Are we seeing a return to Japanese militarism?

Richard Connaughton, Retired British Army Colonel, Project Syndicate

Japan's barbaric conduct during World War II -- and the Allies' nuclear retaliation at Hiroshima and Nagasaki -- laid the foundation for the United States-imposed pacifism that has reigned since the war's end.

The Self-Defense Forces (SDF) that emerged during the 1950s were designed (in theory) only to defend Japan from attack. Offensive missions were forbidden by its Constitution.

But Japan now has in Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi a leader who wants the country to be militarily pro-active. Koizumi holds a majority in Japan's parliament, and despite the continuing popularity of pacifism, he wants the SDF to become capable of "preventive self-defense" -- a form of offensive action in all but name.

In 1992, the dispatch of Japanese peacekeepers under United Nations command to Cambodia (the first time the 240,000-strong SDF had ventured on a mission abroad) was bitterly contested. While Japanese warships' logistical support during the recent Afghan conflict was a no-risk operation, that may not be true of the SDF's participation in the reconstruction of Iraq.

Japan's growing willingness to flex its muscles overseas is reflected in the changing face of the SDF. The Koizumi government plans to add two new 13,500-ton warships, both capable of carrying helicopters and of being converted to take jump jets to strike enemy territory.

Similarly, a 6,000-strong commando unit will be recruited not only to confront outbreaks of domestic terrorism, but also to provide the air-landed component for the new ship-based helicopter squadrons.

Today, Japanese spy satellites closely observe North Korea's nuclear sites. If evidence emerges that Pyongyang has the means to deliver nuclear weapons, then it seems probable that Japan will follow suit and develop its own nuclear capacity, riling South Korea and China.

All of this suggests a tectonic shift in Japan's military thinking. But Koizumi is behaving in accordance with a deep- rooted tradition in Japan, one that long precedes the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941.

Indeed, next year is the centenary of the Russo-Japanese War. To understand what is happening militarily in Japan today, there is no better approach than to examine the Japanese state 100 years ago.

By 1904, Japan had already fought a one-sided, eight-month campaign against China. Under the 1895 peace settlement of Shimonoseki, the full independence of Korea was guaranteed and Japan gained Formosa, the Pescadores, and Manchuria's strategically important Liaotung peninsula, with Port Arthur lying just to the south.

Russia, France and Germany objected to this. Russia coveted Port Arthur, and the powers jointly brought pressure on Japan to withdraw from the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Outraged at being forced to back down, the Japanese invested in shipyards to build a modern fleet.

Japan was determined to assert its mastery in the region because Korea and Manchuria were essential for producing food for a population of more than 46 million. Russia also coveted Korea and Manchuria.

The Japanese at first tried to appease the Russians, declaring Manchuria beyond its sphere of interest in exchange for a similar guarantee from Russia about Korea. But Russian noblemen with timber interests in Korea persuaded the Czar to resist. What, they asked, could Russia possibly fear from "yellow monkeys"? Besides, a short, victorious war might help stem the revolutionary tide threatening the Romanov dynasty.

With a diplomatic resolution ruled out, Japan launched a pre- emptive strike that annihilated the Russian Fleet in Port Arthur and Chemulpo, Korea. For the Russians, the situation went from bad to worse. But the peace treaty, brokered by then U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt, hardly reflected this. On the contrary, The New York Times called the outcome "astonishing -- a nation hopelessly beaten in every battle of the war... dictated her own terms to the victor".

Predictably, this fueled more outrage in Japan. Indeed, from this point began the fatal rivalry between Japan and the U.S. that culminated in Pearl Harbor. The Japanese aircraft carrier Akagi, which led the attack on Pearl Harbor, flew the battle flag flown by Admiral Togo's ship when he attacked the Russian fleet at Port Arthur.

Japan became militaristic precisely because civilian politicians lost control of Japan's generals.

The most dangerous course for Japan now would be to continue its strategically aimless increase in defense spending, while treating the armed forces as pariahs, leaving it without a coherent command and with no leadership from the government.

The doctrine of preventive defense has deep roots in Japan, and it is a dangerous doctrine if there is a political vacuum for the country's militarists to fill. Such a vacuum can be created if government leaders are too cowardly to devise and enforce their own defense policy. The Koizumi government ought to take note.

The writer is author of Rising Sun And Tumbling Bear: Russia's War With Japan.