'Armed Forces should not stick to the past'

Recent reports on the socio-political roles of the Armed Forces by the National Institute of Sciences (LIPI) have drawn a wide response. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, senior researcher at the institute and also at the Center for Information and Development Studies, examines the background to these reports.

JAKARTA (JP): When President Soeharto requested the National Institute of Sciences (LIPI), through its chairman, carry out research on ways to improve the general election and the sociopolitical role of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) in early 1995, many eyebrows were raised. Since this involved the highest power in the land, as is usual in this country, speculations regarding the meaning of these requests abounded. Questions were asked about why the President felt it necessary to commission the study, and whether the choice of LIPI, a national research institute founded and funded by the state, was significant.

Those who tend to look on the bright side regarded the assignment as an indication of the government's, particularly the President's, growing sensitivity to the increasingly vocal criticism being leveled at the way general elections have been conducted, which unabashedly favored Golkar, and at the dominant sociopolitical role of the Armed Forces.

The choice of LIPI was regarded as only natural, since one of the tasks of the institute is to conduct policy studies for the government. Although LIPI is a government institution, meaning its researchers are civil servants and members of Golkar, the institute is generally perceived to be relatively independent and neutral. The President's instruction to LIPI to study the general election process and the sociopolitical role of the Armed Forces, and to come up with suggestions for improvement, was seen by some to be a genuine desire to find answers to a number of fundamental questions that face the Indonesian state and society.

The more cynical observers, however, dismissed the President's request to LIPI as nothing more than a formalistic response to the growing demands for the reform of the general election process and the reduction of the military's involvement in politics. Given LIPI's status, many critics doubted the institute's ability to carry out a thorough and an unbiased study. In fact, quite a few were suspicious that LIPI's reports could be used to legitimize the present order further and thus deflect criticism of the government.

Given the importance of the issues being discussed, LIPI was clearly confronted with a dilemma, resulting in sometimes heated debate among its officials and researchers. It was quite clear that the questions being asked were not mere academic exercises, but could have far-reaching consequences, including for LIPI itself. LIPI was caught between the desire to project itself as a credible and professional research institution whose findings could be relied upon by all parties, and the reality of it being a state-funded institution. There were also heated debates about what to do with the reports once they were completed. Were the reports to be considered confidential for use of only the President or should they be made public knowledge, since the public was entitled to know and debate on the matters?

It was finally agreed that despite the potentially sensitive issues being studied, LIPI could not afford to compromise its integrity and its long-standing reputation. As the national research institution, LIPI's responsibility is not only to the government, but to the nation as a whole. Nonetheless, because the first studies on general elections and the sociopolitical role of the Armed Forces were commissioned by the President, the reports were given only to the President through Minister/State Secretary Moerdiono. These reports were submitted to the President in early 1996. The public, including those who had acted as resource persons, were not given copies of these reports.

The researchers involved in both studies, however, felt that the issues are too important to be left there. Further studies, based on extensive fieldwork, were clearly needed and the findings made public so they could be discussed and debated, and contribute toward the country's political development.

Therefore, based on their own initiatives the researchers at LIPI have taken the research projects beyond what the President initially requested. The plan is to carry out these studies over a number of years, covering as wide an area and as diverse a sector as possible, so that one may obtain a more complete picture and a deeper understanding of the real situation.

The report on ABRI that was released recently is the first study to come out from this series, which will hopefully continue to be funded by the government.

The first report on ABRI has generated a lot of interest, with many observers agreeing with the findings and the recommendations on the future of ABRI's sociopolitical role. There has also been a lot of hostile reaction to and criticism of the report, particularly from military ranks.

These debates and disagreements are clearly very healthy and will help the researchers to improve their final report. The report focuses on the ways ABRI's sociopolitical role has been implemented and how people in various parts of Indonesia feel and perceive the reality of such a role in their respective areas in the past 30 years.

What the report makes clear is that historical justification regarding ABRI's sociopolitical role is no longer sufficient. Sticking to arguments about the past, and refusing to face the problems of today, will clearly make it difficult for us to move toward a better tomorrow.

It is hoped that LIPI's efforts will not be like a cry in the wilderness, to be ignored and forgotten.

Political role -- Page 4