ASEAN+3 versus the East Asia Summit

ASEAN+3 versus the East Asia Summit

R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa, Jakarta

From the vantage point of 2005, ASEAN+3 cooperation, namely
cooperation between the 10 ASEAN countries and the "+3" (China,
Japan and South Korea), is regarded as a given.

But there is little doubt that it was the impact of the
regional financial crisis that struck in 1997, which gave
tremendous momentum to this cooperation. The contagion effect of
that financial shock transcended the geographical distinction
between Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia.

Herein lies the strategic importance of the Second ASEAN
Informal Summit in Kuala Lumpur in 1997 which expanded ASEAN's
cooperation with China, Japan, and Korea, by convening the First
ASEAN+3 Summit.

Of particular relevance to today's discussion is the
establishment of an East Asia Vision Group (EAVG), whose main
task was to determine the vision to promote the establishment of
an East Asia community (EAc). One particular recommendation of
EAVG regarding the establishment of EAc was "the evolution of the
annual summit meetings of ASEAN+3 into the East Asian Summit ".

Based on that recommendation, an East Asia Study Group (EASG)
was formed in 2001, with the main task of reviewing all EAVG
recommendations, with a focus on identifying all concrete
cooperation that could help fulfill the vision of East Asia.

The final report of the EASG was delivered to the ASEAN+3
Summit in Phnom Penh, in 2002. With regard to the EAS, it was
considered a medium- and long-term measure, which should be
carried out gradually.

There are at least two pertinent points to be drawn from the
above.

First, ASEAN's capacity to effect positive change within
itself. Although the financial crisis that struck in 1997 could
have weakened not only the individual affected countries but also
ASEAN as a collective entity, ASEAN actually managed to
strengthen itself by forging cooperation with the "+3" countries.

Therefore, an outward looking and open perspective, far from
diluting the relevance of ASEAN has in fact strengthened ASEAN.

Second, ASEAN's capacity to effect change outside itself.
Prior to ASEAN's initiative in 1997, it was hardly the norm to
consider China, Japan and South Korea as a collective "three".
While no one is making a claim that cooperation with ASEAN has
provided the "glue" that binds the three countries together, it
remains a fact that ASEAN did have a role in developing the habit
and practice of thinking as a "three".

Where does a prospective East Asia Summit fit in the original
scheme of things?

It is worth noting that the East Asia Summit as recommended in
the EASG report was visualized as a continuation of the ASEAN+3
process, involving the same countries, and to be held when the
ASEAN+3 process has sufficiently matured.

Such a step-by-step and incremental approach to the East Asia
Summit was, however, essentially jettisoned at the Tenth ASEAN
Summit and the ASEAN+3 Summit, held in Vientiane late November
2004. At these summits, the leaders decided to hold the first EAS
in Malaysia in 2005 and tasked the Ministers of Foreign Affairs
of ASEAN to further study the idea of such an EAS, including the
projected modalities and selection of participants.

In effect, therefore, what was once a medium or long term goal
has been given a compressed time frame of just one year. More
significantly, perhaps, while previous conventional wisdom was
for the ASEAN+3 Summit to transform itself into an East Asia
Summit as a reflection of the move towards fin East Asia
community, today we face the prospect of the ASEAN+3 Summit
coexisting with the East Asia Summit.

Indonesia does not find it appealing that the ASEAN+3 Summit
should simply be duplicated by an East Asia Summit with the same
participants and essentially the same agenda, with each co-
existing with the other. This would be inefficient and cannot
possibly be sustainable in the long run. Of course, attempts may
be made to tinker with the agenda while maintaining the same
participants. However, given the already extensive scope of the
existing ASEAN+3 agenda, it would be difficult to imagine an East
Asia Summit, similarly constituted, to be able to carve a new and
distinct agenda.

Nor is Indonesia attracted to the idea of simply renaming the
ASEAN+3 Summit to East Asia Summit, again essentially with the
same participants and agenda. Unlike the earlier scenario,
however, whose drawback is primarily its inefficiency, simply re-
labeling ASEAN+3 to make it the East Asia Summit would in fact be
even more disadvantageous. This would certainly be the case if it
entailed the termination of the ASEAN+3 Summit and its
substitution with an East Asia Summit.

At a stroke, we would then be extinguishing the important
achievements of the ASEAN+3 process to-date with no clear and
visible gains in return.

There is also another factor to consider. In contrast to the
ASEAN+3 Summit in which ASEAN member countries have participated
as a collective "10" in cooperating with the "+3", participation
in an East Asian Summit of this type would be individual or
national in nature. As a result, the benefits flowing from the
collective weight of ASEAN may be lost.

For all those reasons, I believe that one must envision the
planned Fast Asia Summit as something distinct from the ASEAN+3
Summit.

In particular, I believe that in thinking about the planned
East Asia Summit there is a need to ensure that ASEAN remain at
the core of the undertaking. This is more than a procedural
matter of Summit participation. It is, in fact, nothing less than
a way or ensuring that ASEAN has a say in the evolution of an
East Asia community.

If, indeed, we are motivated to ensure that ASEAN remains as
the "hub" in the future East Asia community process, it is my
belief that we need to adopt a fresh and bold perspective.

More specifically, we need to think beyond the "+3" countries
as the constituents of the East Asia Summit by looking also at
India, Australia and New Zealand. Hence, rather than looking at
the ASEAN+3 as the exclusive constituting elements of the East
Asia Summit we should visualize ASEAN occupying the "hub", with
three "spokes", namely the "+ 3" countries to its north, India to
its west and Australia and New Zealand to its southeast.

I believe that such an approach would help ensure that the
East Asia Summit to be held later this year in Malaysia actually
address the challenges that we are likely to face in the coming
years and also the opportunities.

On the latter, I need hardly expand on the economic
opportunities that a rapidly growing India would present to
ASEAN. Nor can we belittle the relatively untapped potential that
Australia and New Zealand can offer to ASEAN countries in
promoting their economic advancement.

In emphasizing the opportunities that such an expanded notion
of the East Asia Summit offers, I do not wish to underestimate
the challenges. Principal among these is the simple fact that
while we embark on the East Asia community building process as
represented by the convening of the East Asia Summit later this
year, ASEAN itself has just set in motion the process of building
an ASEAN Community built on three pillars, namely security,
socio-cultural and economic.

The challenge, essentially, is how to ensure that present and
future attention on the East Asia Summit does not detract from
what must remain the priority effort to build an ASEAN Community.

In the same way that in 1997 when the financial crisis struck
and ASEAN responded by opening up and reaching out to the "+3"
countries to their mutual advantage, it is my view that today in
2005 ASEAN must look anew at its regional environment and adopt a
hold and fresh perspective by expanding the notion of an East
Asia process or summit by including India, Australia and New
Zealand. Doing so would not only benefit ASEAN, but would also
highlight ASEAN's not insignificant contribution to promoting
prosperity, peace and stability in the wider region.

The writer is Director-General for ASEAN Cooperation at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and concurrently its spokesperson.
The views expressed herein are personal and do not necessarily
reflect the view of the Government of Indonesia. The article is
taken from a paper presented at the bimonthly meeting of the
Center for East Asian Cooperation Studies (CEACoS), and hosted by
The Jakarta Post.