ASEAN: Moving on the right track (2)

By Vitit Muntarbhorn

This is the second of two articles examining the path the Association of Southeast Asian Nations has taken thus far. The 1995 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting will take place at the end of this month.

BANGKOK: On the basis of an outwardly economic but inwardly political cooperation, in the eyes of ASEAN, the regional achievement in the second half of the 1970s was to retain its independence in the face of a perceived communist threat. In this setting, there was the "domino" theory whereby it was predicted by some that after the rise of Communist governments in Indochina, the next candidates to fall to communism would be the ASEAN countries themselves.

This undercurrent was superseded in 1978 by the fact that Vietnamese-backed troops invaded Cambodia and dislodged the Khmer Rouge government, a communist regime infamous for its radical ways and perpetration of genocide against the Cambodian people. The ejection of the Khmer Rouge led to the establishment of a Vietnamese-backed regime in Phnom Penh under Heng Samrin. In turn, the Khmer Rouge, Prince Sihanouk (the former leader of Cambodia) and another faction set up a government in exile in neighboring Thailand, known as the Coalition Government for Democratic Kampuchea.

From that period onwards and throughout the 1980s, the war in Cambodia between the two sides escalated, while the diplomatic battle in the United Nations was also waged. At issue was the question concerning which group should occupy the Cambodian seat in the General Assembly. ASEAN's diplomatic initiative was directed to supporting the Coalition Government for Democratic Kampuchea in exile and ensuring that the United Nations seat would belong to that government as opposed to the Heng Samrin regime. ASEAN lobbied strongly for a decade as the sponsor of the annual United Nations Resolution on Cambodia which recognized the legitimacy of that Coalition government. It succeeded in retaining the seat for the government in exile throughout the 1980s until a compromise was reached between the various factions leading to the Cambodian Peace Accord of 1991 and subsequent national elections.

This was the political achievement of ASEAN par excellence and established ASEAN as a key political force in the "ex-regional" context at the global level, especially in the United Nations forum. This was assisted by the fact that annually ASEAN would invite key countries from beyond the region to its ministerial meeting as dialog partners; this process helped to consolidate cooperation in a variety of fields, including politics.

There was and is, however, a cloud under the silver lining. The atrocities of the Khmer Rouge were "pragmatically" overlooked, and the fact that they are still waging a war in Cambodia today against the newly elected government which came to power after the national elections implies an unfinished agenda. The fact that much of ASEAN's energy was spent on the Cambodian issue for over a decade also indicated that other dimensions of ASEAN cooperation were less of a priority in the "intra-regional" setting. It is no wonder, therefore, that economic and other forms of cooperation were left on the sidelines for many years in the midst of the political imbroglio in the region.

The resurgence of political and security matters in ASEAN policy-making was witnessed in 1994 with the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Basically, it is a consultative forum involving not only ASEAN but also other powers, including the U.S., Russia, China and Japan. The informal dialog in 1994 included, as an agenda for the future, the following: confidence and security building, nuclear non-proliferation, peacekeeping, exchanges of non-classified military information, maritime security issues, and preventive security. It is to be furthered by another meeting in 1995. An emerging convergence of interest among the ARF participants can be seen in the area of preventive diplomacy, confidence-building measures and dispute prevention.

That trend is influenced by the United Nations Secretary- General's Agenda for Peace which encompasses the areas mentioned, and is supported by various informal workshops between ASEAN, the United Nations and other key players, leading up to the ARF meetings as well as to follow-up thereafter. However, there is reticence on the part of some ARF members to broach the question of dispute settlement. This is particularly in view of the fact that there have been clashes between China and the Philippines during the past year in the context of the hotly disputed Spratly islands which are claimed by various ASEAN countries, China and other countries. Should these disputes be dealt with bilaterally, e.g. between China and the Philippines, or should they be dealt with at the regional level?

There is a tug-of-war as to whether the ARF can offer a helping hand for dispute settlement in a regional context. Despite the tendency of some of the protagonists to prefer a bilateral solution (or no solution), the potential for a regional dispute settlement, whether by means of diplomacy or a legal framework for dispute settlement, should not be overlooked.

On another front, it may be noted that not all ARF countries have joined the United Nations Conventional Arms Register. This indicates a lack of transparency that needs to be overcome in future.

Vitit Muntarbhorn is professor at Faculty of Law, Chulalongkorn University. He is also the executive director of Child Rights ASIANET.

-- The Nation, Bangkok