ASEAN's task at hand

ASEAN's task at hand

Bantarto Bandoro, Editor, 'The Indonesian Quarterly',
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta,
bandoro@csis.or.id

To the world's dismay and horror, 15 days later after India
tested its nuclear weapons on May 13, 1998, Pakistan tested their
own. Now the two are head to head again over Kashmir. India and
Pakistan have fought three wars over Kashmir, and a deadly attack
on India's Parliament last December sparked a military buildup
leading to fears of a fourth major conflict between rivals. Other
parts of the regions will also be implicated.

India and Pakistan have reportedly toned down their warlike
rhetoric. But cross-border shelling persisted. The situation may
worsen if the two countries really pursue their strategic
ambitions. The deep hostility between India and Pakistan has
shaped the two countries images about each other.

After President George Bush announced the war on terror in the
wake of Sept. 11, India hoped Pakistan would withdraw its support
for Pakistan-based militants. But it later found that the latter
had continued to back Pakistan-based insurgents -- leading to a
series of bellicose statements from India's Prime Minister Attar
B. Vajpayee. A physical and real war is usually preceeded by a
war of statements.

The clear and present danger is that the rulers of India and
Pakistan are unconcerned of their nuclear capabilities that could
overwhelmed each other's population and economy. According to one
analysis, if war breaks out, it will be a limited one. Yet even
this has already caused international concern given the nuclear
arsenals in both countries.

Pakistan, who has fewer conventional forces than India, has
always reserved the right to use nuclear weapons first. Even if
anything is restricted to Kashmir, India and Pakistan may feel
the need to disperse their nuclear wepons to ensure that their
nuclear capability could not be destroyed in any surprise
attacks. Each of them feel that nuclear weaponry is a viable way
to ensure their security.

A serious international effort to help ease the tension is
perhaps imperative.International leaders have begun urging a
peaceful resolution. The U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld is scheduled to visit the subcontinent this week. The
visit is aimed at seeking a pledge from both sides, that both
will not even think of moving their nuclear assets.

He must realize, however, that he will be dealing with the
countries who have the age-long and unfinished business of
Kashmir. The United States must be careful not to impose peace
only to one party in the conflict. This would only raise
suspicions that the U.S. is trying to impose its own strategic
preferences. Unless the core issue is touched, anything achieved
will be no more than a temporary and highly fragile peace.

The tension in the subcontinent and its security and political
implication may go well beyond the region. The U.S.-led coalition
against terrorism will be significantly affected for several
reasons:

1. Pakistan's conflict with India will complicate its
relationship with the U.S. due to suspicions that the U.S. might
impose peace more on Islamabad than on New Dehli. Pakistan might
tehn withdraw support for the coalition. This in a sense is also
a security problem for the coalition;

2. Some suspect that the diplomatic moves of the U.S. in the
subcontinent only aims to meet its avowed objective to contain
China. Were this a real American interest, the coalition against
terrorism will be counterproductive as this would only provoke
China to strengthen its already strong strategic position in the
subcontinent and draw China and Pakistan closer. This would
certainly alter the strategic balance in the subcontinent.

The tension between India and Pakistan is also a security
problem for Southeast Asia and ASEAN. India has enjoyed its
position in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) since three years ago.
It is precisely because of this that the ARF cannot avoid
discussing security issues which directly involves its member.
The Forum will certainly not deal in depth the core issue in
India-Pakistan conflict.

But the likely involvement of nuclear weapons in the conflict
and its security implication will at least strengthen ASEAN's
commitment to its own version of a nuclear free zone treaty.

There is not much ASEAN can do to halt the possibility of a
war between India and Pakistan. But ASEAN can at least utilize
the coming November summit between ASEAN and India to discuss the
issue if it persists. Vajpayee once said that Southeast Asia was
one of the focal points of India's foreign policy and strategic
concerns.

Hence ASEAN must be able to convince India that the latter's
relations with ASEAN should not be sacrificed only because of its
higher priority to the conflict with Pakistan. With regard to
Southeast Asia, the continuing tension between India and Pakistan
are destabilizing in two respects.

First, the security of Southeast Asia and ASEAN, in the longer
term, will still be as vulnerable to a nuclear threat as it is to
a non-conventional threat. Second, ASEAN must face the prospect
of a breaking down of a non-proliferation regime in the region;
meaning that it will be a barrier for building regional security.
In its annual meeting this July ASEAN's task is to prevent an
armed conflict between India and Pakistan, and to get the process
of settling this difficult problem back to a political path.

It is in the interest of all members of the international
community to prevent and eliminate the negative consequences of
the continuing conflict. And the development of nuclear weapons
in both countries in India and Pakistan may not have been in the
best interest of the two nations, but both nations have developed
their arsenals in response to a perceived security threat. ASEAN
therefore should be part of the international efforts to help
ease the tension. Security after all is the main concern of all
members in South and Southeast Asia.