ASEAN should delay Myanmar membership

ASEAN should delay Myanmar membership

Myanmar's entry into ASEAN is being questioned, even by member
nations. Dewi Fortuna Anwar explores this issue.

JAKARTA (JP): While Cambodia and Laos are fully expected to
become ASEAN members in July 1997, such is not the case for
Myanmar. Although most people in the region, and supporters
outside the region, adhere to the long-term ideal of a united
Southeast Asia under ASEAN, questions remain about the
appropriateness of Myanmar's immediate entry into the
association. The political and human rights situations in Myanmar
are detrimental to ASEAN's interests, particularly in terms of
dealing with its western dialog partners.

ASEAN's opposition to western criticisms of the constructive
engagement of Myanmar is understandable and defensible. Given
ASEAN's ultimate aim to bring all 10 Southeast Asian countries
within its fold, the gradual inclusion of Myanmar in various
regional activities is clearly important.

Myanmar's self-imposed isolation had led to economic
stagnation which does not promote greater political openness and
better respect for human rights. In this light, it is hard to
justify how further sanctions, as most western countries propose,
would speed up political progress in Myanmar and improve the
living standard of its people. Moreover, it is consistent with
ASEAN's objective to establish an autonomous regional order free
from external interference that the association refuses to bow to
outside pressure about which nations are eligible for membership.

Nevertheless, while fully acknowledging the importance of
continuing ASEAN's constructive engagement of Myanmar, there are
at least four compelling reasons for delaying Yangon's full entry
into ASEAN for a few years. These are:

* the more immediate need of facilitating entry of Cambodia and
Laos into ASEAN.

* the lack of unanimity within and among ASEAN countries
regarding Myanmar's membership.

* Myanmar's attitudes towards ASEAN.

* the possible implications of precipitating Myanmar's membership
on ASEAN's extra-regional relations.

The most important consideration for delaying Myanmar's full
membership into ASEAN is clearly the immediate need to devote our
attention and resources to facilitate Cambodia's and Laos' entry
into the association and to integrate them fully into ASEAN's
activities. There is no doubt that these two countries are now
fully committed to joining ASEAN next year, and ASEAN has long
awaited the participation of Cambodia and Laos. But the
challenges will be enormous.

ASEAN did not have to do too much to integrate Brunei, which
though tiny, is very rich. Once the political obstacle was
overcome, the integration of Vietnam was relatively easy because
of its relatively trained manpower and economic potential.
However, incorporating Cambodia and Laos, two of the world's
least developed countries, into a vibrant regional body with
relatively affluent membership, is clearly another matter. Within
the space of 10 months these two countries have to overcome such
basic problems as the lack of English-speaking officials who can
take part in ASEAN activities, the lack of relevant institutions,
a severe shortage of financial capabilities and other technical
facilities necessary to carry out intensive regional cooperation.

It is to be expected that both Laos and Cambodia will look to
ASEAN for help in overcoming these basic problems. In the next
two to three years ASEAN will have its hands full trying to
mobilize resources, from within the region as well as from
friends outside the region, to assist in the regional integration
of Cambodia and Laos.

Without active help from ASEAN, the new members may feel
marginalized and soon disillusioned. If Myanmar, a country that
is also categorized as one of the world's least developed, and
also carries a political stigma, is to be included in the
membership package at the same time, ASEAN resources will be
stretched very thin. It is also possible that including Myanmar
may make it more difficult for ASEAN to mobilize international
assistance for its efforts to ease the new members into the
association.

The second important consideration is the lack of agreement
among the ASEAN countries themselves, as well as within the
various ASEAN countries, concerning Myanmar's immediate entry. On
important issues ASEAN has always based its decisions on
consensus, and one leader, Philippine President Fidel Ramos, has
gone on record that he prefers to postpone Myanmar's full
membership. That important groups of people within the ASEAN
countries are opposed to Myanmar's membership should also be
considered, particularly since ASEAN wishes to make itself into a
more popular organization that is no longer the monopoly of
bureaucrats.

Myanmar's attitude toward ASEAN also raises questions. The
opposition under Aung San Suu Kyi is vehemently opposed to
Myanmar's membership in ASEAN, fearing that such a membership
would only legitimize SLORC. The SLORC leaders' commitment to the
idea of regional cooperation in general and ASEAN in particular
is not unequivocal.

Only one and a half years ago, SLORC still considered ASEAN a
western colonial tool, membership in which would compromise
Myanmar's long-held neutrality. There is clearly a need for
Myanmar to spell out its commitment to the ideals of ASEAN more
definitively. Without such a declaration, one might wonder
whether the Myanmar government is trying to use ASEAN as a public
relations vehicle to improve its international image. In such a
case ASEAN is open for vilification from a substantial part of
Myanmar population, a situation that would be detrimental to
ASEAN's image as the harbinger of peace and prosperity in the
region.

Finally, while recognizing that ASEAN's strength depends on
its internal cohesiveness, the association's effectiveness in the
international arena owes much to its support from other
countries, particularly from its dialog partners. Without bowing
to external pressure, ASEAN, nevertheless, needs to be sensitive
to the views of its dialog partners. ASEAN's ability to play an
important role in the wider regional and international forums
will depend a great deal on how it manages its relations with the
world's major political and economic powers.

Given these four main considerations, it would clearly be
wiser for ASEAN to wait another two or three years to complete
the unification of Southeast Asia. Once Cambodia and Laos are
fully integrated into ASEAN, the ASEAN-9 will be in a much better
position to receive the full membership of Myanmar. Perhaps by
that time, Myanmar's own commitment to ASEAN will become more
unified and unequivocally clear, signifying a reconciliation or
at least a compromise between SLORC and the opposition group.

The writer is Head of the Regional and International Affairs
Division at the Center for Political and Regional Studies of the
Indonesian Institute of Sciences.