ASEAN's role in resolving the conflict in Aceh

ASEAN's role in resolving the conflict in Aceh

Makmur Keliat, Jakarta

The case for engaging the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) and the European Union (EU) in the process of
conflict resolution in Aceh seems to be viewed with apprehension
both by those who are within or those who are outside the
government. Some legislators, for instance, have argued that the
involvement of third parties in the resolution of the separatist
conflict in Aceh province is a dangerous initiative as it could
provide GAM with the opportunity to internationalize the
conflict.

Meanwhile, Minister of Defense Juwono Sudarsono has aired the
opinion that the ongoing negotiations between Indonesian
delegates and GAM are not binding on the grounds that the
meetings are informal.

Juwono's statement implies at least two important things.
First, there are divergent views within the inner Cabinet on the
strategic importance of the recent meetings held in Helsinki.
Second, given that there has been an encouraging atmosphere of
institutional cooperation between the Ministry of Defense and the
Indonesian Armed Forces on a number of issues related to defense
and security policies, it may be assumed that Juwono's statement
reflects the views of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI).

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, therefore, is confronted
with the question of not only how to convince the House of
Representatives and reconcile divergent views among his Cabinet
members. Of equal importance, he should also take measures to
allay the apprehensions felt by the TNI.

This, however, will require a great deal of tact. Susilo is
indeed being facing a dilemma. If he agrees with the idea of
involving third parties in the Aceh conflict, the nationalists
and the hardliners within the TNI will likely accuse him of
succumbing to external pressures.

On the other side of the coin, he also needs to save the face
of Vice President Jusuf Kalla, who is perceived by the public as
the main architect of the Indonesian position in the current
negotiations. How and in what way Susilo will resolve these
delicate problems is currently a matter of conjecture.

It is sad that ASEAN has not established any mechanism through
which Indonesia could invite the regional organization to
participate in peaceful conflict resolution. No document
whatsoever has been produced by ASEAN that could provide norms
and an entry point for resolving an intrastate conflict.

In essence ASEAN, both through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
mechanism and the ASEAN Security Community, is mainly concerned
with interstate conflict. The achievements and failures of ASEAN
in this context are well known. It is noteworthy for its
confidence building measures but has had far less success with
preventive diplomacy, let alone conflict resolution.

For instance, though all the member countries of ASEAN have
agreed to establish a High Council, bilateral conflicts have
never been resolved through a regional mechanism. Rather than
using the regional framework, the member countries of ASEAN have
relied on bilateral mechanisms to resolve disputes among them for
fear of eroding sovereignty.

In fact, mainly because of similar fears, the idea of having
a regional peace keeping force was omitted from the initial draft
of the ASEAN Security Community document. That is also the reason
why the involvement of Indonesia as a third party in the case
of conflict resolution in the southern part of the Philippines in
the past was not based on an ASEAN framework but rather on a
bilateral agreement upon by Manila and Jakarta.

In this regard, it is also worth mentioning that ASEAN's
concerns over Myanmar have nothing to do with identity conflict
such as in Aceh. It has mainly resulted from the issue of
democratization. Hence, the case of Aceh is totally different
from that of Myanmar given that Indonesia has a democratic
political system.

Seen from this point of view, it is not an exaggeration to
point out that involving ASEAN in conflict resolution in Aceh
would be an extremely bad idea. Indonesian negotiators seem to
have pulled the idea out of the air without knowing exactly what
ASEAN is all about. Why has this fatal mistake been made? Is it
right to say that it is simply because of ignorance?

Though there is no firm evidence, it seems to suggest that
little policy consultation was engaged in with the Indonesian
Foreign Ministry before the Indonesian negotiators arrived at the
negotiating table. Had such consultation taken place, the mistake
would never have happened. This is certainly quite a strange case
as none of the Indonesian negotiators currently involved in the
process have impressive records in diplomatic work or much
experience in the wording of accords.

Against this background, there has been speculation that the
zeal of the Indonesian government in attempting to resolve the
conflict in Aceh is due the possibility of large-scale
infrastructure development projects in the province in the wake
of the tsunami. A number of large Indonesian companies have a
great economic interest in taking advantage of these projects and
it is rumored that they have urged the government to resolve the
conflict in Aceh based on a pragmatic approach. They may belief
that without the active involvement of GAM in joint development,
Aceh will remain volatile with the result that the infrastructure
projects will be unable to go ahead.

Driven by this pragmatic approach, they may also believe that
GAM would give up its rebellion if the central government allowed
it to become a stakeholder in the projects. If that is the case
then it is no wonder that the Indonesian negotiators have failed
to understand the basic normative principles, functions and
powers of ASEAN as a regional organization in Southeast Asia.

The writer is the Executive Director of the Center for East
Asian Cooperation Studies at the University of Indonesia.