ASEAN's task at hand

Bantarto Bandoro, Editor, 'The Indonesian Quarterly', Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, bandoro@csis.or.id

To the world's dismay and horror, 15 days later after India tested its nuclear weapons on May 13, 1998, Pakistan tested their own. Now the two are head to head again over Kashmir. India and Pakistan have fought three wars over Kashmir, and a deadly attack on India's Parliament last December sparked a military buildup leading to fears of a fourth major conflict between rivals. Other parts of the regions will also be implicated.

India and Pakistan have reportedly toned down their warlike rhetoric. But cross-border shelling persisted. The situation may worsen if the two countries really pursue their strategic ambitions. The deep hostility between India and Pakistan has shaped the two countries images about each other.

After President George Bush announced the war on terror in the wake of Sept. 11, India hoped Pakistan would withdraw its support for Pakistan-based militants. But it later found that the latter had continued to back Pakistan-based insurgents -- leading to a series of bellicose statements from India's Prime Minister Attar B. Vajpayee. A physical and real war is usually preceeded by a war of statements.

The clear and present danger is that the rulers of India and Pakistan are unconcerned of their nuclear capabilities that could overwhelmed each other's population and economy. According to one analysis, if war breaks out, it will be a limited one. Yet even this has already caused international concern given the nuclear arsenals in both countries.

Pakistan, who has fewer conventional forces than India, has always reserved the right to use nuclear weapons first. Even if anything is restricted to Kashmir, India and Pakistan may feel the need to disperse their nuclear wepons to ensure that their nuclear capability could not be destroyed in any surprise attacks. Each of them feel that nuclear weaponry is a viable way to ensure their security.

A serious international effort to help ease the tension is perhaps imperative.International leaders have begun urging a peaceful resolution. The U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is scheduled to visit the subcontinent this week. The visit is aimed at seeking a pledge from both sides, that both will not even think of moving their nuclear assets.

He must realize, however, that he will be dealing with the countries who have the age-long and unfinished business of Kashmir. The United States must be careful not to impose peace only to one party in the conflict. This would only raise suspicions that the U.S. is trying to impose its own strategic preferences. Unless the core issue is touched, anything achieved will be no more than a temporary and highly fragile peace.

The tension in the subcontinent and its security and political implication may go well beyond the region. The U.S.-led coalition against terrorism will be significantly affected for several reasons:

1. Pakistan's conflict with India will complicate its relationship with the U.S. due to suspicions that the U.S. might impose peace more on Islamabad than on New Dehli. Pakistan might tehn withdraw support for the coalition. This in a sense is also a security problem for the coalition;

2. Some suspect that the diplomatic moves of the U.S. in the subcontinent only aims to meet its avowed objective to contain China. Were this a real American interest, the coalition against terrorism will be counterproductive as this would only provoke China to strengthen its already strong strategic position in the subcontinent and draw China and Pakistan closer. This would certainly alter the strategic balance in the subcontinent.

The tension between India and Pakistan is also a security problem for Southeast Asia and ASEAN. India has enjoyed its position in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) since three years ago. It is precisely because of this that the ARF cannot avoid discussing security issues which directly involves its member. The Forum will certainly not deal in depth the core issue in India-Pakistan conflict.

But the likely involvement of nuclear weapons in the conflict and its security implication will at least strengthen ASEAN's commitment to its own version of a nuclear free zone treaty.

There is not much ASEAN can do to halt the possibility of a war between India and Pakistan. But ASEAN can at least utilize the coming November summit between ASEAN and India to discuss the issue if it persists. Vajpayee once said that Southeast Asia was one of the focal points of India's foreign policy and strategic concerns.

Hence ASEAN must be able to convince India that the latter's relations with ASEAN should not be sacrificed only because of its higher priority to the conflict with Pakistan. With regard to Southeast Asia, the continuing tension between India and Pakistan are destabilizing in two respects.

First, the security of Southeast Asia and ASEAN, in the longer term, will still be as vulnerable to a nuclear threat as it is to a non-conventional threat. Second, ASEAN must face the prospect of a breaking down of a non-proliferation regime in the region; meaning that it will be a barrier for building regional security. In its annual meeting this July ASEAN's task is to prevent an armed conflict between India and Pakistan, and to get the process of settling this difficult problem back to a political path.

It is in the interest of all members of the international community to prevent and eliminate the negative consequences of the continuing conflict. And the development of nuclear weapons in both countries in India and Pakistan may not have been in the best interest of the two nations, but both nations have developed their arsenals in response to a perceived security threat. ASEAN therefore should be part of the international efforts to help ease the tension. Security after all is the main concern of all members in South and Southeast Asia.