrine
betokening the deep traditionalist roots of this society.

Authoritarian-pluralism comes in several varieties, but its
essence lies in a controlled politics combined with increased
pluralism in the social and economic sphere. A civil society with
some autonomy apart from the state emerges and the economy is
mixed, with the market playing a significant role. Political
variation is depicted in the hard authoritarianism of Myanmar
versus the soft authoritarianism of Singapore. The authoritarian-
pluralist model has had a vogue in recent decades both because it
accords with Asian tradition and because it promises to combine
political stability and economic development. Yet by its very
nature, it is a transitional system, with a strong dependence
upon the capacity of the political elite to make systemic
alterations of the proper nature, at the proper time.

Meanwhile, the advance of democracy in Asia, especially in the
past two decades, has been phenomenal, a result of a combination
of factors: a more compatible economic environment; the
revolutions in transport and telecommunications, and the
resulting expansion of both mobility and knowledge; and finally,
in certain cases, a decline in the perception of external threat
or domestic separatism.

To be sure, virtually all elites have desired to use the term
"democracy" throughout past decades. Thus, we have had "people's
democracy," "guided democracy," and "Asian democracy." True
democracy, however, requires three basic conditions: genuine,
regularized political competition; the requisite freedoms to make
that competition meaningful; and a government based upon law. No
government is perfect, but unless a political system reaches
toward these principles and comes close to their achievement, it
cannot be considered a democracy.

When one reflects upon the recent past, it is obvious that
throughout Asia, current political institutions are very new in
contrast to those of the United States and many other Western
nations. Hence, the formal political structure remains fluid and
relatively fragile in many cases. Further, there is a substantial
difference between formal and informal politics. In the latter
realm, one sense the continuing difference between Asia and the
West. Essentially, Western politics is based upon legalism; Asian
politics is based upon reciprocity. Thus, the struggle to accept
legalism in its fullest dimensions continues in all parts of the
region.

Another political trend of the recent past should be noted. At
the onset of the post-war era, ideological appeals were at high
tide, interwoven with nationalist exhortations. The competition
between Marxism-Leninism and liberalism was intense, especially
in intellectual circles. In the post-Cold War era, we have
witnessed the decline of ideology, with materialism in some
degree taking its place. Individuals are intent upon bettering
themselves economically, and development, not belief, is the
dominant factor in determining legitimacy. The vacuum in
political values has to some extent been filled by a resurgent
nationalism -- a phenomena now seen throughout Pacific-Asia in
spite of, or perhaps more accurately, because of the on-coming
tides of interdependence. But other sources are competing to fill
the void: ethnic consciousness is rising and in certain regions,
religious commitment, especially to fundamentalist creeds, eases
psychological distress for some. Yet as we move into the 21st
century, the issue of "What do I believe?" along with that of
"Who am I?" will constitute twin challenges for the future.

Turning to the economic sphere, the changes of the past 50
years have been at least equally spectacular. Asia was
overwhelmingly composed of traditional agrarian societies at the
close of World War II. Further, in the case of colonies, the
economy was largely tied to that of the governing nation. Such
industrialization as existed was primarily the product of
expatriate entrepreneurs. In China, a small but influential class
of indigenous capitalists existed, mainly in Shanghai and other
coastal port cities. Yet more than 80 percent of the population
were rural farmers, many desperately poor. Two cities -- Hong
Kong and Singapore -- both under British governance and
overwhelmingly Chinese in population, represented a striking
contrast with rural Asia. Japan also stood out as an exception,
having consciously constructed a developmental program from the
early Meiji era designed to preserve its independence. In its
mercantilist and cartelized pattern as well as in its reach for
empire, its skill at adapting the classic Western model were
displayed.

It is thus not surprising that Japan became a model for many
of the late developing Asian nations in recent decades. With
various adaptations, South Korea and Taiwan in particular found
the Japanese pattern instructive. Japan's influence elsewhere was
less pronounced, but usually present. From Japanese sources came
the imagery of flying geese, with Japan in the lead, the newly
industrial countries close behind, followed by all others.

Whatever one's evaluation of Japan's role, no one can doubt
the phenomenal economic growth of most Asian societies in the
past three decades, with the basic strategy being that of initial
import substitution, a rapid emphasis upon exports, with
government serving as supporter, guide and protector of the
economy, yet the market given due homage. Thus, a region that
once constituted a mere 4 percent of the global GNP, rose to some
25 percent in the course of a few decades, with 33 percent likely
by the turn of the century.

