ASEAN solidarity more surface than subtance

ASEAN solidarity more surface than subtance

Solidarity was a trait that was always a priority among
members of the ASEAN regional grouping. Political scientist J.
Soedjati Djiwandono examines the strength of this bond by going
over the region's potential flash points and recent events.

JAKARTA (JP): An important part of the widely acclaimed
success of ASEAN is their ability to sweep internal problems
under the carpet.

I am referring particularly to such intra-ASEAN territorial
disputes as that between Indonesia and Malaysia over the islands
of Ligitan and Sipadan; between Malaysia and Singapore over the
island of Batu Puteh; between Indonesia and the Philippines over
the island of Mianggas; and, most serious of all, between
Malaysia and the Philippines over Sabah -- not to mention their
involvement in the claims and counter-claims to sovereignty over
the Spratlys in the South China Sea, along with Brunei
Darussalam, Vietnam and China.

Occasionally, those disputes do create ripples in the ASEAN
waters. However, ASEAN leaders have generally managed to pass
over them. They seem to take meticulous care not to damage ASEAN
solidarity. The memories of Indonesia's confrontation with
Malaysia may still linger in their minds.

One might well wonder, however, how deep and genuine that
sense of solidarity really is. In any future conflicts, one
should never take it for granted. And no one should rule out the
possibility, however remote, that any of those territorial
disputes could become a time bomb that might some day may blow
apart the ASEAN carpet.

A territorial dispute, however trivial it might appear,
touches the most sensitive issue of national sovereignty and
territorial integrity. This is something of which each of the
ASEAN states, without exception, is acutely jealous. What may
have sounded like an overreaction on the part of the Indonesian
government to the abortive international conference in Manila --
which planned to discuss the issue of human rights in East Timor
-- attests to this observation.

The bomb might well be set off should any of the ASEAN states
no longer see the possibility of reconciling their vital national
interests, however perceived, with the regional interests of
ASEAN. It would be the limit of the strength of the ASEAN carpet.

"Big brother"

Therefore, more serious attention needs to be given to intra-
ASEAN territorial disputes, given the strain on ASEAN solidarity.
To be sure, bilateral relations between Indonesia and the
Philippines have remained unscathed. It has survived what
initially looked like another crisis on East Timor, a sore point
in Indonesia's diplomacy for most of the past two decades.

However, the incident has created considerable embarrassment
and a nuisance, to say the least, to both Indonesia and the
Philippines. One newspaper in the region has accused Indonesia of
behaving like a "big brother" towards the Philippines.

Subsequently, a similar conference was planned in Bangkok, and
another in Kuala Lumpur. And false reports were circulated that
Indonesia had threatened not to attend the 27th ASEAN ministerial
meeting in Bangkok. Radio Australia reported Foreign Minister
Gareth Evans as saying that Indonesia should reduce its military
personnel in East Timor and open a dialog with the so-called
"independence fighters".

It does not seem inconceivable, therefore, that efforts are
being made, by whomsoever and for whatever ends, to embarrass and
to bring pressure to bear on Indonesia by disrupting its
relations with its neighbors. This will certainly help to
undermine ASEAN solidarity.

The dispute over the Spratlys had likely been touched on the
agenda of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), officially meeting for
the first time immediately after the ministerial meeting, and may
add more strain on ASEAN solidarity. Indeed, dealing with
disputes that involve not only ASEAN member states but also
external powers, before first facing intra-ASEAN problems head
on, does not seem to make much sense.

The strength of the ASEAN carpet, as mentioned earlier, has
its limits. It should only serve to create a favorable climate
for an eventual peaceful solution of intra-ASEAN conflicts. It
should not represent a head-in-the-sand approach.

The writer is a member of board of directors at the Centre for
Strategic and International Studies.