ASEAN: Moving on the right track (2)

ASEAN: Moving on the right track (2)

By Vitit Muntarbhorn

This is the second of two articles examining the path the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations has taken thus far. The
1995 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting will take place at the end of this
month.

BANGKOK: On the basis of an outwardly economic but inwardly
political cooperation, in the eyes of ASEAN, the regional
achievement in the second half of the 1970s was to retain its
independence in the face of a perceived communist threat. In this
setting, there was the "domino" theory whereby it was predicted
by some that after the rise of Communist governments in
Indochina, the next candidates to fall to communism would be the
ASEAN countries themselves.

This undercurrent was superseded in 1978 by the fact that
Vietnamese-backed troops invaded Cambodia and dislodged the Khmer
Rouge government, a communist regime infamous for its radical
ways and perpetration of genocide against the Cambodian people.
The ejection of the Khmer Rouge led to the establishment of a
Vietnamese-backed regime in Phnom Penh under Heng Samrin. In
turn, the Khmer Rouge, Prince Sihanouk (the former leader of
Cambodia) and another faction set up a government in exile in
neighboring Thailand, known as the Coalition Government for
Democratic Kampuchea.

From that period onwards and throughout the 1980s, the war in
Cambodia between the two sides escalated, while the diplomatic
battle in the United Nations was also waged. At issue was the
question concerning which group should occupy the Cambodian seat
in the General Assembly. ASEAN's diplomatic initiative was
directed to supporting the Coalition Government for Democratic
Kampuchea in exile and ensuring that the United Nations seat
would belong to that government as opposed to the Heng Samrin
regime. ASEAN lobbied strongly for a decade as the sponsor of the
annual United Nations Resolution on Cambodia which recognized the
legitimacy of that Coalition government. It succeeded in
retaining the seat for the government in exile throughout the
1980s until a compromise was reached between the various factions
leading to the Cambodian Peace Accord of 1991 and subsequent
national elections.

This was the political achievement of ASEAN par excellence and
established ASEAN as a key political force in the "ex-regional"
context at the global level, especially in the United Nations
forum. This was assisted by the fact that annually ASEAN would
invite key countries from beyond the region to its ministerial
meeting as dialog partners; this process helped to consolidate
cooperation in a variety of fields, including politics.

There was and is, however, a cloud under the silver lining.
The atrocities of the Khmer Rouge were "pragmatically"
overlooked, and the fact that they are still waging a war in
Cambodia today against the newly elected government which came to
power after the national elections implies an unfinished agenda.
The fact that much of ASEAN's energy was spent on the Cambodian
issue for over a decade also indicated that other dimensions of
ASEAN cooperation were less of a priority in the "intra-regional"
setting. It is no wonder, therefore, that economic and other
forms of cooperation were left on the sidelines for many years in
the midst of the political imbroglio in the region.

The resurgence of political and security matters in ASEAN
policy-making was witnessed in 1994 with the establishment of the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Basically, it is a consultative forum
involving not only ASEAN but also other powers, including the
U.S., Russia, China and Japan. The informal dialog in 1994
included, as an agenda for the future, the following: confidence
and security building, nuclear non-proliferation, peacekeeping,
exchanges of non-classified military information, maritime
security issues, and preventive security. It is to be furthered
by another meeting in 1995. An emerging convergence of interest
among the ARF participants can be seen in the area of preventive
diplomacy, confidence-building measures and dispute prevention.

That trend is influenced by the United Nations Secretary-
General's Agenda for Peace which encompasses the areas mentioned,
and is supported by various informal workshops between ASEAN, the
United Nations and other key players, leading up to the ARF
meetings as well as to follow-up thereafter. However, there is
reticence on the part of some ARF members to broach the question
of dispute settlement. This is particularly in view of the fact
that there have been clashes between China and the Philippines
during the past year in the context of the hotly disputed Spratly
islands which are claimed by various ASEAN countries, China and
other countries. Should these disputes be dealt with bilaterally,
e.g. between China and the Philippines, or should they be dealt
with at the regional level?

There is a tug-of-war as to whether the ARF can offer a
helping hand for dispute settlement in a regional context.
Despite the tendency of some of the protagonists to prefer a
bilateral solution (or no solution), the potential for a regional
dispute settlement, whether by means of diplomacy or a legal
framework for dispute settlement, should not be overlooked.

On another front, it may be noted that not all ARF countries
have joined the United Nations Conventional Arms Register. This
indicates a lack of transparency that needs to be overcome in
future.

Vitit Muntarbhorn is professor at Faculty of Law,
Chulalongkorn University. He is also the executive director of
Child Rights ASIANET.

-- The Nation, Bangkok