Arms and the hegemon

Hirak Choudhuri The Statesman Asia News Network Calcutta

India is one of Russia's most prominent customers for arms. Yet, sales are much more than an exchange of weapons or technology for cash. The arms sales and the linkages established exert a subtle but major influence on future Indian security policy. They must also be seen in light of a new Asian security order. Asia is awash with arms sales, and with U.S. power visibly advancing in Afghanistan in its global war against terrorism, fears of regional instability are on the increase.

Russian officials perceive India as a "strategic partner" while India's longstanding military ties with Moscow remain critical as far as New Delhi is concerned. India's military build-up has brought it beyond the nuclear threshold and given it a position of a regional hegemon. But its influence has been limited. India's defense budget for 2002-2003 is awash with funds for weapons development and modernization.

At the heart of the problem is the fact that over 70 percent of the Indian army's weapons systems are of Soviet/Russian origin, yet Russian defense sales to India had declined since 1988. Moscow now wants payment for defense exports in hard currency but India's foreign reserves are limited. In fact India already owes sizable arrears to Russia.

Russia continues to value this relationship, so as to retain India's pivotal arms market and maintain its old political ties. India's goal is to achieve the maximum number of arms purchases while Russia is "fighting for space" in a highly competitive and cutthroat business. Russian attempts to establish export markets in arms and missile technology also lie behind the recent deals to sell T-90 main battle tanks, Krivak class guided missile frigates, SU-30 fighter aircraft and jointly develop the Brah-Mos supersonic anti-ship cruise missile.

There are other good reasons to maintain old ties. Islamic fundamentalism in South and Central Asia can inflame common borders.

Russia and India are also apparently co-operating to extend their "influence" with the new interim government in Kabul against supposed "radical Islamic" enemies. India also wants to deprive Pakistan of a foothold in Central Asia. Consequently, India does not want Moscow to sell arms to Pakistan or support it in Central Asia.

India continues to upgrade its conventional forces and "nuclearise" its navy. Naval plans call for nuclear strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) in the fleet by the year 2010. Furthermore, there are also plans to acquire Russian nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) to protect the boomers (SSBNs). Presently, India is also negotiating for the acquisition of the former Soviet aircraft carrier "Admiral Gorshkov" along with a carrier air wing of novelized MiG-29Ks.

The search for power projection systems continues. India has purchased 50 SU-30 MKI fighter aircraft and negotiated the license-manufacture of 150 more by HAL. Since this aircraft is designed for long-range interception missions, it matches India's future needs. Russia is also collaborating with India to modernize 125 late model MiG-21bis to the far more capable MiG-21-93 standard. There will also be mid-life upgrades, with Russian technical assistance, for MiG-23/27 and MiG-29 aircraft currently in air force inventory. Russia has also sold the Tungushka-2SM mobile anti-aircraft gun-missile system to the Army and has shown a readiness to sell the Buk, Tor, S-300V and S- 300PMU air defense missile systems. The joint development of the "Brah-Mos" cruise missile based on the Russian Yakhont missile with Indian electronics is another indication of the depth of this defense relationship.

These are all important deals. The SU-30 is a far more advanced version of the SU-27 that Russia has already sold to China. This aircraft can act as a mini-AWACS to designate airborne targets and then hand them over to other fighter aircraft. These examples demonstrate that Indo-Russian co- operation also matches India's drive for regional superiority and sufficiency.

This bilateral connection enhances the general diffusion of production skills and capacities. Russia is transferring technology and expertise by joint venture agreements. For example, the MiG-MAPO aerospace company has established a joint venture company with HAL of India to manufacture spare parts for the MiG line of aircraft not only for India but also for Malaysia and Vietnam. The firm established for this purpose, Indo-Russian Aviation, will initially upgrade 125 of India's MiG-21bis fighter aircraft and possibly MiG-23/27 and MiG-29 combat aircraft at a later date.

In the wake of the 1991 Gulf War, Indian military analysts, have concluded that arms exports ensure an independent weapons manufacturing capability. When advanced military requirements, such as making the Indian Navy a sophisticated "high-tech four dimensional force", drive the R&D effort, weapons become available to the forces. Therefore, India must step up private sector R&D to become self-sufficient, save and earn foreign exchange as well as create and market unique and effective weapons systems.

The recent change of policy to finally allow the private sector into defense production is a step in that direction. The Indian defense industry must also export these new weapons in order to obtain the foreign currency needed to modernize further and remain competitive. The congruence of this view with Russias emerging needs is striking but not surprising.

Accordingly, the details of sales to India are astounding given Russia's economic position for the last decade. India received 30 MiG-29 fighter aircraft in early 1993 and a line of credit of US$830 million to finance ship and combat aircraft building programs, as well as tank construction, under agreements contracted during the Soviet period.

Moscow's arms agreements with India displays the joint pressures of a threatened arms industry and the continued use of arms deals to strengthen shared geo-political interests. Moscow has virtually invited India to play a more pro-active role in Central Asia and has fashioned a rapprochement with China partly on the shared fear of Islamic radicalism; it is thus clear that the transfer of arms and technologies to India will have a profound overall impact on regional security that goes beyond merely Indo-Pakistani relations. India will also be, to some degree, a participant in a shared Sino-Russian endeavor that could become a three-sided one, principally to stabilize the status quo in Central Asia. As a quid pro quo, India's hegemony will be acknowledged in South Asia.