ARF needs concrete programs, preventive diplomacy

By Jusuf Wanandi

Foreign ministers from ASEAN countries and major powers of the world gather in Manila today for the annual ASEAN Regional Forum to discuss regional and international security. In this article, Jusuf Wanandi, Chairman of the Supervisory Board of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, shares his view on where the forum should be heading.

The ASEAN Regional Forum or ARF was a brilliant initiative. It was made in 1993 when there was still confusion about post-Cold War developments, and the Tiananmen Square incident had frozen U.S.-China relations. ASEAN's proposal was intended as a regional confidence building measure (CBM) to lay the foundations for an Asia-Pacific multilateral security arrangement. The vehicle for this was the grouping's annual Post Ministerial Conference. ARF was intended to complement, not replace, bilateral relations or alliances.

In five years the Forum has laid down CBMs amongst its members through dialog and conferences held between defense officials, military academies and defense universities; by encouraging the publication of defense white papers; and participation in international treaties on weapons of mass destruction. Equally important are special efforts to create CBMs such as exchanges on peace-keeping experiences and training as well as search and rescue techniques.

Now is the time to gradually strengthen cooperation through the Forum because CBMs have created a sound base upon which to do so. However, more needs to come from ARF in terms of concrete programs to make it relevant to the region's future stability and security. This is important because the strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific region remains fluid. The main factor which made ARF relevant, the post-Tiananmen strain in relations between the U.S. and China, has been largely overcome. Furthermore, China is now feeling much more relaxed with multilateralism.

The past few years have seen the emergence of serious worries about ARF, and ASEAN's leadership of it. These worries have increased because of the economic and political crises in Indonesia. It is expected that the regional monetary crisis will force ASEAN countries into a preoccupation with domestic problems to the neglect of regional issues and institution-building. Also, the resources necessary to further develop ARF may not be available at the present time.

Another question about the leadership of ARF relates to ASEAN's expanding membership. New members Laos, Myanmar and, later possibly Cambodia, could pose a problem when they assume the rotating ASEAN chair and therefore the ARF chairmanship too, either because they are unprepared for the task or because of problems which they have with dialog partners, particularly states from the West. That is why ASEAN must make certain improvements in order to maintain the relevance of the Forum.

First, translate the suggestions emanating from exchanges and dialogs in CBMs into concrete programs. This could include discussions on regional strategic developments in seminars held in cooperation with other institutions like the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific; the publication of defense white papers by all ARF members; and exchanges between officials, especially military officials, and defense universities.

Peacekeeping is one of the most important CBM activities. ARF should seriously consider setting up a small center to exchange information and undertake studies on this subject. A feasibility study on this is currently being undertaken by the ASEAN Institute for Strategic and International Studies. More readily set up could be a search and rescue center or a code of conduct on how to cooperate in the aftermath of disasters. Other proposals for ARF include taking up the subject of preventive diplomacy (PD). Forum ministers considered this last year.

Preventive diplomacy is different from CBM because it is deployed in the context of a conflict situation. China's reluctance to bring PD onto the agenda is understandable because it could be applied to what the Chinese consider to be domestic conflicts. However, China might be willing to entertain bilateral or even a multilateral PD effort in the South China Sea between itself and the ASEAN states. Beijing might also be more open to PD if it concerns new security issues involving the environment, migration or crime.

For these efforts to become practical, two other improvements have to be made by ARF. One is a degree of institutionalization. The ASEAN tradition of a revolving leadership and institutional support will not be adequate to implement concrete programs. This necessitates the creation of a unit or a small secretariat. It could be under the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting or the ARF equivalent, or under a special division in the ASEAN Secretariat. Its members should consist of ASEAN representatives and other members on a seconded basis.

The other improvement needed is for ASEAN to agree to ARF having a co-chair from a non-member nation. The co-chair should be elected by consensus among ARF's dialog partners and be rotated through non-member regions like Northeast Asia, North America and the Southwest Pacific. This is not only important for the equality of ARF members, but would help the Forum to get the necessary resources for its programs, both human and financial. Only then will it become a fully-fledged institution that can take care of the whole region.

China might have problems with these ideas initially, but it might accept them if it feels assured that on very important issues such as ARF membership and co-chairmanship, a consensus by all members is a prerequisite.