ASEAN's Second Bali Summit

ASEAN's Second Bali Summit

C.P.F. Luhulima, Foreign Affairs Analyst, Centre for Strategic and
International Studies, (CSIS), Jakarta

On Oct. 7-8, 2003 ASEAN Leaders will meet for a second time in
Bali, this time to establish an ASEAN Community comprising
political and security, economic, social and cultural cooperation
which are now considered to have grown closely together to the
point of integration and thus reinforcing ASEAN's quest for
peace, stability and prosperity in the region.

It will be formulated into a second Declaration of the ASEAN
Concord. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation of 1976, which has
been amended twice (1987 and 1998) to allow non-Southeast Asian
countries to become party to it under specific conditions, will
be highlighted again as the crucial code of conduct that govern
relations between member states to promote peace and stability in
the region.

However, ASEAN continues to refrain from expanding its
validity of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), allegedly the primary
forum for the enhancement for political and security cooperation
in the wider Asia-Pacific region. The ARF still lacks a code of
conduct in its endeavors to establish and ensure security in the
Asia-Pacific, in going through its three stages of cooperation,
confidence-building, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution
-- which is still being formulated at the insistence of China.

The essence of the Treaty had been applied to the South China
Sea. The Declaration of Principles of the South China Sea of July
1992 persuades all parties to "apply the principles of the Treaty
of Amity and Cooperation as a basis for formulating a code of
international conduct in the South China Sea" and "invites all
parties to abide by the Declaration of Principles."

It is, however, only the Declaration of Principles, not the
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in its entirety, including the
High Council to resolve intra-mural conflicts, that is being
applied here. The emphasis on the operational capacity of the
High Council in the coming Summit is essentially for ASEAN
members to take into consideration for peaceful conflict
resolution.

At the upcoming 9th Summit, ASEAN will accept China's, India's
and possibly Russia's formal requests to become party to the
Treaty. Does this mean that the three signatories will have the
right to request for the institution of the High Council for
peaceful conflict resolutions in cases of border or territorial
disputes between them and the ASEAN members or will it be
referred to the International Court of Justice in the Hague?

The ASEAN Security Community to be established at the second
Bali Summit is essentially a community that relies exclusively on
peaceful processes in the settlement of intra-mural differences,
that security in this community is essentially indivisible. Its
theme is comprehensive security, comprising national and regional
resilience, and which is again, like in the first Bali Concord,
highlighted.

It subscribes to the UN Charter and principles of
international law and upholds ASEAN's principles of independence,
sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national
identity, non-interference in the internal affairs of one another
and repudiation of the threat or use of force, and peaceful
settlement of disputes. Maritime cooperation is highlighted as an
integral part in the establishment of this security community.

Combating terrorism, essentially as a crime against humanity,
and other trans-national organized crime is equally the main
thrust of this security community. However, comprehensive
security here excludes military cooperation, alliances and
defense pacts. Equally, the establishment a joint ASEAN foreign
policy is not included in an ASEAN Security Community.

A design of an ASEAN Security Community 20 years from now
should, however, not preclude common defense and foreign
policies. A security community that pretends to be future
oriented should keep its options open, a task future generations
should further contemplate upon and redesign. Any attempt to
prescribe policies from our generation's points of view for them
to implement will surely be unsuccessful.

They will have to respond to challenges that will emerge from
the changes in the political and security configurations in the
future. An ASEAN foreign minister may not be impossible in 20
years. One who will be responsible for a joint ASEAN foreign
policy and perhaps a joint ASEAN security policy.

Equally, we could say that the present generation should meet
its security needs without compromising the needs of future
generations to do the same in perhaps entirely different
circumstances.

An over-emphasis on the rights of sovereignty should in times
of globalization and the intense international communication and
information revolution be balanced by the obligations of the
state to guarantee human rights and human security.

Such a clear-cut statement in the Constitution on the
government's responsibility for the basic rights of human beings
in Indonesia should make it realize that it must raise the
subject in the coming Summit. It is here that Indonesia should
take the leadership in the redefinition of non-interference, in
balancing the rights and obligation of sovereignty, state and
human security in the ASEAN region, although human rights
violations are still rampant in this country.

ASEAN's Economic Community is much more advanced in its end-
goal, to accomplish "a stable, prosperous and highly competitive
ASEAN economic region in which there is a free flow of goods,
services, investment, and a freer flow of capital, equitable
economic development and reduced poverty and socio-economic
disparities" in 2020. The approach should essentially be
incremental towards "an integrated market and an integrated
production network", thus stimulating investment inflows,
economies of scale and consumer welfare.

It is envisioned to enhanced ASEAN's credibility and economic
weight. ASEAN's strategy in achieving an economic community
comprises two fundamental approaches: ASEAN's integration and
enhanced economic competitiveness. A common regional market is
thus on the agenda, essentially, according to Goh Cok Tong,
Singapore's prime minister, to balance China's and India's rising
low-wage competition.

Of course, the rolling back of the original setting of the
timetable of 2020 still depends on the domestic economic outlooks
of the various member states. In this effort, Singapore, Thailand
and Malaysia (rather than Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia as
projected earlier) will definitely take the lead in bringing
forward the target dates of an economically integrated ASEAN and
perhaps a common ASEAN currency to step up its competitiveness.

Talking about ASEAN leadership, does the regional grouping
still depend on charismatic leadership? No! The need for
charismatic leadership of ASEAN has definitely passed.

Mahathir Mohammad will be the last of that category. ASEAN's
new brand of leaders will be administrator types, not solidarity
makers as the former ones, as the generation of Soeharto, Lee
Kuan Yew, Tun Hussein Onn, Mahathir Mohammad, Prem Tinsulanonda,
and Ferdinand Marcos demonstrated.

These new type of leaders will need more input into the
decision making from civil society, from ASEAN's second and third
track institutions. These new type of leaders will have to design
the new ASEAN way in promoting regional cooperation and
integration, where respect for human rights, democracy,
transparency and fairness will be central in making ASEAN more
relevant to the population at large.