ASEAN Security Cooperation

ASEAN Security Cooperation

Undoubtedly, the signing of what the 10 leaders of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) refer to as Bali
Concord II is an impressive achievement in terms of solidifying
the sense of community in the region. Former foreign minister Ali
Alatas, who is now President Megawati Soekarnoputri's special
envoy, presented a clear picture of the state of cooperation
among the organization's member countries when he addressed a
conference of ASEAN editors last Monday in Bali. He figuratively
described the Bali Concord II documents as signaling the
emergence of a more cohesive regional community in this region,
with the accord's three main components as supporting pillars. He
rightly stated that economic integration was not possible without
the forging of a common perception of security issues.

Given the complex recent history of Southeast Asia, which was
greatly affected by the intense power rivalry of the Cold War
after the end of World War II in 1945, the forging of such a
common perception on security issues is easier said than done.
However, in the last 27 years since Bali Concord I was signed,
historical turning points have taken place that were previously
regarded as impossibilities. We are referring to the end of the
Vietnam War, from which a global superpower, the United States,
managed to extricate itself with a minimum loss of face.

Since 1975, we have witnessed not only the emergence of a
united Vietnam as envisaged by Ho Chi Minh, but a Vietnam that is
also gradually liberalizing its economy and that politically
strikes an open posture. Vietnam's active membership in ASEAN
shows that qualitative changes have taken place in the political
makeup of Southeast Asia. Today's Cambodia, despite its domestic
political squabbles, is more proof that historical miracles can
occur in this region.

However, the last 27 years have also shown how Indonesia, the
largest ASEAN member, has become a weakened power because of its
inability to stem political decay and spur political development.
If Indonesia's role as "the prime manager of regional order" --
to borrow a phrase coined by the late Prof. Michael Leifer of the
London School of Economics and Political Science -- can be
considered as its natural position in the wake of Bali Concord I
in 1976, in the coming years after the signing of Bali Concord II
a more realistic stance is dictated.

On the one hand, the key points reiterated in the ASEAN
Security Community document must be implemented because of the
volatile nature of the current global situation. What is
cataloged as transnational crimes, especially acts of terrorism,
which are technically becoming more sophisticated, must be
tackled jointly and vigorously in order to prevent a slide toward
anarchy. We also welcome the call for consultation and
cooperation between ASEAN members and between ASEAN and its
friends and partners to be fostered.

On the other hand, however, to achieve the desired goals as
listed in the ASEAN Security Community document, the governments
of the ASEAN member countries must first demonstrate their
ability to effectively manage their domestic situation and
display their determination to solve intra-regional conflicts in
accordance with the spirit of Bali Concord II.

Can we hope, for example, now that the ink has dried on the
ASEAN Security Community document, Malaysia and Singapore will
resolve their raw water supply argument in a more civilized
manner? Can we hope that based on the understanding reached
between Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong and President Megawati
during their meeting on Batam Island last August, Singapore and
Indonesia will now try to resolve -- in a systematic, intensive
and forthright manner -- several bilateral issues that have so
far been left pending?

We are not being motivated by an ingrained cynical inclination
when we say that we would like to see the real implementation of
Bali Concord II in the coming years. However, the global social
dynamics and the changes affecting international politics are at
present taking place so rapidly that ASEAN has no choice but to
also step up its working rhythm.

The message regarding a rapidly changing global situation
should be clearly and succinctly conveyed to the military junta
in Yangon that for the sake of Myanmar's survival and ASEAN's
credibility, they too have to change.

As Ali Alatas has already conveyed to the junta the message
that it is "counterproductive" to the implementation of their own
political program to continue to detain Aung San Suu Kyi. Now,
after the signing of Bali Concord II, it should also be clearly
stated to the aging military junta in Yangon that their
undemocratic heavy-handed rule is counterproductive to ASEAN.

We laud the hard work that has been done by the numerous
diplomats and experts in the preparation of the ASEAN Security
Community document and the vigorous determination of Indonesia to
achieve this significant milestone in ASEAN's development.
However, the relevant historicity of the Bali Concord II must
still be proven with concrete achievements in resolving the
various disputes that still encumber relations between the member
countries of ASEAN and between ASEAN and the outside powers.