ASEAN and the Spratly dispute
By J. Soedjati Djiwandono
JAKARTA (JP): The sixth in the series of workshops entitled "Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea", initiated by Indonesia in 1990 with Canadian support, is being held in Balikpapan, East Kalimantan, this week.
The workshop is intended to be an informal forum, in which the participants take part, in their personal capacities, in an exchange of ideas and information on the problems in the South China Sea.
It is not to be a dispute-settlement mechanism, but is aimed at seeking possible common ground as a basis for multilateral cooperation among the littoral states of the South China Sea for common benefit, without dealing with the existing claims and counter-claims to the Spratly Islands.
By putting aside the issue of sovereignty, such multilateral cooperation, as joint exploration and exploitation of resources and jointly-conducted scientific research, is expected to help create a climate that would be conducive to an eventual settlement of the dispute.
ASEAN as a group is not directly involved in the dispute over the Spratlys. But it is understandably concerned about potential conflicts over the issue, which also involves a majority of its member states (Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, the Philippines and new member Vietnam).
Moreover, the South China Sea has great strategic importance. Extending across Southeast Asia, it links the Indian and Pacific oceans. It links Southeast Asia with mainland Asia. It contains important sea lanes. Thus located, it can serve as a staging area for surveillance, possible sea-lane interdiction and naval operations to disrupt shipping. It is thought to contain economic potential such as deposits of gas, oil and minerals. And it is certainly a large fishing ground.
ASEAN's concern also relates to the uncertainty that has characterized the post-Cold War world. It concerns, in particular, the future role and intentions of China in the region. There is no assurance, for instance, that China will not resort to force in support of its claim on the Spratlys.
On the contrary, in a number of past cases China has not hesitated to do so. The ASEAN states called for restraint from the use of force over the issue in a statement of 1992 and renounced the use of force in the settlement of disputes in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia signed at the first ASEAN Summit in Bali in 1976. However, no similar statement has been made by the Chinese.
In the mean time, there have been reports that China, as well as the nations of Southeast Asia, have increased their military capabilities over the past few years.
Moreover, all of the claimant states, except for Brunei, have deployed troops in the area to sustain their respective claims. Yet it seems doubtful if any of the claimants are capable of defending their claims by military means.
Any military action by any one claimant is likely to impinge on other claimants. And a major military action by the Chinese would probably provoke American intervention, a risk the Chinese are not likely to risk under the circumstances.
It would also mean an internalization of the issue; something dreaded by the Chinese. While the Americans are neutral on the Spratly issue, they have made it clear that they would not tolerate disruption of the maritime lines of communication in the area.
America is even prepared to protect civilian ships passing through the sea lanes concerned. Otherwise, the United States seems at the moment more interested in Europe and the Middle East than in the South China Sea, Southeast Asia or even the Asia- Pacific region.
At all events, while their relations with the Americans are in trouble, the Chinese are not likely to want a confrontation with ASEAN. While insisting upon China's "indisputable sovereignty" over the Spratlys, the Chinese foreign minister stated at a multilateral meeting in Brunei last July that, apart from its historical claim, China would submit to a solution according to International Law.
The Chinese, moreover, have reportedly sold weapons to the Philippines. They would not have done so if they thought military confrontation with that country was likely, despite the recent Mischief Reef incident.
The uncertainty as to China's future international behavior is made greater by uncertainty about that country's domestic scene. While it is not a monopoly of the Chinese, the question of the national leadership succession, for instance, or the mystery of the decision-making process or the relationship between the civilian and military leadership, only adds to the uncertainty.
The Spratly dispute is important in another sense. With the end of the Cold War, and thus of ideological alignments, the withdrawal of the Soviet Union and the partial withdrawal of American military presence and the resultant "new world order" -- which is still in the making -- a final settlement of the dispute may help the future pattern or management of relations among the nations in the region of East Asia and, perhaps, of the whole Asia-Pacific region.
The fact that the first workshop was attended only by ASEAN representatives -- except some Canadians as resource persons -- does not mean that the ASEAN states have attempted to formulate a common position, thereby forming an ASEAN grouping against China (and Taiwan). No such grouping has been formed, notwithstanding the fact that an ASEAN-China meeting was held on the issue in Hangzhou in April 1995.
The possibility of a hostile ASEAN ganging up against China is remote, for with four of its member states being themselves involved in the dispute, their claims also impinge on one another, not just China and Taiwan.
If there is what may be called a common ASEAN position, it is that the ASEAN states favor a multilateral approach, although some member states have also been inclined to a bilateral approach. The ASEAN Declaration of 1992 on the South China Sea referred to the earlier call for self-restraint on the part of all claimants, for refraining from the use of force, and for avoiding actions that could destabilize the area. That declaration could also be considered a common ASEAN position, particularly as it was reiterated at the ASEAN ministerial meeting in Brunei in July.
Indeed, the Chinese have been reluctant to approach with the issue on a multilateral basis, preferring instead a bilateral approach. It is important to note, however, that the Chinese participation in the workshops is an indication that they are not completely averse to a multilateral approach, although limited in scope.
In any event, the dispute is already multilateral in nature. Yet a bilateral approach has not been abandoned altogether. The Chinese held talks with the Philippines last July on a code of conduct in the area. Previously, in May, they held talks with the Vietnamese in Beijing, also discussing the issue. These bilateral talks may help reduce tension and, as such, they will not stand in the way of multilateral negotiations. They may even assist in the multilateral process.
If anything, the series of workshops have primarily served as confidence-building measures. This is important to reduce tension and to avert armed conflict.
The apparent increase in flexibility on the part of the Chinese is an opportunity not to be missed. The possibility of a mechanism along the lines of the workshop may be considered for a future solution to the Spratly dispute.
The ASEAN Regional Forum is not appropriate, for it would mean a further internationalization of the issue involving major external powers which would not be acceptable to the Chinese. Although the present workshop is multilateral, it is "regional" rather than "international".
One possibility to be considered would be the workshop's gradual development from an informal into a formal forum for negotiations in search of a final solution of the Spratly dispute. The process may still be long, and thus the Spratly dispute may still remain with us for a long time to come. But the idea may merit serious consideration "while the iron is hot".
It is important, however, that the ASEAN states should be able to settle their own intra-ASEAN territorial disputes first, perhaps also on a multilateral basis. This would serve as evidence of their good faith. It might serve as an acceptable model for a conclusive resolution of the Spratly dispute.
The writer is a director of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies.