ASEAN should expand the ARF

By A.K.P. Mochtan

JAKARTA (JP): As if eluding the prevailing trend toward multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific region, trilateral ties remain dominant and critical to strategic and security equations in Northeast Asia. As testified by the visit of Japan's Premier Ryutaro Hashimoto to Beijing last week, balance and stability in Northeast Asia precariously depend on the trilateral relations involving China, Japan and the US.

Such a pattern of relations brings several important repercussions to Southeast Asia, especially ASEAN. First, on the conceptualization and implementation of cooperative security in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly the one being purported by the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum). Second, as ASEAN insists, on the effort to assert ASEAN leadership in the ARF process and activities, namely through the application of the ASEAN- experience and the ASEAN-way.

The main question is whether an ASEAN-driven ARF is appropriate and if it is able to contribute to the promotion of security cooperation in Northeast Asia. Of particular importance is whether the ARF can actually facilitate confidence building measures in that crucially important corner of the Asia-Pacific region.

This is certainly a formidable challenge. In the first place, the triangular relations among China, Japan and the US are highly dynamic, and, unfortunately, rarely smooth or harmonious. Distrust and suspicion vis-a-vis each others security and strategic intentions linger on, deeply permeated into their respective mind sets. This is illustrated by Beijing's harsh reaction toward the interim report on the new guidelines of Japan-US Defense Cooperation last June. The deep seated distrust often leads to a "reject first" attitude to practically all new initiatives.

Second, a regional consultative arrangement for the area is conspicuously missing. Unlike Southeast Asia, the Northeast Asian region lacks a dialogue and consultation mechanism, especially one that is inclusive and aims at discussing strategic and security issues. New initiatives therefore typically start at the bilateral level, and not uncommonly, unilateral.

Third, the problems and issues of the Northeast Asian region are complex. Most of them are also irrelevant to Southeast Asia. This means ASEAN members tend to be indifferent toward the problems and issues in Northeast Asia.

Finally, there is the question whether ASEAN has sufficient clout to expand its influence over Northeast Asia.

In sum, the character of the problems and issues in Northeast Asia -- and hence the approach and arrangements to resolve them -- are distinctly different from the ones in Southeast Asia. Because of this, the prospect for a substantive and pro-active involvement by an ASEAN-led ARF in Northeast Asia appears distant, even futile.

These are not reasons for ASEAN to turn away from the problems and issues that confront Northeast Asia, however. The situation in Northeast Asia in fact provides a great opportunity to improve and strengthen the ARF's mechanism and effectiveness, namely through the introduction of new approaches, and if necessary, the adoption of new principles and visions that would enrich and empower cooperative security and conflict resolution mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific.

Toward that end, ASEAN may have to adopt a different attitude vis-a-vis Northeast Asia. This would entail inclusion of new principles of action, which may include the following:

First, establish more regular and frank dialogue between Southeast and Northeast Asia, including among the Heads of State. This in essence is expanding the ASEAN-led Southeast Asian summit to include leaders from Northeast Asia, particularly China, Japan and South Korea. The strength of this forum is its deliberateness and regularity, it is not merely by chance or proxy such as ALEM or ASEM fora.

Second, facilitate transparency between Southeast and Northeast Asia, particularly over security and strategic matters. ASEAN could expand its Special SOM (which includes defense officials) to include defense representatives from China, Japan and South and North Korea. The expanded special SOM could start simply as a socialization forum, with no preconceived structure, agenda and outcome. As it proceeds, it will be able to increase understanding over "Asian problems", as perceived and felt by other fellow Asians. This understanding over the Asian problem would hopefully lead to a new "Asian initiative" to resolve or minimize it.

Finally, expand ASEAN's concerns and interests to Northeast Asia by adopting sustained and deliberate engagement toward the problems and issues that confront the region. This should be done formally through the ARF, which provides the distinct advantage of including other major players, notably the U.S. In this context, ASEAN may have to be flexible in implementing its self- imposed ideal of asserting "ASEAN-centeredness" and acknowledge the potential constructive roles and contributions that may be offered by the U.S. or other ARF members. In other words, ASEAN should be more active in soliciting the major powers' security and strategic interests in Northeast Asia and be able to translate and incorporate them into the ARF's activities and processes.

The ARF's -- especially ASEAN's -- attempt to address the problems and issues in Northeast Asia will predictably be difficult. For this purpose, there is no other choice but to embrace it with determination, broad-mindedness and flexibility. Without these, or if ASEAN chooses to bury its head in the sand, the ARF will most probably loose its credibility and the Asia- Pacific region will perpetually be plagued by insecurity and instability.

The writer is a political analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta.