ASEAN's China-Taiwan policy

By Jusuf Wanandi

JAKARTA (JP): Questions are being asked about ASEAN's (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) policies on China-Taiwan relations, because ASEAN member countries (except Singapore) have said almost nothing about the tensions across the Straits at the height of Chinese military exercises during Taiwan's presidential campaign last March. Last month, several ASEAN countries received a visit from John Chang, Taiwan's foreign minister, when he made a swing through southeast Asia. This adds to the curiosity of observers regarding ASEAN's stand on the China-Taiwan relationship, because it looks contradictory, while in fact it is not. Here is why.

First, as a matter of principle in guiding the relationship between ASEAN and China, ASEAN countries strictly adhere to the policy of "one China" and that Taiwan is an integral part of China. This policy is not likely to change in the future.

There are several reasons why this is a matter of principle to ASEAN. All ASEAN members have their irredentist movement and they all understand how vital and emotional this issue is for their own people and leaders. Indonesia, for instance, almost went to war against the Dutch in its efforts to regain the last part of the former Netherlands Indies, West Irian, in 1962. It was president Kennedy's intervention and ambassador Elsworth Bunker's mediation at the UN that prevented a war between Indonesia and the Netherlands from breaking out.

ASEAN members do not want anybody to intervene in their problems of irredentist movements, and therefore, they can completely understand and sympathize with China on the Taiwan re- unification problem. China also poses the most important strategic challenge, especially for ASEAN as its neighbor, because it is an emerging great power in the region and the world. The challenge for the region is to establish peaceful and cooperative relations with China and to get it positively involved in the region as a responsible member and leader of the region.

Of course, this is not only ASEAN's challenge, but ASEAN's role in forging positive relations with China could be a real contribution for a peaceful Asia Pacific region. Therefore, while Taiwan's economic role in the region is well-appreciated, it is no comparison with China's strategic importance to ASEAN and the region.

Third, while some countries, especially the West, have been supportive of Taiwan because of its emerging democracy, ASEAN's position is that this domestic development will not influence ASEAN's foreign policies towards Taiwan.

The tensions around the presidential elections last March in fact began earlier, resulting from Taiwan's changes on the status quo in her relations with China. This partly results from domestic pressures, and is partly due to the ending of the Cold War. Efforts by Taiwan to create what China has called a "two- China" or a "one China and one Taiwan" policy by applying for membership in the UN at the end of 1993 and "private" visits by the president, premier or ministers from Taiwan to Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Europe (culminating in President Lee Teng Hui's visit to the U.S. in May 1995) produced the tensions with and retaliation by China.

ASEAN understands that the Chinese military exercises during Taiwan's presidential election in March were intended to send a very serious warning to Taiwan and were not a preparation for war, which China at this stage could not afford and would not win. The missile testing around Taiwan could be a real mishap, and China was privately informed about ASEAN's concerns on that. That act by China also interfered with the freedom of navigation around the island. Despite the international media hype, most ASEAN members kept their heads cool.

John Chang's visits to ASEAN member nations were mainly Taiwan's own initiative and were handled very carefully by ASEAN governments: first, so as not to give an official status to the visits and second, not to encourage similar visits in the future. In some instances, they also indicate that there are inter-agency problems of coordination in the ASEAN country visited.

But in the future, ASEAN should be very cautious not to repeat this, because ASEAN members themselves would not like to face reciprocal acts in the future from China. Rather, exchanges between Taiwan and ASEAN countries should involve sub-cabinet economic officials.

In the meantime, the heat across the Straits has subsided, but the problem remains far from being solved. While Taiwan has lessened its "provocation" towards China in order not to anger a powerful neighbor, Taiwan is still following the same basic policies on Straits relations. The unwillingness of Taiwan to develop direct links with China, and the recent move by the government in Taipei to discourage Taiwanese private investments in China are rather worrying. The Chinese, while being quiet, are observing Taiwan's policies very closely. ASEAN should make clear to both sides that an increase of tensions -- or worse, a conflict in the region -- is against the region's interest to achieve a dynamic and peaceful region in the Asia Pacific in the future. Therefore, any provocation from either side and any conflict arising from those actions should be looked upon disapprovingly by the region and acted upon together, especially by ASEAN.

In the meantime, efforts by ASEAN to encourage more dialogues and confidence building between the two parties have to be enhanced, while reunification should be postponed into the future, maybe for a further 10 or 20 years. Dialogues and political negotiations on matters other than reunification could take place. These could involve such issues as confidence building measures (CBMs), the three direct links (post, air and shipping services, and trade), the content of a one-China policy, Taiwan's international space problem, Taiwan's political status, as well as on the specific arrangements for ending hostilities. This will be a difficult and an arduous task for both sides, but could be done if there is enough political will on both sides. But first, it is important for Taiwan to recognize the "one China" principle now and not only in the future.

If Taiwan commits itself to abide by the "one China" principle and really implements it with other CBM measures towards China, then it could be expected that China will make reciprocal concessions, such as a commitment to not use force against Taiwan so long as Taiwan sticks to the "one China" principle, adopting a flexible policy toward Taiwan's international space problem; negotiating with Taipei on an equal footing, and settling problems related to Taiwan's interests after Hong Kong's return to China.

At the end of difficult negotiations, one could expect that a peaceful agreement to end the hostilities could be reached and Straits relations will enter a completely new stage.

Window: The Chinese, while being quiet, are observing Taiwan policies very closesly. ASEAN should make clear to both sides that an increase of tensions -- or worse, a conflict in the region -- is against the region's interest.