ASEAN key to Asia-Pacific region

By Juwono Sudarsono

The following article is based on a paper presented at ASEAN's 30th anniversary seminar in Sydney on Aug. 26 this year. The ASEAN Focus Group, the Asia-Australia Institute and the Research Institute for Asia and the Pacific organized the seminar in cooperation with ASEAN's Canberra committee.

SYDNEY: The regional role of ASEAN is to effect the smooth transition of three important geopolitical and geo-economic shifts in the Asia-Pacific region.

First, to match and balance the strategic interests of China, Japan and the United States as the post Cold War system continues to disperse and polarize.

Second, to ensure that interregional issues affecting Southeast and Northeast Asia become politically manageable.

Third, to harmonize the multilateralization of "trade balances" within the ASEAN Free Trade Area/Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (AFTA/APEC) and the evolving "military balances" in the ASEAN Regional Forum track.

ASEAN's scheduled summit with China, Japan and South Korea in December this year underlies the Asia-centric nature of regional politics, economics as well as security trends.

The future course of ASEAN in the 21st century will depend on how its member states face these issues within a more coherent and independent Southeast Asian identity.

Can economic growth of countries in the region -- which has been geared for 30 years to export more than 35 percent of its products to the U.S, Japan and Europe -- survive the shift toward intra-regional trade of more than 38 percent within the Northeast and Southeast Asia context?

Can strategic stability survive the reduction of American military will-power and rising nationalism in China and Japan?

As established economic powers, the U.S and Japan seek to institutionalized both the APEC and ARF processes in order to control the terms and conditions of economic interaction and regional security.

As a rising power, China does not seek to fully adhere to the rules of international organizations and regimes; but neither can it afford to undermine them entirely.

Together with ASEAN, China must be persuaded to gradually and peacefully change the terms and conditions of its international system commensurate with the nation's growing political, economic and military prominence.

ASEAN's success has been a product of its geostrategic importance, its abundant and varied natural resources and its potential as a vibrant market for the Japanese, American and European economies, matching both opportunity and self- advancement.

Underpinning that success has been the constant flow of 60 percent of energy resources from the Middle East. This has allowed the key economies of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Indonesia and the Philippines to ride on back of a Japanese economic powerhouse and an American military reassurance during the past 30 years.

ASEAN is cognizant that the imperatives of geo-economic interaction make it inevitable that the region will play a more significant role in co-determining the terms and conditions of trade, investment, finance and human resources development.

The ASEAN states do not want their region to remain as recipients and consumers of products and services provided by powerful external powers and their multinational corporations.

ASEAN also recognizes that the energy market in the region is changing fast. In the past, the Middle East met energy needs and local production, principally from China and Indonesia, supplemented demand.

But in the next 15 years, the Malacca and Singapore straits, as well as the Lombok and Makassar waterways, will be subjected to three times the current amount of oil traffic from the Persian Gulf.

By the year 2010, it is estimated that the dependence ratio will reach 60 percent of OPEC-produced oil. Barring new oil strikes in the South China area, this energy dependence factor means that ASEAN must develop agreements on security regimes which will guarantee the flow of such energy requirements for Southeast and Northeast Asia.

Since the Northeast Asia region will need 15 million barrels of oil per day (constituting 20 percent of global consumption), the political and economic strains affecting the Northeast Asia- Southeast Asia nexus will be even more compelling.

Economic growth and success in the broader Asia-Pacific region have escalated changes in the balance of military power, especially in naval capability. Where previously the U.S. provided strategic assurance throughout the 1960s until the late 1980s, the situation now and in the future merits a different approach.

The sea routes that link Yokohama, Shanghai and the Persian Gulf regions account for 60 percent of oil traffic and 78 percent of Japan's sea-borne trade. Confidence building among naval powers in these regions is an important dimension of ASEAN's diplomatic activity.

China's sustained growth means that its has to increasingly rely on its external energy supplies from states in the gulf with the attendant volatile nature of the Middle East politics.

In return for weapon sales (missiles and other weapons of mass destruction), China's access to energy supplies will be secured, albeit necessary to shift strategic environments connecting the Indian Ocean and Southeast and Northeast Asia.

China's recent agreement with Russia and several Central Asian states to secure a long-term supply of oil and gas may alleviate the pressure for conflict in the South China Sea region.

ASEAN's task will be to match these intersecting trends in a coherent framework reinforcing both economic growth and regional security.

A new approach incorporating both economic as well as security tracks is required to provide fast-moving updates of each country's needs at every stage of its economic development and the region's overall strategic balance.

It would facilitate confidence building in the military field, particularly if countries showed commitment to economic development by controlling military expenditure.

This is particularly important as arms modernization has progressed the most in these regions while military spending in other regions of the world is declining.

In East Asia alone, regional arms purchases have increased by 10 percent to 15 percent a year since 1991. Published reports on military expenditure reveal that the Northeast Asia region currently spends US$75 billion annually on arms purchase and military modernization while the Southeast Asia region outlays about $12 billion.

Naval mobility and maritime capability will be increasingly important for the long-term security and development of the entire Asia Pacific region.

Australia's role in education for ASEAN has been an important element in providing self assurance for the region's governmental, professional, business and intellectual leaders.

As ASEAN's oldest dialog partner since 1974, Australia has been steadfast in its commitment. Australia's direct interest in the economic development of Southeast Asia complements its strong relations with China and Japan in trade and investment.

The $1 billion contribution to ASEAN's recent financial crisis is a clear indication of Australia's commitment to sustainable growth and stability in the region.

Over the past 30 years, Australia has played an important role in preparing many of ASEAN's business and academic communities to cope with the revolution in communications technology and transportation and their attendant expansion of knowledge.

The next 30 years will bring about yet another revolutionary change: the drive for economic sustainability and social justice to the provinces and localities in ASEAN's peripheral regions.

These are the exciting challenges facing ASEAN in the 21st century. Australia's role will be to ensure that those challenges are met, in part through the carefully calibrated support of its government, as well as its business and intellectual communities.

The writer is professor of political science at the University of Indonesia and Vice Governor of the National Resilience Institute, Jakarta.