ASEAN should expand the ARF

ASEAN should expand the ARF

By A.K.P. Mochtan

JAKARTA (JP): As if eluding the prevailing trend toward
multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific region, trilateral ties
remain dominant and critical to strategic and security equations
in Northeast Asia. As testified by the visit of Japan's Premier
Ryutaro Hashimoto to Beijing last week, balance and stability in
Northeast Asia precariously depend on the trilateral relations
involving China, Japan and the US.

Such a pattern of relations brings several important
repercussions to Southeast Asia, especially ASEAN. First, on the
conceptualization and implementation of cooperative security in
the Asia-Pacific region, particularly the one being purported by
the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum). Second, as ASEAN insists, on the
effort to assert ASEAN leadership in the ARF process and
activities, namely through the application of the ASEAN-
experience and the ASEAN-way.

The main question is whether an ASEAN-driven ARF is
appropriate and if it is able to contribute to the promotion of
security cooperation in Northeast Asia. Of particular importance
is whether the ARF can actually facilitate confidence building
measures in that crucially important corner of the Asia-Pacific
region.

This is certainly a formidable challenge. In the first place,
the triangular relations among China, Japan and the US are highly
dynamic, and, unfortunately, rarely smooth or harmonious.
Distrust and suspicion vis-a-vis each others security and
strategic intentions linger on, deeply permeated into their
respective mind sets. This is illustrated by Beijing's harsh
reaction toward the interim report on the new guidelines of
Japan-US Defense Cooperation last June. The deep seated distrust
often leads to a "reject first" attitude to practically all new
initiatives.

Second, a regional consultative arrangement for the area is
conspicuously missing. Unlike Southeast Asia, the Northeast Asian
region lacks a dialogue and consultation mechanism, especially
one that is inclusive and aims at discussing strategic and
security issues. New initiatives therefore typically start at the
bilateral level, and not uncommonly, unilateral.

Third, the problems and issues of the Northeast Asian region
are complex. Most of them are also irrelevant to Southeast Asia.
This means ASEAN members tend to be indifferent toward the
problems and issues in Northeast Asia.

Finally, there is the question whether ASEAN has sufficient
clout to expand its influence over Northeast Asia.

In sum, the character of the problems and issues in Northeast
Asia -- and hence the approach and arrangements to resolve them
-- are distinctly different from the ones in Southeast Asia.
Because of this, the prospect for a substantive and pro-active
involvement by an ASEAN-led ARF in Northeast Asia appears
distant, even futile.

These are not reasons for ASEAN to turn away from the problems
and issues that confront Northeast Asia, however. The situation
in Northeast Asia in fact provides a great opportunity to improve
and strengthen the ARF's mechanism and effectiveness, namely
through the introduction of new approaches, and if necessary, the
adoption of new principles and visions that would enrich and
empower cooperative security and conflict resolution mechanisms
in the Asia-Pacific.

Toward that end, ASEAN may have to adopt a different attitude
vis-a-vis Northeast Asia. This would entail inclusion of new
principles of action, which may include the following:

First, establish more regular and frank dialogue between
Southeast and Northeast Asia, including among the Heads of State.
This in essence is expanding the ASEAN-led Southeast Asian summit
to include leaders from Northeast Asia, particularly China, Japan
and South Korea. The strength of this forum is its deliberateness
and regularity, it is not merely by chance or proxy such as ALEM
or ASEM fora.

Second, facilitate transparency between Southeast and
Northeast Asia, particularly over security and strategic matters.
ASEAN could expand its Special SOM (which includes defense
officials) to include defense representatives from China, Japan
and South and North Korea. The expanded special SOM could start
simply as a socialization forum, with no preconceived structure,
agenda and outcome. As it proceeds, it will be able to increase
understanding over "Asian problems", as perceived and felt by
other fellow Asians. This understanding over the Asian problem
would hopefully lead to a new "Asian initiative" to resolve or
minimize it.

Finally, expand ASEAN's concerns and interests to Northeast
Asia by adopting sustained and deliberate engagement toward the
problems and issues that confront the region. This should be done
formally through the ARF, which provides the distinct advantage
of including other major players, notably the U.S. In this
context, ASEAN may have to be flexible in implementing its self-
imposed ideal of asserting "ASEAN-centeredness" and acknowledge
the potential constructive roles and contributions that may be
offered by the U.S. or other ARF members. In other words, ASEAN
should be more active in soliciting the major powers' security
and strategic interests in Northeast Asia and be able to
translate and incorporate them into the ARF's activities and
processes.

The ARF's -- especially ASEAN's -- attempt to address the
problems and issues in Northeast Asia will predictably be
difficult. For this purpose, there is no other choice but to
embrace it with determination, broad-mindedness and flexibility.
Without these, or if ASEAN chooses to bury its head in the sand,
the ARF will most probably loose its credibility and the Asia-
Pacific region will perpetually be plagued by insecurity and
instability.

The writer is a political analyst at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta.