ASEAN's role in resolving the conflict in Aceh

Makmur Keliat, Jakarta

The case for engaging the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the European Union (EU) in the process of conflict resolution in Aceh seems to be viewed with apprehension both by those who are within or those who are outside the government. Some legislators, for instance, have argued that the involvement of third parties in the resolution of the separatist conflict in Aceh province is a dangerous initiative as it could provide GAM with the opportunity to internationalize the conflict.

Meanwhile, Minister of Defense Juwono Sudarsono has aired the opinion that the ongoing negotiations between Indonesian delegates and GAM are not binding on the grounds that the meetings are informal.

Juwono's statement implies at least two important things. First, there are divergent views within the inner Cabinet on the strategic importance of the recent meetings held in Helsinki. Second, given that there has been an encouraging atmosphere of institutional cooperation between the Ministry of Defense and the Indonesian Armed Forces on a number of issues related to defense and security policies, it may be assumed that Juwono's statement reflects the views of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI).

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, therefore, is confronted with the question of not only how to convince the House of Representatives and reconcile divergent views among his Cabinet members. Of equal importance, he should also take measures to allay the apprehensions felt by the TNI.

This, however, will require a great deal of tact. Susilo is indeed being facing a dilemma. If he agrees with the idea of involving third parties in the Aceh conflict, the nationalists and the hardliners within the TNI will likely accuse him of succumbing to external pressures.

On the other side of the coin, he also needs to save the face of Vice President Jusuf Kalla, who is perceived by the public as the main architect of the Indonesian position in the current negotiations. How and in what way Susilo will resolve these delicate problems is currently a matter of conjecture.

It is sad that ASEAN has not established any mechanism through which Indonesia could invite the regional organization to participate in peaceful conflict resolution. No document whatsoever has been produced by ASEAN that could provide norms and an entry point for resolving an intrastate conflict.

In essence ASEAN, both through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) mechanism and the ASEAN Security Community, is mainly concerned with interstate conflict. The achievements and failures of ASEAN in this context are well known. It is noteworthy for its confidence building measures but has had far less success with preventive diplomacy, let alone conflict resolution.

For instance, though all the member countries of ASEAN have agreed to establish a High Council, bilateral conflicts have never been resolved through a regional mechanism. Rather than using the regional framework, the member countries of ASEAN have relied on bilateral mechanisms to resolve disputes among them for fear of eroding sovereignty.

In fact, mainly because of similar fears, the idea of having a regional peace keeping force was omitted from the initial draft of the ASEAN Security Community document. That is also the reason why the involvement of Indonesia as a third party in the case of conflict resolution in the southern part of the Philippines in the past was not based on an ASEAN framework but rather on a bilateral agreement upon by Manila and Jakarta.

In this regard, it is also worth mentioning that ASEAN's concerns over Myanmar have nothing to do with identity conflict such as in Aceh. It has mainly resulted from the issue of democratization. Hence, the case of Aceh is totally different from that of Myanmar given that Indonesia has a democratic political system.

Seen from this point of view, it is not an exaggeration to point out that involving ASEAN in conflict resolution in Aceh would be an extremely bad idea. Indonesian negotiators seem to have pulled the idea out of the air without knowing exactly what ASEAN is all about. Why has this fatal mistake been made? Is it right to say that it is simply because of ignorance?

Though there is no firm evidence, it seems to suggest that little policy consultation was engaged in with the Indonesian Foreign Ministry before the Indonesian negotiators arrived at the negotiating table. Had such consultation taken place, the mistake would never have happened. This is certainly quite a strange case as none of the Indonesian negotiators currently involved in the process have impressive records in diplomatic work or much experience in the wording of accords.

Against this background, there has been speculation that the zeal of the Indonesian government in attempting to resolve the conflict in Aceh is due the possibility of large-scale infrastructure development projects in the province in the wake of the tsunami. A number of large Indonesian companies have a great economic interest in taking advantage of these projects and it is rumored that they have urged the government to resolve the conflict in Aceh based on a pragmatic approach. They may belief that without the active involvement of GAM in joint development, Aceh will remain volatile with the result that the infrastructure projects will be unable to go ahead.

Driven by this pragmatic approach, they may also believe that GAM would give up its rebellion if the central government allowed it to become a stakeholder in the projects. If that is the case then it is no wonder that the Indonesian negotiators have failed to understand the basic normative principles, functions and powers of ASEAN as a regional organization in Southeast Asia.

The writer is the Executive Director of the Center for East Asian Cooperation Studies at the University of Indonesia.