ASEAN and the Cambodian crisis

ASEAN and the Cambodian crisis

By Rizal Sukma

JAKARTA (JP): In a special meeting of Foreign Ministers on
July 10 in Kuala Lumpur, ASEAN finally came to the conclusion
that the time has not yet come for Cambodia to join ASEAN. The
outbreak of armed conflict between the two prime ministers, Hun
Sen and Norodom Ranariddh, has plunged the country once again
into a crisis. This development has been unfortunate. It forced
ASEAN to postpone the realization of the idea of ASEAN-10 at the
30th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Malaysia. More
importantly, the current crisis in Cambodia constitutes a
reminder to ASEAN's previous diplomatic involvement with that
conflict-ridden country prior to the end of the Cold War.

Indeed, the outbreak of war between Hun Sen and Ranariddh
factions conveys a strong message to ASEAN and the international
community that the Cambodian conflict has its roots in domestic
politics and history. An international-sponsored "solution by
general elections" under the auspices of the United Nations (UN)
in 1993 could only manage to establish an ersatz peace by
"sweeping most of the problems under the carpet." Now that the
conflict has once again come to the surface, it is very likely
that ASEAN will again have to engage in a search for a peaceful
solution. The fact that what is happening in Cambodia might have
serious implications for regional stability and peace makes
ASEAN's involvement -- in whatever form that involvement might
take -- imperative. Indeed, ASEAN has already offered itself to
help find a peaceful solution to the crisis.

The course of events has already indicated that ASEAN's
involvement is looming. Here, ASEAN's initial response to the
crisis has been impressive and, in a way, unprecedented. Firstly,
to the surprise of many, ASEAN Foreign Ministers managed to
convene a special meeting in such a short time to address the
problem. This rapid reaction constitutes a major breakthrough in
the decision-making process often characterized by institutional
constraints. Secondly, by deciding to postpone the membership of
Cambodia, ASEAN has also demonstrated a high degree of
organizational maturity. The decision clearly reserved ASEAN's
previous decision to accept Cambodia taken during a meeting of
Foreign Ministers in Langkawi, Malaysia, two months ago. This act
clearly demonstrates that ASEAN is no longer reluctant to review
its own political decision if the need arises. Thirdly, in this
case ASEAN has also demonstrated its growing ability to deal with
a crisis.

The decision to postpone the Cambodian membership itself has
been a wise one. The nature of the current conflict in Cambodia
is quite problematic for ASEAN. Continuing with the decision to
accept Cambodia as a member would have put ASEAN in a dilemma
because it necessitates ASEAN to choose who should represent
Cambodia. Choosing or supporting one of the Prime Ministers at
this stage of developments is clearly not a strategic act. Such
an action, while running the risk of being charged with
"interference" in Cambodian internal affairs, would also
complicate the situation. Taking side at this stage would also
close the door to a neutral ASEAN position which in turn
precludes the possibility of ASEAN's positive contribution in
finding a comprehensive solution to the crisis. In this regard,
the postponement of Cambodia's membership would reduce such a
risk.

However, the present Cambodian crisis also provides two
importance lessons for ASEAN. First, it again reveals a dilemma
stemming from the principle of non-interference strongly adhered
by ASEAN. On the one hand, it must be acknowledged that ASEAN's
co-operation has been sustained by member states' adherence to
the principle. However, on the other hand, ASEAN is also faced
with the fact that the contemporary inter-state relations is
increasingly characterized by interdependence. It has become
increasingly difficult to draw a clear boundary between domestic
and international issues. Consequently, the question of
interference and non-interference in domestic affairs of other
country has become more problematic than before.