However, not all Asian countries trod the path of economic
success, at lease initially. Those following the Soviet economic
model or Laskian socialism found that autarky separated them from
critical aspects of the scientific-technological revolution even
as over-bureaucratization damaged incentives and initiatives. In
the contest between socialism and a market oriented system, the
market won. Even North Korea, the last holdout, is furtively
examining reform -- at a very late point. The role of state
remains an important one, even in the most open systems, but as
provider of macroeconomic policies and as regulator, not as an
omniscient, omnipresent force.

With rapid development has come progressive interdependence.
Far back in history, Asia had trade routes that brought diverse
peoples into contact with each other. Yet the emphasis after
World War II was initially upon separate economic systems, with a
strong element of protectionism. In recent decades, however, the
Asianization of Asia's economy has steadily advanced, albeit,
less intensely than the Europeanization of West Europe's economy.

The process of interdependence has taken several directions.
We have witnessed the emergence first of ASEAN, later of APEC,
with the latter's goal that of free and open trading system in
the early 21st century.

Simultaneously, Natural Economic Territories (NETs) have
proliferated, noninstitutional economic entities cutting across
political boundaries, combining resources, manpower, technology
and capital in optimal degree. NETs may initially require the
support of governments, or at a minimum, no opposition, but in
the long run, they are dependent upon their attractiveness to the
private sector. Over time, they may change shape, extending or
contracting. Together with capital flows and migration tides,
however, they are a powerful testimony to the economic revolution
of our times.

Naturally, political and economic events have had major impact
upon what we broadly term Asian culture. Looking back, one should
note that societal differences in Asia were nurtured in certain
respects by colonial policies. As suggested, the elite were drawn
away from the peasantry by Western contacts and education. In
certain respects, this included the indigenous military elite.
However, they partook less of Western political values and more
of a commitment to rapid economic development and modern
mobilization techniques.

The colonial era also bequeathed deep fissures based upon
ethnicity. These had always existed, to be sure, but colonial
policy often included the use of ethnic minorities as
counterweights to the dominants ethnic stream, whether as
soldiers and police, or in more general terms, by granting them
extensive autonomy. In addition, minorities were often the most
suitable subjects for religious proselytization. Yet for the
overwhelming majority of Asians, traditional values and life-
styles remained largely intact, buttressed by the economic system
and a self-contained, village-centered culture.

The monumental changes in Asian society in recent decades
scarcely need to be elaborated. The combination of radio,
television, and motion pictures has broken virtually all the old
barriers to the outside world, even in most rural areas. Equally
important has been the infusion of foreign products from Coca
Cola to stylish dress. Yet the cultural gap between the younger,
better educated, more affluent, urban Asians and their rural,
less advantaged brethren is greater than in 1946. Thus, when one
champions Asian culture against that of the West, the obvious
question is "Which culture?" and this applies within a given
society as well as among Asian states. And it is a supreme irony
that those who raise this issue most vigorously are themselves
among the most pronounced cultural hybrids.

The transformations in relations between and among nations
that have taken place in recent decades are no less significant
than those on the domestic front. After World War II, three broad
political constellations emerged. The American and Soviet-
ledalliances dominated the scene strategically, with a global
balance painfully established and always tilted. Another group,
composed principally of newly emerging states, termed itself the
Non-Aligned Movement, and sought minimal risk and cost in the
international arena.

With the end of the Cold War, the nature of those alliances
that remained changed substantially. The earlier ties had been
tight and all-encompassing. The major party had pledged
protection and frequently, economic assistance. The minor party
or parties had promised political allegiance. At present,
however, existing alliances are in fact alignments. Pledges by
the major party are generally conditional, and the minor parties
feel free to establish external relationships of importance.

The fluidity in alliance patterns is matched by that in the
broader arena. There is no international order at present.
Agencies, global and regional, dedicated to peacemaking or peace-
keeping, are far from adequate, as most observers would
acknowledge. Solutions or containment of regional and sub-
regional threats are dependent upon the construction of ad hoc
coalitions, composed of nations whose perceived national
interests are involved. Leadership in such instances varies, but
the United States frequently plays that role.

In sum, economic, interdependence is far more advanced than
political interdependence. And as the effort goes forward to
strengthen or create institutions and mechanisms that will
advance the security of all, insistence upon the sovereignty of
the nation-state is frequently invoked to curb the scope and
power of such bodies. Even the United Nations has a limited
reach. Many new bodies and modalities have emerged, at sub-
regional, regional and global levels, but generally, these organs
are for dialogue, not governance. Perhaps one should emphasize
the various agreements reached in the security as well as the
economic realm. Yet, it must be admitted that above the
nationstate, ours remains predominately a lawless age.

Window: Yet as we move into the 21st century, the issue of "What
do I believe?" along with that of "Who am I?" will constitute twin
challenges for the future.