ARF needs concrete programs, preventive diplomacy

ARF needs concrete programs, preventive diplomacy

By Jusuf Wanandi

Foreign ministers from ASEAN countries and major powers of the
world gather in Manila today for the annual ASEAN Regional Forum
to discuss regional and international security. In this article,
Jusuf Wanandi, Chairman of the Supervisory Board of the Center
for Strategic and International Studies, shares his view on where
the forum should be heading.

The ASEAN Regional Forum or ARF was a brilliant initiative. It
was made in 1993 when there was still confusion about post-Cold
War developments, and the Tiananmen Square incident had frozen
U.S.-China relations. ASEAN's proposal was intended as a regional
confidence building measure (CBM) to lay the foundations for an
Asia-Pacific multilateral security arrangement. The vehicle for
this was the grouping's annual Post Ministerial Conference. ARF
was intended to complement, not replace, bilateral relations or
alliances.

In five years the Forum has laid down CBMs amongst its members
through dialog and conferences held between defense officials,
military academies and defense universities; by encouraging the
publication of defense white papers; and participation in
international treaties on weapons of mass destruction. Equally
important are special efforts to create CBMs such as exchanges on
peace-keeping experiences and training as well as search and
rescue techniques.

Now is the time to gradually strengthen cooperation through
the Forum because CBMs have created a sound base upon which to do
so. However, more needs to come from ARF in terms of concrete
programs to make it relevant to the region's future stability and
security. This is important because the strategic environment in
the Asia-Pacific region remains fluid. The main factor which made
ARF relevant, the post-Tiananmen strain in relations between the
U.S. and China, has been largely overcome. Furthermore, China is
now feeling much more relaxed with multilateralism.

The past few years have seen the emergence of serious worries
about ARF, and ASEAN's leadership of it. These worries have
increased because of the economic and political crises in
Indonesia. It is expected that the regional monetary crisis will
force ASEAN countries into a preoccupation with domestic problems
to the neglect of regional issues and institution-building. Also,
the resources necessary to further develop ARF may not be
available at the present time.

Another question about the leadership of ARF relates to
ASEAN's expanding membership. New members Laos, Myanmar and,
later possibly Cambodia, could pose a problem when they assume
the rotating ASEAN chair and therefore the ARF chairmanship too,
either because they are unprepared for the task or because of
problems which they have with dialog partners, particularly
states from the West. That is why ASEAN must make certain
improvements in order to maintain the relevance of the Forum.

First, translate the suggestions emanating from exchanges and
dialogs in CBMs into concrete programs. This could include
discussions on regional strategic developments in seminars held
in cooperation with other institutions like the Council for
Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific; the publication of
defense white papers by all ARF members; and exchanges between
officials, especially military officials, and defense
universities.

Peacekeeping is one of the most important CBM activities. ARF
should seriously consider setting up a small center to exchange
information and undertake studies on this subject. A feasibility
study on this is currently being undertaken by the ASEAN
Institute for Strategic and International Studies. More readily
set up could be a search and rescue center or a code of conduct
on how to cooperate in the aftermath of disasters. Other
proposals for ARF include taking up the subject of preventive
diplomacy (PD). Forum ministers considered this last year.

Preventive diplomacy is different from CBM because it is
deployed in the context of a conflict situation. China's
reluctance to bring PD onto the agenda is understandable because
it could be applied to what the Chinese consider to be domestic
conflicts. However, China might be willing to entertain bilateral
or even a multilateral PD effort in the South China Sea between
itself and the ASEAN states. Beijing might also be more open to
PD if it concerns new security issues involving the environment,
migration or crime.

For these efforts to become practical, two other improvements
have to be made by ARF. One is a degree of institutionalization.
The ASEAN tradition of a revolving leadership and institutional
support will not be adequate to implement concrete programs. This
necessitates the creation of a unit or a small secretariat. It
could be under the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting or the ARF
equivalent, or under a special division in the ASEAN Secretariat.
Its members should consist of ASEAN representatives and other
members on a seconded basis.

The other improvement needed is for ASEAN to agree to ARF
having a co-chair from a non-member nation. The co-chair should
be elected by consensus among ARF's dialog partners and be
rotated through non-member regions like Northeast Asia, North
America and the Southwest Pacific. This is not only important for
the equality of ARF members, but would help the Forum to get the
necessary resources for its programs, both human and financial.
Only then will it become a fully-fledged institution that can
take care of the whole region.

China might have problems with these ideas initially, but it
might accept them if it feels assured that on very important
issues such as ARF membership and co-chairmanship, a consensus by
all members is a prerequisite.