ASEAN key to Asia-Pacific region

ASEAN key to Asia-Pacific region

By Juwono Sudarsono

The following article is based on a paper presented at ASEAN's
30th anniversary seminar in Sydney on Aug. 26 this year. The
ASEAN Focus Group, the Asia-Australia Institute and the Research
Institute for Asia and the Pacific organized the seminar in
cooperation with ASEAN's Canberra committee.

SYDNEY: The regional role of ASEAN is to effect the smooth
transition of three important geopolitical and geo-economic
shifts in the Asia-Pacific region.

First, to match and balance the strategic interests of China,
Japan and the United States as the post Cold War system continues
to disperse and polarize.

Second, to ensure that interregional issues affecting
Southeast and Northeast Asia become politically manageable.

Third, to harmonize the multilateralization of "trade
balances" within the ASEAN Free Trade Area/Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (AFTA/APEC) and the evolving "military balances" in
the ASEAN Regional Forum track.

ASEAN's scheduled summit with China, Japan and South Korea in
December this year underlies the Asia-centric nature of regional
politics, economics as well as security trends.

The future course of ASEAN in the 21st century will depend on
how its member states face these issues within a more coherent
and independent Southeast Asian identity.

Can economic growth of countries in the region -- which has
been geared for 30 years to export more than 35 percent of its
products to the U.S, Japan and Europe -- survive the shift toward
intra-regional trade of more than 38 percent within the Northeast
and Southeast Asia context?

Can strategic stability survive the reduction of American
military will-power and rising nationalism in China and Japan?

As established economic powers, the U.S and Japan seek to
institutionalized both the APEC and ARF processes in order to
control the terms and conditions of economic interaction and
regional security.

As a rising power, China does not seek to fully adhere to the
rules of international organizations and regimes; but neither can
it afford to undermine them entirely.

Together with ASEAN, China must be persuaded to gradually and
peacefully change the terms and conditions of its international
system commensurate with the nation's growing political, economic
and military prominence.

ASEAN's success has been a product of its geostrategic
importance, its abundant and varied natural resources and its
potential as a vibrant market for the Japanese, American and
European economies, matching both opportunity and self-
advancement.

Underpinning that success has been the constant flow of 60
percent of energy resources from the Middle East. This has
allowed the key economies of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore,
Brunei, Indonesia and the Philippines to ride on back of a
Japanese economic powerhouse and an American military reassurance
during the past 30 years.

ASEAN is cognizant that the imperatives of geo-economic
interaction make it inevitable that the region will play a more
significant role in co-determining the terms and conditions of
trade, investment, finance and human resources development.

The ASEAN states do not want their region to remain as
recipients and consumers of products and services provided by
powerful external powers and their multinational corporations.

ASEAN also recognizes that the energy market in the region is
changing fast. In the past, the Middle East met energy needs and
local production, principally from China and Indonesia,
supplemented demand.

But in the next 15 years, the Malacca and Singapore straits,
as well as the Lombok and Makassar waterways, will be subjected
to three times the current amount of oil traffic from the Persian
Gulf.

By the year 2010, it is estimated that the dependence ratio
will reach 60 percent of OPEC-produced oil. Barring new oil
strikes in the South China area, this energy dependence factor
means that ASEAN must develop agreements on security regimes
which will guarantee the flow of such energy requirements for
Southeast and Northeast Asia.

Since the Northeast Asia region will need 15 million barrels
of oil per day (constituting 20 percent of global consumption),
the political and economic strains affecting the Northeast Asia-
Southeast Asia nexus will be even more compelling.

Economic growth and success in the broader Asia-Pacific region
have escalated changes in the balance of military power,
especially in naval capability. Where previously the U.S.
provided strategic assurance throughout the 1960s until the late
1980s, the situation now and in the future merits a different
approach.

The sea routes that link Yokohama, Shanghai and the Persian
Gulf regions account for 60 percent of oil traffic and 78 percent
of Japan's sea-borne trade. Confidence building among naval
powers in these regions is an important dimension of ASEAN's
diplomatic activity.

China's sustained growth means that its has to increasingly
rely on its external energy supplies from states in the gulf with
the attendant volatile nature of the Middle East politics.

In return for weapon sales (missiles and other weapons of mass
destruction), China's access to energy supplies will be secured,
albeit necessary to shift strategic environments connecting the
Indian Ocean and Southeast and Northeast Asia.

China's recent agreement with Russia and several Central Asian
states to secure a long-term supply of oil and gas may alleviate
the pressure for conflict in the South China Sea region.

ASEAN's task will be to match these intersecting trends in a
coherent framework reinforcing both economic growth and regional
security.

A new approach incorporating both economic as well as security
tracks is required to provide fast-moving updates of each
country's needs at every stage of its economic development and
the region's overall strategic balance.

It would facilitate confidence building in the military field,
particularly if countries showed commitment to economic
development by controlling military expenditure.

This is particularly important as arms modernization has
progressed the most in these regions while military spending in
other regions of the world is declining.

In East Asia alone, regional arms purchases have increased by
10 percent to 15 percent a year since 1991. Published reports on
military expenditure reveal that the Northeast Asia region
currently spends US$75 billion annually on arms purchase and
military modernization while the Southeast Asia region outlays
about $12 billion.

Naval mobility and maritime capability will be increasingly
important for the long-term security and development of the
entire Asia Pacific region.

Australia's role in education for ASEAN has been an important
element in providing self assurance for the region's
governmental, professional, business and intellectual leaders.

As ASEAN's oldest dialog partner since 1974, Australia has
been steadfast in its commitment. Australia's direct interest in
the economic development of Southeast Asia complements its strong
relations with China and Japan in trade and investment.

The $1 billion contribution to ASEAN's recent financial crisis
is a clear indication of Australia's commitment to sustainable
growth and stability in the region.

Over the past 30 years, Australia has played an important role
in preparing many of ASEAN's business and academic communities to
cope with the revolution in communications technology and
transportation and their attendant expansion of knowledge.

The next 30 years will bring about yet another revolutionary
change: the drive for economic sustainability and social justice
to the provinces and localities in ASEAN's peripheral regions.

These are the exciting challenges facing ASEAN in the 21st
century. Australia's role will be to ensure that those challenges
are met, in part through the carefully calibrated support of its
government, as well as its business and intellectual communities.

The writer is professor of political science at the University
of Indonesia and Vice Governor of the National Resilience
Institute, Jakarta.