ASEAN and the Spratly dispute

ASEAN and the Spratly dispute

By J. Soedjati Djiwandono

JAKARTA (JP): The sixth in the series of workshops entitled
"Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea", initiated
by Indonesia in 1990 with Canadian support, is being held in
Balikpapan, East Kalimantan, this week.

The workshop is intended to be an informal forum, in which the
participants take part, in their personal capacities, in an
exchange of ideas and information on the problems in the South
China Sea.

It is not to be a dispute-settlement mechanism, but is aimed
at seeking possible common ground as a basis for multilateral
cooperation among the littoral states of the South China Sea for
common benefit, without dealing with the existing claims and
counter-claims to the Spratly Islands.

By putting aside the issue of sovereignty, such multilateral
cooperation, as joint exploration and exploitation of resources
and jointly-conducted scientific research, is expected to help
create a climate that would be conducive to an eventual
settlement of the dispute.

ASEAN as a group is not directly involved in the dispute over
the Spratlys. But it is understandably concerned about potential
conflicts over the issue, which also involves a majority of its
member states (Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, the Philippines and
new member Vietnam).

Moreover, the South China Sea has great strategic importance.
Extending across Southeast Asia, it links the Indian and Pacific
oceans. It links Southeast Asia with mainland Asia. It contains
important sea lanes. Thus located, it can serve as a staging area
for surveillance, possible sea-lane interdiction and naval
operations to disrupt shipping. It is thought to contain economic
potential such as deposits of gas, oil and minerals. And it is
certainly a large fishing ground.

ASEAN's concern also relates to the uncertainty that has
characterized the post-Cold War world. It concerns, in
particular, the future role and intentions of China in the
region. There is no assurance, for instance, that China will not
resort to force in support of its claim on the Spratlys.

On the contrary, in a number of past cases China has not
hesitated to do so. The ASEAN states called for restraint from
the use of force over the issue in a statement of 1992 and
renounced the use of force in the settlement of disputes in the
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia signed at the
first ASEAN Summit in Bali in 1976. However, no similar statement
has been made by the Chinese.

In the mean time, there have been reports that China, as well
as the nations of Southeast Asia, have increased their military
capabilities over the past few years.

Moreover, all of the claimant states, except for Brunei, have
deployed troops in the area to sustain their respective claims.
Yet it seems doubtful if any of the claimants are capable of
defending their claims by military means.

Any military action by any one claimant is likely to impinge
on other claimants. And a major military action by the Chinese
would probably provoke American intervention, a risk the Chinese
are not likely to risk under the circumstances.

It would also mean an internalization of the issue; something
dreaded by the Chinese. While the Americans are neutral on the
Spratly issue, they have made it clear that they would not
tolerate disruption of the maritime lines of communication in the
area.

America is even prepared to protect civilian ships passing
through the sea lanes concerned. Otherwise, the United States
seems at the moment more interested in Europe and the Middle East
than in the South China Sea, Southeast Asia or even the Asia-
Pacific region.

At all events, while their relations with the Americans are in
trouble, the Chinese are not likely to want a confrontation with
ASEAN. While insisting upon China's "indisputable sovereignty"
over the Spratlys, the Chinese foreign minister stated at a
multilateral meeting in Brunei last July that, apart from its
historical claim, China would submit to a solution according to
International Law.

The Chinese, moreover, have reportedly sold weapons to the
Philippines. They would not have done so if they thought military
confrontation with that country was likely, despite the recent
Mischief Reef incident.

The uncertainty as to China's future international behavior is
made greater by uncertainty about that country's domestic scene.
While it is not a monopoly of the Chinese, the question of the
national leadership succession, for instance, or the mystery of
the decision-making process or the relationship between the
civilian and military leadership, only adds to the uncertainty.

The Spratly dispute is important in another sense. With the
end of the Cold War, and thus of ideological alignments, the
withdrawal of the Soviet Union and the partial withdrawal of
American military presence and the resultant "new world order" --
which is still in the making -- a final settlement of the dispute
may help the future pattern or management of relations among the
nations in the region of East Asia and, perhaps, of the whole
Asia-Pacific region.

The fact that the first workshop was attended only by ASEAN
representatives -- except some Canadians as resource persons --
does not mean that the ASEAN states have attempted to formulate a
common position, thereby forming an ASEAN grouping against China
(and Taiwan). No such grouping has been formed, notwithstanding
the fact that an ASEAN-China meeting was held on the issue in
Hangzhou in April 1995.

The possibility of a hostile ASEAN ganging up against China is
remote, for with four of its member states being themselves
involved in the dispute, their claims also impinge on one
another, not just China and Taiwan.

If there is what may be called a common ASEAN position, it is
that the ASEAN states favor a multilateral approach, although
some member states have also been inclined to a bilateral
approach. The ASEAN Declaration of 1992 on the South China Sea
referred to the earlier call for self-restraint on the part of
all claimants, for refraining from the use of force, and for
avoiding actions that could destabilize the area. That
declaration could also be considered a common ASEAN position,
particularly as it was reiterated at the ASEAN ministerial
meeting in Brunei in July.

Indeed, the Chinese have been reluctant to approach with the
issue on a multilateral basis, preferring instead a bilateral
approach. It is important to note, however, that the Chinese
participation in the workshops is an indication that they are not
completely averse to a multilateral approach, although limited in
scope.

In any event, the dispute is already multilateral in nature.
Yet a bilateral approach has not been abandoned altogether. The
Chinese held talks with the Philippines last July on a code of
conduct in the area. Previously, in May, they held talks with the
Vietnamese in Beijing, also discussing the issue. These bilateral
talks may help reduce tension and, as such, they will not stand
in the way of multilateral negotiations. They may even assist in
the multilateral process.

If anything, the series of workshops have primarily served as
confidence-building measures. This is important to reduce tension
and to avert armed conflict.

The apparent increase in flexibility on the part of the
Chinese is an opportunity not to be missed. The possibility of a
mechanism along the lines of the workshop may be considered for a
future solution to the Spratly dispute.

The ASEAN Regional Forum is not appropriate, for it would mean
a further internationalization of the issue involving major
external powers which would not be acceptable to the Chinese.
Although the present workshop is multilateral, it is "regional"
rather than "international".

One possibility to be considered would be the workshop's
gradual development from an informal into a formal forum for
negotiations in search of a final solution of the Spratly
dispute. The process may still be long, and thus the Spratly
dispute may still remain with us for a long time to come. But the
idea may merit serious consideration "while the iron is hot".

It is important, however, that the ASEAN states should be able
to settle their own intra-ASEAN territorial disputes first,
perhaps also on a multilateral basis. This would serve as
evidence of their good faith. It might serve as an acceptable
model for a conclusive resolution of the Spratly dispute.

The writer is a director of the Centre for Strategic and
International Studies.