Sat, 19 Jul 1997

ASEAN and the Cambodian crisis

By Rizal Sukma

JAKARTA (JP): In a special meeting of Foreign Ministers on July 10 in Kuala Lumpur, ASEAN finally came to the conclusion that the time has not yet come for Cambodia to join ASEAN. The outbreak of armed conflict between the two prime ministers, Hun Sen and Norodom Ranariddh, has plunged the country once again into a crisis. This development has been unfortunate. It forced ASEAN to postpone the realization of the idea of ASEAN-10 at the 30th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Malaysia. More importantly, the current crisis in Cambodia constitutes a reminder to ASEAN's previous diplomatic involvement with that conflict-ridden country prior to the end of the Cold War.

Indeed, the outbreak of war between Hun Sen and Ranariddh factions conveys a strong message to ASEAN and the international community that the Cambodian conflict has its roots in domestic politics and history. An international-sponsored "solution by general elections" under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) in 1993 could only manage to establish an ersatz peace by "sweeping most of the problems under the carpet." Now that the conflict has once again come to the surface, it is very likely that ASEAN will again have to engage in a search for a peaceful solution. The fact that what is happening in Cambodia might have serious implications for regional stability and peace makes ASEAN's involvement -- in whatever form that involvement might take -- imperative. Indeed, ASEAN has already offered itself to help find a peaceful solution to the crisis.

The course of events has already indicated that ASEAN's involvement is looming. Here, ASEAN's initial response to the crisis has been impressive and, in a way, unprecedented. Firstly, to the surprise of many, ASEAN Foreign Ministers managed to convene a special meeting in such a short time to address the problem. This rapid reaction constitutes a major breakthrough in the decision-making process often characterized by institutional constraints. Secondly, by deciding to postpone the membership of Cambodia, ASEAN has also demonstrated a high degree of organizational maturity. The decision clearly reserved ASEAN's previous decision to accept Cambodia taken during a meeting of Foreign Ministers in Langkawi, Malaysia, two months ago. This act clearly demonstrates that ASEAN is no longer reluctant to review its own political decision if the need arises. Thirdly, in this case ASEAN has also demonstrated its growing ability to deal with a crisis.

The decision to postpone the Cambodian membership itself has been a wise one. The nature of the current conflict in Cambodia is quite problematic for ASEAN. Continuing with the decision to accept Cambodia as a member would have put ASEAN in a dilemma because it necessitates ASEAN to choose who should represent Cambodia. Choosing or supporting one of the Prime Ministers at this stage of developments is clearly not a strategic act. Such an action, while running the risk of being charged with "interference" in Cambodian internal affairs, would also complicate the situation. Taking side at this stage would also close the door to a neutral ASEAN position which in turn precludes the possibility of ASEAN's positive contribution in finding a comprehensive solution to the crisis. In this regard, the postponement of Cambodia's membership would reduce such a risk.

However, the present Cambodian crisis also provides two importance lessons for ASEAN. First, it again reveals a dilemma stemming from the principle of non-interference strongly adhered by ASEAN. On the one hand, it must be acknowledged that ASEAN's co-operation has been sustained by member states' adherence to the principle. However, on the other hand, ASEAN is also faced with the fact that the contemporary inter-state relations is increasingly characterized by interdependence. It has become increasingly difficult to draw a clear boundary between domestic and international issues. Consequently, the question of interference and non-interference in domestic affairs of other country has become more problematic than before.

It is precisely such a dilemma that ASEAN is facing at present. On the one hand, ASEAN continues to adhere to the conventional understanding of non-interference principle. However, on the other hand, it is difficult for ASEAN not to "interfere" in the Cambodian crisis. For example, the fact that ASEAN convened a special meeting in Kuala Lumpur to review the situation in Cambodia and its membership in the Association can be easily construed by outside parties as an act of "interference." Here, the dilemma becomes clearer when ASEAN decided to postpone the Cambodian membership. Because, such a decision can be seen as contrary to ASEAN's claim that a country's domestic condition is not a criteria for membership in ASEAN which constitutes a manifestation of non-interference principle. Therefore, there is a need for ASEAN to rethink this question and, if possible, agree on acceptable forms of interference. Because, what happens in Cambodia at present can also occur again after the country becomes a member in the future.

Secondly, the Cambodian crisis reinforces the need for an institutionalized ASEAN conflict resolution mechanism. So far, ASEAN has been known for its role as a conflict defuser. However, such a role can only be articulated in defusing intra-ASEAN conflict or at regional level, not yet at a national level. In a way, such a limited role constitutes the nature of ASEAN cooperation which limits itself to efforts to create a regional community free from inter-state conflicts. It also constitutes a logical consequence of the implementation of non-interference principle in ASEAN. In this context, ASEAN's achievement deserves to be mentioned as a "success story." On the other hand, however, ASEAN has not devised any mechanism to address internal conflict in a member states which might affect regional stability and peace. It is here that the idea of an ASEAN Peace Keeping Force becomes more relevance than ever.

How, then, can ASEAN play a positive role in seeking a peaceful solution to the Cambodian crisis? In the near terms, it seems that there is no readily available option that ASEAN can pursue but to offer its good intention. The most visible option at present is that ASEAN show its intention to be a mediator between Hun Sen and Norodom Ranariddh. This option -- if it can be materialized -- constitutes a positive aspect for both sides because it indicates the presence of trust from the Cambodian side on the function of ASEAN. More over, the role as mediator in an internal conflict will also provides new experience for ASEAN to improve its function as conflict defuser. However, it should be stated that this option is not an easy one because it requires consent from conflicting parties in Cambodia. In other words, Hun Sen and Ranariddh should agree to invite ASEAN to act as a conflict mediator.

The opportunity for ASEAN to take a more constructive leading role remains open. In this regard, ASEAN is expected to maintain a situation which denies the opportunity for foreign intervention and involvement. ASEAN is also faced with the challenge to maintain its neutrality so that the conflicting parties in Cambodia would not have any reason to seek foreign allies. The attitude of the Cambodian People Party (CPP) led by Hun Sen is most sensitive in this case. Due to ASEAN's support to FUNCINPEC in the past, it is likely that Hun Sen suspects that ASEAN would again lend its sympathy and support to Norodom Ranariddh. Any sign of ASEAN's official support to Ranariddh is likely to push Hun Sen to seek support from its old ally, Vietnam. If this happens, and Vietnam responds positively to support Hun Sen, than ASEAN unity will be at stake. The whole question of peace and stability in Cambodia will go back to the square one with a more devastating impact on the idea of ASEAN-10.

At present, there have been no sign that the CPP will move to that direction. Hun Sen's strong statement that "Cambodia can survive without ASEAN" is, of course, regrettable. However, such a statement should be understood as a result of misperception of ASEAN's position. Therefore, ASEAN's decision to send a delegation to open up a series of talks with King Sihanouk, Norodom Ranariddh, and Hun Sen should be enough to demonstrate ASEAN's neutral position and goodwill. In terms of this effort, it should be made clear also that an international pressure on Hun Sen at this stage of developments, as currently being mobilized by Norodom Ranariddh, could be counter-productive and will not necessarily contribute positively to the peace process. An international-led peace initiative in Cambodia has not brought a permanent peace in Cambodia. Therefore, it is now time to give "The ASEAN Way" a greater chance.

Dr. Rizal Sukma is a researcher at CSIS, Jakarta.

Window: Therefore, ASEAN's decision to send a delegation to open up a series of talks with King Sihanouk, Norodom Ranariddh, and Hun Sen should be enough to demonstrate ASEAN's neutral position and goodwill.