Asia: The past 50 years and next 50 years
The following article is based on a paper presented by Robert A. Scalapino, a Robson Research Professor of Government Emeritus at the University of California, Berkeley, U.S.A. at a seminar on Sept. 18, 1996 to commemorate the silver anniversary of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies. This is the first of two articles.
JAKARTA: In the broad sweep of history, 50 years is a fleeting second. Yet we are privileged to live in an unique age when time has been transformed. In the past 50 years, greater changes have taken place, both in the nature of societies and in the lives of individuals, than in any comparable period in human history.
We now know the true meaning of revolution. It cannot be defined merely as a political act whereby one leadership or one system is replaced by another. In a more profound sense, a revolution is a fundamental, accelerating charge in basic political, economic, and social conditions that affects the life- style and values of every individual in a given society.
In these terms, ours is a truly revolutionary age, and Asia-Pacific has been at the vortex of that revolution. Conditions at the end of World War II are almost unrecognizable from the perspective of 1996. Let us first examine the political scene. In 1946, the great majority of Asian societies were still colonial appendages of Western imperialism. China, wracked by a lengthy conflict, was about to enter the climactic stage of its sporadic civil war. Korea had been liberated from Japanese dominance, but had emerged as a divided state. Japan itself, devastated by the war, was being pushed onto the democratic road by American tutors, but predictions concerning its future were largely gloomy.
Western and Japanese imperialism had bequeathed an Asia whose people while in close geographic proximity, were half-foreign to each other. Elites, for the most part, had been educated in Western ways, or more precisely, the ways of their respective colonial governors. Except in the case of Korea, the political values implanted were those of democracy, but the socio-economic policies currently in operation did not support that political creed. Hence, a deep contradiction existed virtually everywhere between the political systems initially and the socio-economic foundations upon which they rested. Only in India and Sri Lanka was this contradiction overcome, or more accurately, accommodated.
Tutelage, however, should be given more credit than the economic determinists are inclined to do. While many of the early democracies were overturned, the values that they espoused remained implanted in portions of the society. Indeed, tutelage continued via overseas and indigenous educational programs reaching a significant portion of the young elite. Thus, when the economic developmental process spawned heightened diversity and a larger middle class, political pluralism often returned.
Nevertheless, broadly speaking, three political systems exist in Asia at present; Leninist; authoritarian-pluralist; and democratic. Four states -- China, North Korea, Vietnam and Laos -- consider themselves socialist in the Leninist sense, although in this period of surging nationalism, Marxism-Leninism is featured less frequently, and in the case of the DPRK, it has been abandoned in favor of juche, "self-reliance," a doctrine betokening the deep traditionalist roots of this society.
Authoritarian-pluralism comes in several varieties, but its essence lies in a controlled politics combined with increased pluralism in the social and economic sphere. A civil society with some autonomy apart from the state emerges and the economy is mixed, with the market playing a significant role. Political variation is depicted in the hard authoritarianism of Myanmar versus the soft authoritarianism of Singapore. The authoritarian- pluralist model has had a vogue in recent decades both because it accords with Asian tradition and because it promises to combine political stability and economic development. Yet by its very nature, it is a transitional system, with a strong dependence upon the capacity of the political elite to make systemic alterations of the proper nature, at the proper time.
Meanwhile, the advance of democracy in Asia, especially in the past two decades, has been phenomenal, a result of a combination of factors: a more compatible economic environment; the revolutions in transport and telecommunications, and the resulting expansion of both mobility and knowledge; and finally, in certain cases, a decline in the perception of external threat or domestic separatism.
To be sure, virtually all elites have desired to use the term "democracy" throughout past decades. Thus, we have had "people's democracy," "guided democracy," and "Asian democracy." True democracy, however, requires three basic conditions: genuine, regularized political competition; the requisite freedoms to make that competition meaningful; and a government based upon law. No government is perfect, but unless a political system reaches toward these principles and comes close to their achievement, it cannot be considered a democracy.
When one reflects upon the recent past, it is obvious that throughout Asia, current political institutions are very new in contrast to those of the United States and many other Western nations. Hence, the formal political structure remains fluid and relatively fragile in many cases. Further, there is a substantial difference between formal and informal politics. In the latter realm, one sense the continuing difference between Asia and the West. Essentially, Western politics is based upon legalism; Asian politics is based upon reciprocity. Thus, the struggle to accept legalism in its fullest dimensions continues in all parts of the region.
Another political trend of the recent past should be noted. At the onset of the post-war era, ideological appeals were at high tide, interwoven with nationalist exhortations. The competition between Marxism-Leninism and liberalism was intense, especially in intellectual circles. In the post-Cold War era, we have witnessed the decline of ideology, with materialism in some degree taking its place. Individuals are intent upon bettering themselves economically, and development, not belief, is the dominant factor in determining legitimacy. The vacuum in political values has to some extent been filled by a resurgent nationalism -- a phenomena now seen throughout Pacific-Asia in spite of, or perhaps more accurately, because of the on-coming tides of interdependence. But other sources are competing to fill the void: ethnic consciousness is rising and in certain regions, religious commitment, especially to fundamentalist creeds, eases psychological distress for some. Yet as we move into the 21st century, the issue of "What do I believe?" along with that of "Who am I?" will constitute twin challenges for the future.
Turning to the economic sphere, the changes of the past 50 years have been at least equally spectacular. Asia was overwhelmingly composed of traditional agrarian societies at the close of World War II. Further, in the case of colonies, the economy was largely tied to that of the governing nation. Such industrialization as existed was primarily the product of expatriate entrepreneurs. In China, a small but influential class of indigenous capitalists existed, mainly in Shanghai and other coastal port cities. Yet more than 80 percent of the population were rural farmers, many desperately poor. Two cities -- Hong Kong and Singapore -- both under British governance and overwhelmingly Chinese in population, represented a striking contrast with rural Asia. Japan also stood out as an exception, having consciously constructed a developmental program from the early Meiji era designed to preserve its independence. In its mercantilist and cartelized pattern as well as in its reach for empire, its skill at adapting the classic Western model were displayed.
