ASEAN forum and preventive diplomacy

ASEAN forum and preventive diplomacy

By C.P.F. Luhulima

JAKARTA (JP): Apparently the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
innaugural meeting, held in Bangkok yesterday, was not structured
in the sense that it could be effective in fostering dialogs on
political and security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.

There was no specific agenda although preparations had been
made by the senior officials in Bangkok last May. In fact,
Australia, Canada and South Korea had made written contributions
towards institutionalizing the forum.

Yesterday's three-hour session enabled its participants (the
six ASEAN countries, their seven dialog partners, Australia,
Canada, the European Union, Japan, Korea, New Zealand and the
United States, the "consultation partners" China and Russia, and
three observers, Laos, Papua New Guinea and Vietnam) to exchange
views on diverse security issues in the region and the contiguous
areas. This was done in order to familiarize them with the
various views and interests in efforts to head off nascent
security flash points, particularly in the South China Sea and
the Korean Peninsula.

There were no substantive discussions. The fate of the ARF
will most probably not differ substantially from the ASEAN
approach to tackling border and territorial issues among the
member countries. Taking priority over problem solving will be:
preventive diplomacy in the sense of building peace through
preventing disputes and threats from escalating into armed
conflicts; trust-building proposals formulated to provide mutual
reassurance by promoting openness about defense matters, and
conflict diffusion.

The U.S.and Australia brought up the issue of human rights
violations by the SLORC (State Law and Order Restoration Council)
in Myanmar to force the Myanmarese junta to return to their
senses and formally recognize the outcome of the 1990 elections.
No less than U.S. President Bill Clinton has agreed that the
SLORC has one of the most dismal human rights records. The U.S.
wants ASEAN to push the Myanmarese government to talk to Aung San
Suu Kyi, the Nobel Peace Prize winner, whose party won the above
election. Winston Lord, U.S. assistant secretary of state, has
said that the ARF should begin by encouraging "transparency" in
defense matters and building mutual trust.

Two broad topics might have come up in the ARF discussion: an
overview of security-related "challenges and opportunities" (Zone
of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality and the Nuclear Weapons Free
Zone) the Asia-Pacific region faces, and confidence building
measures to preempt disputes between potential antagonists.

The question remains as to whether ASEAN is capable of
providing enough leadership in such discussions to manage
regional security issues effectively. This very much depends on
the question this author raised one year ago on the issue: "Will
ASEAN be cohesive enough in its political and security views to
effectively manage political and security issues in the region."

ASEAN is still not fully cohesive on the realization of ZOPFAN
and the SEANWFZ despite the fact that the ASEAN foreign ministers
agreed long ago, in April 1972, on 14 guidelines for implementing
ZOPFAN, and in July 1993, on the Program of Action of ZOPFAN.

If the ASEAN members have not reached complete agreement on
the need and timing of its implementation, how will ASEAN be able
to produce a cohesive and harmonious view on the presence and the
role of the major powers in the region and agree on the
instruments that should structure their behavior and their
legitimate mediation?

The code of conduct to regulate their behavior in the form of
protocol has yet to be finalized. ASEAN is not agreeable to
applying the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast
Asia, ZOPFAN's legal instrument, as an international code of
conduct even though it was amended in 1987 by two articles that
allow non-Southeast Asian countries to become party to the
Treaty. The reason is not entirely clear except for the argument
that allowing outside countries to become party to the Treaty
will enable them to intervene in Southeast Asian affairs.

This argument is untenable for two reasons. First, the
Protocol Amending the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation of Dec.
15, 1987, allows for accession of states outside Southeast Asia
only "by the consent of all the States in Southeast Asia which
are signatories to this Treaty and Brunei Darussalam."

Hence, ASEAN would have to stipulate on what terms that
consent could be provided.

To formulate a separate protocol as a code of international
conduct in Southeast Asia for non-Southeast Asians will not have
the legal power of the Treaty and will not bind the major powers
legally to their commitments.

Secondly, ASEAN has been successful in obtaining concessions
from the United States in its preference for cultural relativism
in its stance on human rights issues. In a recent Worldnet Dialog
(July 20, 1994) Winston Lord acknowledged that the United States
recognized that while it would carry on with its policies on
human rights "there are many other interests -- economic,
security and environmental -- and we have to take different
approaches to various countries, depending on the nature of the
problems and the other interests that are included."

If ASEAN is cohesive and adamant enough to back up their
stance on a certain issue, big countries will eventually
compromise.

ASEAN should keep projecting itself at a higher profile, an
attitude Dr. Mahathir keeps proclaiming, particularly vis-a-vis
the economically advanced countries. This can also be applied to
TAC as the code of international conduct in Southeast Asia.

The most crucial question will have to be answered in the
affirmative: Yes, ASEAN is cohesive and adamant enough in its
political and security views to effectively manage, guide and
seek solutions to political and security issues in the region.

Yes, ASEAN is cohesive in its stance on ZOPFAN and the NWFZ as
the foremost trust-building instruments in Southeast Asia and the
contiguous areas.

Only in such a way will ASEAN be able to call the shots in
politics and security in the region and hence give meaning to the
ASEAN Regional Forum. Otherwise, the ARF will be transformed into
a forum dominated and managed by the big powers in the region.

ASEAN will thus have to come up with a background paper on
practical proposals for the realization of ZOPFAN and the NWFZ,
for security cooperation in the wider region and on preventive
diplomacy and conflict management. This should entail proposals
for exchange of information among members on arms procurement
plans, military exercises and intelligence, joint programs to
monitor Asia-Pacific sea lines of communication, cooperation on
limiting weapons proliferation and others. And the question still
remains as to how to develop the ARF in order that by the Jakarta
meeting in 1996, the institutionalizing of the forum will have
been completed.

ARF meetings will by then have transparently annotated agendas
for talks which are prepared far in advance so that the
negotiations can proceed efficiently and effectively, such as is
the case with the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and the ASEAN-Post
Ministerial Conference.

The writer is a senior researcher at the Indonesian Institute
of Sciences (LIPI).