ASEAN at a crossroad

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which this country helped found on this day 38 years ago, occupies a distinctive place in Indonesian foreign policy. Perhaps even more so than the United Nations or any other multilateral organization in which this country is a member.

After years of "aggressive" rhetoric by first President Sukarno, the ensuing sensibility and wisdom displayed by Jakarta in its "informal" leadership of the grouping was evidence of Indonesia's worthiness to become a trusted and responsible member of the international community. There is no doubt that Indonesia's harmonizing role in ASEAN did much to catapult its own international standing.

By engaging with its closest neighbors -- its friends -- through ASEAN, Indonesia helped construct a geopolitical environment that propelled economic growth and an unprecedented era of peace never before witnessed in Southeast Asia.

The peace dividend was a windfall for Indonesia and ASEAN's four other founding members. Hence it is not surprising that nearly four decades later, ASEAN remains the cornerstone of Indonesia's foreign policy. Much of our regional outlook is intrinsically anchored to ASEAN.

Such is our empathy towards ASEAN that it is painful to see the current wilting state of the grouping as it withers into insignificance.

ASEAN professionals -- its paid administrators and career paper pushers -- will quickly produce a stack of documents testifying to the accomplishments and relevance of the grouping. Certainly, there are many technical endeavors related to ASEAN that should not be understated. But it would be erroneous not to concede that the grouping has lost much of its zest over the past decade or so.

ASEAN has committed itself toward erecting a "community of caring nations". A goal that cannot be measured by statements or the signing of documents. To do so would be to "lessen" ASEAN into something like OPEC, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, or the CGI, the donors' organization of the Consultative Group on Indonesia, in which representatives of the status quo consign its real stakeholders -- the general public -- to passive recipients of high diplomacy.

That is an ASEAN that we do not need, nor seek.

Our hope, or vision, is that ASEAN could be identified akin to the Red Cross/Crescent or even the Boy Scouts as an organization, which most of the 500 million or so inhabitants of Southeast Asia can relate to and appreciate.

The inability of the organization to adapt to the changing regional setting has been the single biggest drawback to the organization's present lethargy, characterized by its reluctance to react to the changing values of the people of the region and to promote the inclusion of civil society within its ranks.

Any national (democratic) government that does not reflect the aspirations of its constituents is unlikely to succeed in governing or remaining in power very long (unless it employs repressive methods). The same goes for ASEAN, as it experiences a growing divergence with the hopes of Southeast peoples.

How can Indonesians, Thais or Filipinos, who live in a vibrant open democracy be proud to be pillars of an organization that condones the political repression of peoples in neighboring lands?

How can an organization that claims to work for civil society endure while it does not facilitate the free participation of its constituents in the grouping's evolution?

These are questions that are not only unanswered, but -- like most points of conflict in ASEAN -- have been evaded.

We believe that ASEAN is now mature enough to address these difficult issues. The rug can no longer serve as a protective cover to sweep ASEAN's problems under. And we believe even more strongly that Indonesia should become the agent of change if consensus on such issues is not forthcoming among the 10 ASEAN members.

Two issues, addressed earlier, should be included as primary objectives in the future.

The first is to send the clearest message that democratic processes should be forthcoming if Yangon expects continued support -- political, moral and economic -- from other southeast Asian states. ASEAN should draw the line at being used as cheerleader for a repressive regime.

The second is to facilitate, encourage and provide avenues for true civil society participation in the organization.

One may point out the difficulty of identifying exactly who represents civil society, but that is, at this stage, technically irrelevant. At the initial stage, there is bound to be a glut of representation resulting in a cacophony of rhetoric. But the "natural selection" will streamline the groups that will eventually be seen as sincerely representative.

The importance is that the grouping at the outset does not set restrictions or strict parameters that tend to succumb to political favoritism. This includes putting money where ASEAN's mouth is, by generously supporting projects such as the ASEAN People's Assembly and the ASEAN Foundation.

It would be very valuable to listen, because there is a clear message of solidarity and concern in the voices of ASEAN's millions.

Failure to appreciate these voices will only signify ASEAN's alienation from its people, and confirm that the once important grouping has truly run its course.