It is thus not surprising that Japan became a model for many of the late developing Asian nations in recent decades. With various adaptations, South Korea and Taiwan in particular found the Japanese pattern instructive. Japan's influence elsewhere was less pronounced, but usually present. From Japanese sources came the imagery of flying geese, with Japan in the lead, the newly industrial countries close behind, followed by all others.
Whatever one's evaluation of Japan's role, no one can doubt the phenomenal economic growth of most Asian societies in the past three decades, with the basic strategy being that of initial import substitution, a rapid emphasis upon exports, with government serving as supporter, guide and protector of the economy, yet the market given due homage. Thus, a region that once constituted a mere 4 percent of the global GNP, rose to some 25 percent in the course of a few decades, with 33 percent likely by the turn of the century.
However, not all Asian countries trod the path of economic success, at lease initially. Those following the Soviet economic model or Laskian socialism found that autarky separated them from critical aspects of the scientific-technological revolution even as over-bureaucratization damaged incentives and initiatives. In the contest between socialism and a market oriented system, the market won. Even North Korea, the last holdout, is furtively examining reform -- at a very late point. The role of state remains an important one, even in the most open systems, but as provider of macroeconomic policies and as regulator, not as an omniscient, omnipresent force.
With rapid development has come progressive interdependence. Far back in history, Asia had trade routes that brought diverse peoples into contact with each other. Yet the emphasis after World War II was initially upon separate economic systems, with a strong element of protectionism. In recent decades, however, the Asianization of Asia's economy has steadily advanced, albeit, less intensely than the Europeanization of West Europe's economy.
The process of interdependence has taken several directions. We have witnessed the emergence first of ASEAN, later of APEC, with the latter's goal that of free and open trading system in the early 21st century.
Simultaneously, Natural Economic Territories (NETs) have proliferated, noninstitutional economic entities cutting across political boundaries, combining resources, manpower, technology and capital in optimal degree. NETs may initially require the support of governments, or at a minimum, no opposition, but in the long run, they are dependent upon their attractiveness to the private sector. Over time, they may change shape, extending or contracting. Together with capital flows and migration tides, however, they are a powerful testimony to the economic revolution of our times.
Naturally, political and economic events have had major impact upon what we broadly term Asian culture. Looking back, one should note that societal differences in Asia were nurtured in certain respects by colonial policies. As suggested, the elite were drawn away from the peasantry by Western contacts and education. In certain respects, this included the indigenous military elite. However, they partook less of Western political values and more of a commitment to rapid economic development and modern mobilization techniques.
The colonial era also bequeathed deep fissures based upon ethnicity. These had always existed, to be sure, but colonial policy often included the use of ethnic minorities as counterweights to the dominants ethnic stream, whether as soldiers and police, or in more general terms, by granting them extensive autonomy. In addition, minorities were often the most suitable subjects for religious proselytization. Yet for the overwhelming majority of Asians, traditional values and life- styles remained largely intact, buttressed by the economic system and a self-contained, village-centered culture.
The monumental changes in Asian society in recent decades scarcely need to be elaborated. The combination of radio, television, and motion pictures has broken virtually all the old barriers to the outside world, even in most rural areas. Equally important has been the infusion of foreign products from Coca Cola to stylish dress. Yet the cultural gap between the younger, better educated, more affluent, urban Asians and their rural, less advantaged brethren is greater than in 1946. Thus, when one champions Asian culture against that of the West, the obvious question is "Which culture?" and this applies within a given society as well as among Asian states. And it is a supreme irony that those who raise this issue most vigorously are themselves among the most pronounced cultural hybrids.
The transformations in relations between and among nations that have taken place in recent decades are no less significant than those on the domestic front. After World War II, three broad political constellations emerged. The American and Soviet- ledalliances dominated the scene strategically, with a global balance painfully established and always tilted. Another group, composed principally of newly emerging states, termed itself the Non-Aligned Movement, and sought minimal risk and cost in the international arena.
With the end of the Cold War, the nature of those alliances that remained changed substantially. The earlier ties had been tight and all-encompassing. The major party had pledged protection and frequently, economic assistance. The minor party or parties had promised political allegiance. At present, however, existing alliances are in fact alignments. Pledges by the major party are generally conditional, and the minor parties feel free to establish external relationships of importance.
The fluidity in alliance patterns is matched by that in the broader arena. There is no international order at present. Agencies, global and regional, dedicated to peacemaking or peace- keeping, are far from adequate, as most observers would acknowledge. Solutions or containment of regional and sub- regional threats are dependent upon the construction of ad hoc coalitions, composed of nations whose perceived national interests are involved. Leadership in such instances varies, but the United States frequently plays that role.
In sum, economic, interdependence is far more advanced than political interdependence. And as the effort goes forward to strengthen or create institutions and mechanisms that will advance the security of all, insistence upon the sovereignty of the nation-state is frequently invoked to curb the scope and power of such bodies. Even the United Nations has a limited reach. Many new bodies and modalities have emerged, at sub- regional, regional and global levels, but generally, these organs are for dialogue, not governance. Perhaps one should emphasize the various agreements reached in the security as well as the economic realm. Yet, it must be admitted that above the nationstate, ours remains predominately a lawless age.
Window: Yet as we move into the 21st century, the issue of "What do I believe?" along with that of "Who am I?" will constitute twin challenges for the future.