ASEAN Security Cooperation

Undoubtedly, the signing of what the 10 leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) refer to as Bali Concord II is an impressive achievement in terms of solidifying the sense of community in the region. Former foreign minister Ali Alatas, who is now President Megawati Soekarnoputri's special envoy, presented a clear picture of the state of cooperation among the organization's member countries when he addressed a conference of ASEAN editors last Monday in Bali. He figuratively described the Bali Concord II documents as signaling the emergence of a more cohesive regional community in this region, with the accord's three main components as supporting pillars. He rightly stated that economic integration was not possible without the forging of a common perception of security issues.

Given the complex recent history of Southeast Asia, which was greatly affected by the intense power rivalry of the Cold War after the end of World War II in 1945, the forging of such a common perception on security issues is easier said than done. However, in the last 27 years since Bali Concord I was signed, historical turning points have taken place that were previously regarded as impossibilities. We are referring to the end of the Vietnam War, from which a global superpower, the United States, managed to extricate itself with a minimum loss of face.

Since 1975, we have witnessed not only the emergence of a united Vietnam as envisaged by Ho Chi Minh, but a Vietnam that is also gradually liberalizing its economy and that politically strikes an open posture. Vietnam's active membership in ASEAN shows that qualitative changes have taken place in the political makeup of Southeast Asia. Today's Cambodia, despite its domestic political squabbles, is more proof that historical miracles can occur in this region.

However, the last 27 years have also shown how Indonesia, the largest ASEAN member, has become a weakened power because of its inability to stem political decay and spur political development. If Indonesia's role as "the prime manager of regional order" -- to borrow a phrase coined by the late Prof. Michael Leifer of the London School of Economics and Political Science -- can be considered as its natural position in the wake of Bali Concord I in 1976, in the coming years after the signing of Bali Concord II a more realistic stance is dictated.

On the one hand, the key points reiterated in the ASEAN Security Community document must be implemented because of the volatile nature of the current global situation. What is cataloged as transnational crimes, especially acts of terrorism, which are technically becoming more sophisticated, must be tackled jointly and vigorously in order to prevent a slide toward anarchy. We also welcome the call for consultation and cooperation between ASEAN members and between ASEAN and its friends and partners to be fostered.

On the other hand, however, to achieve the desired goals as listed in the ASEAN Security Community document, the governments of the ASEAN member countries must first demonstrate their ability to effectively manage their domestic situation and display their determination to solve intra-regional conflicts in accordance with the spirit of Bali Concord II.

Can we hope, for example, now that the ink has dried on the ASEAN Security Community document, Malaysia and Singapore will resolve their raw water supply argument in a more civilized manner? Can we hope that based on the understanding reached between Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong and President Megawati during their meeting on Batam Island last August, Singapore and Indonesia will now try to resolve -- in a systematic, intensive and forthright manner -- several bilateral issues that have so far been left pending?

We are not being motivated by an ingrained cynical inclination when we say that we would like to see the real implementation of Bali Concord II in the coming years. However, the global social dynamics and the changes affecting international politics are at present taking place so rapidly that ASEAN has no choice but to also step up its working rhythm.

The message regarding a rapidly changing global situation should be clearly and succinctly conveyed to the military junta in Yangon that for the sake of Myanmar's survival and ASEAN's credibility, they too have to change.

As Ali Alatas has already conveyed to the junta the message that it is "counterproductive" to the implementation of their own political program to continue to detain Aung San Suu Kyi. Now, after the signing of Bali Concord II, it should also be clearly stated to the aging military junta in Yangon that their undemocratic heavy-handed rule is counterproductive to ASEAN.

We laud the hard work that has been done by the numerous diplomats and experts in the preparation of the ASEAN Security Community document and the vigorous determination of Indonesia to achieve this significant milestone in ASEAN's development. However, the relevant historicity of the Bali Concord II must still be proven with concrete achievements in resolving the various disputes that still encumber relations between the member countries of ASEAN and between ASEAN and the outside powers.