It is precisely such a dilemma that ASEAN is facing at
present. On the one hand, ASEAN continues to adhere to the
conventional understanding of non-interference principle.
However, on the other hand, it is difficult for ASEAN not to
"interfere" in the Cambodian crisis. For example, the fact that
ASEAN convened a special meeting in Kuala Lumpur to review the
situation in Cambodia and its membership in the Association can
be easily construed by outside parties as an act of
"interference." Here, the dilemma becomes clearer when ASEAN
decided to postpone the Cambodian membership. Because, such a
decision can be seen as contrary to ASEAN's claim that a
country's domestic condition is not a criteria for membership in
ASEAN which constitutes a manifestation of non-interference
principle. Therefore, there is a need for ASEAN to rethink this
question and, if possible, agree on acceptable forms of
interference. Because, what happens in Cambodia at present can
also occur again after the country becomes a member in the
future.

Secondly, the Cambodian crisis reinforces the need for an
institutionalized ASEAN conflict resolution mechanism. So far,
ASEAN has been known for its role as a conflict defuser. However,
such a role can only be articulated in defusing intra-ASEAN
conflict or at regional level, not yet at a national level. In a
way, such a limited role constitutes the nature of ASEAN
cooperation which limits itself to efforts to create a regional
community free from inter-state conflicts. It also constitutes a
logical consequence of the implementation of non-interference
principle in ASEAN. In this context, ASEAN's achievement deserves
to be mentioned as a "success story." On the other hand, however,
ASEAN has not devised any mechanism to address internal conflict
in a member states which might affect regional stability and
peace. It is here that the idea of an ASEAN Peace Keeping Force
becomes more relevance than ever.

How, then, can ASEAN play a positive role in seeking a
peaceful solution to the Cambodian crisis? In the near terms, it
seems that there is no readily available option that ASEAN can
pursue but to offer its good intention. The most visible option
at present is that ASEAN show its intention to be a mediator
between Hun Sen and Norodom Ranariddh. This option -- if it can
be materialized -- constitutes a positive aspect for both sides
because it indicates the presence of trust from the Cambodian
side on the function of ASEAN. More over, the role as mediator in
an internal conflict will also provides new experience for ASEAN
to improve its function as conflict defuser. However, it should
be stated that this option is not an easy one because it requires
consent from conflicting parties in Cambodia. In other words, Hun
Sen and Ranariddh should agree to invite ASEAN to act as a
conflict mediator.

The opportunity for ASEAN to take a more constructive leading
role remains open. In this regard, ASEAN is expected to maintain
a situation which denies the opportunity for foreign intervention
and involvement. ASEAN is also faced with the challenge to
maintain its neutrality so that the conflicting parties in
Cambodia would not have any reason to seek foreign allies. The
attitude of the Cambodian People Party (CPP) led by Hun Sen is
most sensitive in this case. Due to ASEAN's support to FUNCINPEC
in the past, it is likely that Hun Sen suspects that ASEAN would
again lend its sympathy and support to Norodom Ranariddh. Any
sign of ASEAN's official support to Ranariddh is likely to push
Hun Sen to seek support from its old ally, Vietnam. If this
happens, and Vietnam responds positively to support Hun Sen, than
ASEAN unity will be at stake. The whole question of peace and
stability in Cambodia will go back to the square one with a more
devastating impact on the idea of ASEAN-10.

At present, there have been no sign that the CPP will move to
that direction. Hun Sen's strong statement that "Cambodia can
survive without ASEAN" is, of course, regrettable. However, such
a statement should be understood as a result of misperception of
ASEAN's position. Therefore, ASEAN's decision to send a
delegation to open up a series of talks with King Sihanouk,
Norodom Ranariddh, and Hun Sen should be enough to demonstrate
ASEAN's neutral position and goodwill. In terms of this effort,
it should be made clear also that an international pressure on
Hun Sen at this stage of developments, as currently being
mobilized by Norodom Ranariddh, could be counter-productive and
will not necessarily contribute positively to the peace process.
An international-led peace initiative in Cambodia has not brought
a permanent peace in Cambodia. Therefore, it is now time to give
"The ASEAN Way" a greater chance.

Dr. Rizal Sukma is a researcher at CSIS, Jakarta.

Window: Therefore, ASEAN's decision to send a delegation to open
up a series of talks with King Sihanouk, Norodom Ranariddh, and
Hun Sen should be enough to demonstrate ASEAN's neutral position
and goodwill.