ASEAN+3 versus the East Asia Summit

R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa, Jakarta

From the vantage point of 2005, ASEAN+3 cooperation, namely cooperation between the 10 ASEAN countries and the "+3" (China, Japan and South Korea), is regarded as a given.

But there is little doubt that it was the impact of the regional financial crisis that struck in 1997, which gave tremendous momentum to this cooperation. The contagion effect of that financial shock transcended the geographical distinction between Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia.

Herein lies the strategic importance of the Second ASEAN Informal Summit in Kuala Lumpur in 1997 which expanded ASEAN's cooperation with China, Japan, and Korea, by convening the First ASEAN+3 Summit.

Of particular relevance to today's discussion is the establishment of an East Asia Vision Group (EAVG), whose main task was to determine the vision to promote the establishment of an East Asia community (EAc). One particular recommendation of EAVG regarding the establishment of EAc was "the evolution of the annual summit meetings of ASEAN+3 into the East Asian Summit ".

Based on that recommendation, an East Asia Study Group (EASG) was formed in 2001, with the main task of reviewing all EAVG recommendations, with a focus on identifying all concrete cooperation that could help fulfill the vision of East Asia.

The final report of the EASG was delivered to the ASEAN+3 Summit in Phnom Penh, in 2002. With regard to the EAS, it was considered a medium- and long-term measure, which should be carried out gradually.

There are at least two pertinent points to be drawn from the above.

First, ASEAN's capacity to effect positive change within itself. Although the financial crisis that struck in 1997 could have weakened not only the individual affected countries but also ASEAN as a collective entity, ASEAN actually managed to strengthen itself by forging cooperation with the "+3" countries.

Therefore, an outward looking and open perspective, far from diluting the relevance of ASEAN has in fact strengthened ASEAN.

Second, ASEAN's capacity to effect change outside itself. Prior to ASEAN's initiative in 1997, it was hardly the norm to consider China, Japan and South Korea as a collective "three". While no one is making a claim that cooperation with ASEAN has provided the "glue" that binds the three countries together, it remains a fact that ASEAN did have a role in developing the habit and practice of thinking as a "three".

Where does a prospective East Asia Summit fit in the original scheme of things?

It is worth noting that the East Asia Summit as recommended in the EASG report was visualized as a continuation of the ASEAN+3 process, involving the same countries, and to be held when the ASEAN+3 process has sufficiently matured.

Such a step-by-step and incremental approach to the East Asia Summit was, however, essentially jettisoned at the Tenth ASEAN Summit and the ASEAN+3 Summit, held in Vientiane late November 2004. At these summits, the leaders decided to hold the first EAS in Malaysia in 2005 and tasked the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of ASEAN to further study the idea of such an EAS, including the projected modalities and selection of participants.

In effect, therefore, what was once a medium or long term goal has been given a compressed time frame of just one year. More significantly, perhaps, while previous conventional wisdom was for the ASEAN+3 Summit to transform itself into an East Asia Summit as a reflection of the move towards fin East Asia community, today we face the prospect of the ASEAN+3 Summit coexisting with the East Asia Summit.

Indonesia does not find it appealing that the ASEAN+3 Summit should simply be duplicated by an East Asia Summit with the same participants and essentially the same agenda, with each co- existing with the other. This would be inefficient and cannot possibly be sustainable in the long run. Of course, attempts may be made to tinker with the agenda while maintaining the same participants. However, given the already extensive scope of the existing ASEAN+3 agenda, it would be difficult to imagine an East Asia Summit, similarly constituted, to be able to carve a new and distinct agenda.

Nor is Indonesia attracted to the idea of simply renaming the ASEAN+3 Summit to East Asia Summit, again essentially with the same participants and agenda. Unlike the earlier scenario, however, whose drawback is primarily its inefficiency, simply re- labeling ASEAN+3 to make it the East Asia Summit would in fact be even more disadvantageous. This would certainly be the case if it entailed the termination of the ASEAN+3 Summit and its substitution with an East Asia Summit.

At a stroke, we would then be extinguishing the important achievements of the ASEAN+3 process to-date with no clear and visible gains in return.

There is also another factor to consider. In contrast to the ASEAN+3 Summit in which ASEAN member countries have participated as a collective "10" in cooperating with the "+3", participation in an East Asian Summit of this type would be individual or national in nature. As a result, the benefits flowing from the collective weight of ASEAN may be lost.

For all those reasons, I believe that one must envision the planned Fast Asia Summit as something distinct from the ASEAN+3 Summit.

In particular, I believe that in thinking about the planned East Asia Summit there is a need to ensure that ASEAN remain at the core of the undertaking. This is more than a procedural matter of Summit participation. It is, in fact, nothing less than a way or ensuring that ASEAN has a say in the evolution of an East Asia community.

If, indeed, we are motivated to ensure that ASEAN remains as the "hub" in the future East Asia community process, it is my belief that we need to adopt a fresh and bold perspective.

More specifically, we need to think beyond the "+3" countries as the constituents of the East Asia Summit by looking also at India, Australia and New Zealand. Hence, rather than looking at the ASEAN+3 as the exclusive constituting elements of the East Asia Summit we should visualize ASEAN occupying the "hub", with three "spokes", namely the "+ 3" countries to its north, India to its west and Australia and New Zealand to its southeast.

I believe that such an approach would help ensure that the East Asia Summit to be held later this year in Malaysia actually address the challenges that we are likely to face in the coming years and also the opportunities.

On the latter, I need hardly expand on the economic opportunities that a rapidly growing India would present to ASEAN. Nor can we belittle the relatively untapped potential that Australia and New Zealand can offer to ASEAN countries in promoting their economic advancement.

In emphasizing the opportunities that such an expanded notion of the East Asia Summit offers, I do not wish to underestimate the challenges. Principal among these is the simple fact that while we embark on the East Asia community building process as represented by the convening of the East Asia Summit later this year, ASEAN itself has just set in motion the process of building an ASEAN Community built on three pillars, namely security, socio-cultural and economic.

The challenge, essentially, is how to ensure that present and future attention on the East Asia Summit does not detract from what must remain the priority effort to build an ASEAN Community.

In the same way that in 1997 when the financial crisis struck and ASEAN responded by opening up and reaching out to the "+3" countries to their mutual advantage, it is my view that today in 2005 ASEAN must look anew at its regional environment and adopt a hold and fresh perspective by expanding the notion of an East Asia process or summit by including India, Australia and New Zealand. Doing so would not only benefit ASEAN, but would also highlight ASEAN's not insignificant contribution to promoting prosperity, peace and stability in the wider region.

The writer is Director-General for ASEAN Cooperation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and concurrently its spokesperson. The views expressed herein are personal and do not necessarily reflect the view of the Government of Indonesia. The article is taken from a paper presented at the bimonthly meeting of the Center for East Asian Cooperation Studies (CEACoS), and hosted by The Jakarta Post.