ASEAN at a crossroad

ASEAN at a crossroad

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which this
country helped found on this day 38 years ago, occupies a
distinctive place in Indonesian foreign policy. Perhaps even more
so than the United Nations or any other multilateral organization
in which this country is a member.

After years of "aggressive" rhetoric by first President
Sukarno, the ensuing sensibility and wisdom displayed by Jakarta
in its "informal" leadership of the grouping was evidence of
Indonesia's worthiness to become a trusted and responsible member
of the international community. There is no doubt that
Indonesia's harmonizing role in ASEAN did much to catapult its
own international standing.

By engaging with its closest neighbors -- its friends --
through ASEAN, Indonesia helped construct a geopolitical
environment that propelled economic growth and an unprecedented
era of peace never before witnessed in Southeast Asia.

The peace dividend was a windfall for Indonesia and ASEAN's
four other founding members. Hence it is not surprising that
nearly four decades later, ASEAN remains the cornerstone of
Indonesia's foreign policy. Much of our regional outlook is
intrinsically anchored to ASEAN.

Such is our empathy towards ASEAN that it is painful to see
the current wilting state of the grouping as it withers into
insignificance.

ASEAN professionals -- its paid administrators and career
paper pushers -- will quickly produce a stack of documents
testifying to the accomplishments and relevance of the grouping.
Certainly, there are many technical endeavors related to ASEAN
that should not be understated. But it would be erroneous not to
concede that the grouping has lost much of its zest over the past
decade or so.

ASEAN has committed itself toward erecting a "community of
caring nations". A goal that cannot be measured by statements or
the signing of documents. To do so would be to "lessen" ASEAN
into something like OPEC, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries, or the CGI, the donors' organization of the
Consultative Group on Indonesia, in which representatives of the
status quo consign its real stakeholders -- the general public --
to passive recipients of high diplomacy.

That is an ASEAN that we do not need, nor seek.

Our hope, or vision, is that ASEAN could be identified akin to
the Red Cross/Crescent or even the Boy Scouts as an organization,
which most of the 500 million or so inhabitants of Southeast Asia
can relate to and appreciate.

The inability of the organization to adapt to the changing
regional setting has been the single biggest drawback to the
organization's present lethargy, characterized by its reluctance
to react to the changing values of the people of the region and
to promote the inclusion of civil society within its ranks.

Any national (democratic) government that does not reflect the
aspirations of its constituents is unlikely to succeed in
governing or remaining in power very long (unless it employs
repressive methods). The same goes for ASEAN, as it experiences a
growing divergence with the hopes of Southeast peoples.

How can Indonesians, Thais or Filipinos, who live in a vibrant
open democracy be proud to be pillars of an organization that
condones the political repression of peoples in neighboring
lands?

How can an organization that claims to work for civil society
endure while it does not facilitate the free participation of its
constituents in the grouping's evolution?

These are questions that are not only unanswered, but -- like
most points of conflict in ASEAN -- have been evaded.

We believe that ASEAN is now mature enough to address these
difficult issues. The rug can no longer serve as a protective
cover to sweep ASEAN's problems under. And we believe even more
strongly that Indonesia should become the agent of change if
consensus on such issues is not forthcoming among the 10 ASEAN
members.

Two issues, addressed earlier, should be included as primary
objectives in the future.

The first is to send the clearest message that democratic
processes should be forthcoming if Yangon expects continued
support -- political, moral and economic -- from other southeast
Asian states. ASEAN should draw the line at being used as
cheerleader for a repressive regime.

The second is to facilitate, encourage and provide avenues for
true civil society participation in the organization.

One may point out the difficulty of identifying exactly who
represents civil society, but that is, at this stage, technically
irrelevant. At the initial stage, there is bound to be a glut of
representation resulting in a cacophony of rhetoric. But the
"natural selection" will streamline the groups that will
eventually be seen as sincerely representative.

The importance is that the grouping at the outset does not set
restrictions or strict parameters that tend to succumb to
political favoritism. This includes putting money where ASEAN's
mouth is, by generously supporting projects such as the ASEAN
People's Assembly and the ASEAN Foundation.

It would be very valuable to listen, because there is a clear
message of solidarity and concern in the voices of ASEAN's
millions.

Failure to appreciate these voices will only signify ASEAN's
alienation from its people, and confirm that the once important
grouping has truly run its course.