ASEAN's China-Taiwan policy

ASEAN's China-Taiwan policy

By Jusuf Wanandi

JAKARTA (JP): Questions are being asked about ASEAN's
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations) policies on China-Taiwan
relations, because ASEAN member countries (except Singapore) have
said almost nothing about the tensions across the Straits at the
height of Chinese military exercises during Taiwan's presidential
campaign last March. Last month, several ASEAN countries received
a visit from John Chang, Taiwan's foreign minister, when he made
a swing through southeast Asia. This adds to the curiosity of
observers regarding ASEAN's stand on the China-Taiwan
relationship, because it looks contradictory, while in fact it is
not. Here is why.

First, as a matter of principle in guiding the relationship
between ASEAN and China, ASEAN countries strictly adhere to the
policy of "one China" and that Taiwan is an integral part of
China. This policy is not likely to change in the future.

There are several reasons why this is a matter of principle to
ASEAN. All ASEAN members have their irredentist movement and they
all understand how vital and emotional this issue is for their
own people and leaders. Indonesia, for instance, almost went to
war against the Dutch in its efforts to regain the last part of
the former Netherlands Indies, West Irian, in 1962. It was
president Kennedy's intervention and ambassador Elsworth Bunker's
mediation at the UN that prevented a war between Indonesia and
the Netherlands from breaking out.

ASEAN members do not want anybody to intervene in their
problems of irredentist movements, and therefore, they can
completely understand and sympathize with China on the Taiwan re-
unification problem. China also poses the most important
strategic challenge, especially for ASEAN as its neighbor,
because it is an emerging great power in the region and the
world. The challenge for the region is to establish peaceful and
cooperative relations with China and to get it positively
involved in the region as a responsible member and leader of the
region.

Of course, this is not only ASEAN's challenge, but ASEAN's
role in forging positive relations with China could be a real
contribution for a peaceful Asia Pacific region. Therefore, while
Taiwan's economic role in the region is well-appreciated, it is
no comparison with China's strategic importance to ASEAN and the
region.

Third, while some countries, especially the West, have been
supportive of Taiwan because of its emerging democracy, ASEAN's
position is that this domestic development will not influence
ASEAN's foreign policies towards Taiwan.

The tensions around the presidential elections last March in
fact began earlier, resulting from Taiwan's changes on the status
quo in her relations with China. This partly results from
domestic pressures, and is partly due to the ending of the Cold
War. Efforts by Taiwan to create what China has called a "two-
China" or a "one China and one Taiwan" policy by applying for
membership in the UN at the end of 1993 and "private" visits by
the president, premier or ministers from Taiwan to Southeast
Asia, the Middle East and Europe (culminating in President Lee
Teng Hui's visit to the U.S. in May 1995) produced the tensions
with and retaliation by China.

ASEAN understands that the Chinese military exercises during
Taiwan's presidential election in March were intended to send a
very serious warning to Taiwan and were not a preparation for
war, which China at this stage could not afford and would not
win. The missile testing around Taiwan could be a real mishap,
and China was privately informed about ASEAN's concerns on that.
That act by China also interfered with the freedom of navigation
around the island. Despite the international media hype, most
ASEAN members kept their heads cool.

John Chang's visits to ASEAN member nations were mainly
Taiwan's own initiative and were handled very carefully by ASEAN
governments: first, so as not to give an official status to the
visits and second, not to encourage similar visits in the future.
In some instances, they also indicate that there are inter-agency
problems of coordination in the ASEAN country visited.

But in the future, ASEAN should be very cautious not to repeat
this, because ASEAN members themselves would not like to face
reciprocal acts in the future from China. Rather, exchanges
between Taiwan and ASEAN countries should involve sub-cabinet
economic officials.

In the meantime, the heat across the Straits has subsided, but
the problem remains far from being solved. While Taiwan has
lessened its "provocation" towards China in order not to anger a
powerful neighbor, Taiwan is still following the same basic
policies on Straits relations. The unwillingness of Taiwan to
develop direct links with China, and the recent move by the
government in Taipei to discourage Taiwanese private investments
in China are rather worrying. The Chinese, while being quiet, are
observing Taiwan's policies very closely. ASEAN should make clear
to both sides that an increase of tensions -- or worse, a
conflict in the region -- is against the region's interest to
achieve a dynamic and peaceful region in the Asia Pacific in the
future. Therefore, any provocation from either side and any
conflict arising from those actions should be looked upon
disapprovingly by the region and acted upon together, especially
by ASEAN.

In the meantime, efforts by ASEAN to encourage more dialogues
and confidence building between the two parties have to be
enhanced, while reunification should be postponed into the
future, maybe for a further 10 or 20 years. Dialogues and
political negotiations on matters other than reunification could
take place. These could involve such issues as confidence
building measures (CBMs), the three direct links (post, air and
shipping services, and trade), the content of a one-China policy,
Taiwan's international space problem, Taiwan's political status,
as well as on the specific arrangements for ending hostilities.
This will be a difficult and an arduous task for both sides, but
could be done if there is enough political will on both sides.
But first, it is important for Taiwan to recognize the "one
China" principle now and not only in the future.

If Taiwan commits itself to abide by the "one China" principle
and really implements it with other CBM measures towards China,
then it could be expected that China will make reciprocal
concessions, such as a commitment to not use force against Taiwan
so long as Taiwan sticks to the "one China" principle, adopting a
flexible policy toward Taiwan's international space problem;
negotiating with Taipei on an equal footing, and settling
problems related to Taiwan's interests after Hong Kong's return
to China.

At the end of difficult negotiations, one could expect that a
peaceful agreement to end the hostilities could be reached and
Straits relations will enter a completely new stage.

Window: The Chinese, while being quiet, are observing Taiwan
policies very closesly. ASEAN should make clear to both sides
that an increase of tensions -- or worse, a conflict in the
region -- is against the region's interest.