Are NATO's new members ready to sign up?

LONDON: Following NATO's decision at its Madrid summit in July 1997 to admit the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to the Alliance, the military capabilities of these three countries are coming under increasing scrutiny.

Concerns have been expressed that Prague, Budapest and Warsaw will be unable to fulfill their commitments and that plans to modernize their armed forces will not be sufficient to meet NATO standards.

However, this assessment appears overly pessimistic given that all three states have begun military restructuring programs and are all expected to achieve good rates of economic growth over the next five years.

Since 1993, gross domestic product (GDP) in the Czech Republic and Hungary has grown at, or above, the European Union (EU) average of 1.7 percent. Moreover, Poland has achieved a better rate of economic development than some EU member-states, averaging 5.5 percent in 1993-1996. Given that this trend is expected to continue, all three states will have money available to invest in their armed forces in order to meet NATO's requirements.

The Czech Republic and Hungary are committed to raising the percentage of GDP spent on defense to 2 percent and 1.8 percent respectively by 2000. If GDP grows as anticipated until 2001, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland will have an additional US$350 million, $450m and $700m available respectively for their armed forces. As a result, they will be able to earmark collectively at least an additional $1 billion per year for military investment from 2001.

While the availability of resources is not an indicator of a country's willingness to spend those funds on defense, governments and legislatures in all three states have expressed a desire to do so. Ensuring that any military expenditure is consistent with NATO standards, however, will depend on close collaboration with the Alliance. Developments support the view that the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have begun to take decisions that will substantially strengthen their military capabilities by about 2007.

Existing weapon stocks in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland -- with the exception of aircraft -- are not much older or less technically efficient than those of other NATO member- states. All three countries are committed to improving their Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) capabilities, air-defense units and ground-force components -- the latter occurring primarily through upgrades of existing equipment.

The Czech Republic signed a $250m contract with Israeli defense manufacturer Nimda in September 1997 to upgrade power packs for 250 T-72 tanks. In April 1997, Hungary signed a $100m deal with French defense contractor Matra for a Mistral low-level air-defense system. In addition, Budapest is spending $3m of U.S. Warsaw Initiative funding on a new communications structure, and plans to purchase a three-dimensional radar system.

Poland aims to spend 25-30 percent of its defense budget on modernization by 2012. As part of its proposed 15-year upgrade program, Warsaw has earmarked $3 billion for modern communication and command systems, $2.5 billion for anti-tank weaponry and $2 billion for air-defense hardware. The Polish military has also placed a high priority on procuring combat and transport helicopters.

Finally, all three states have cooperated on a modern regional air-control system. This will improve civil and military air- traffic management and safety, while making the next step in the process -- reaching agreement on identification friend or foe (IFF) codes and procedures -- easier and quicker to implement. As a result, aircraft will function in a NATO-compatible environment.

Internal reform and military modernization is intended to allow the Czech, Hungarian and Polish armed forces to operate alongside NATO allies. However, all three countries have already contributed to Alliance and other multinational operations.

The Czech Republic offered valuable chemical-warfare-detection vehicles to coalition forces during the 1991 Gulf War. Prague also deployed an 850-strong mechanized infantry unit to Bosnia as part of the Peace Implementation Force (IFOR) and its successor, the Stabilization Force (SFOR). This unit consists of volunteers from the country's rapid-deployment brigade, which is already considered to be operationally compatible with NATO structures. Furthermore, many observers agree that infrastructure in the Czech Republic -- such as roads, railways and airports -- is already capable of supporting NATO's rapid-reaction corps.

Hungary has allowed IFOR and SFOR to use its airbase at Taszar. Given the modest amount of modernization needed at the facility, national infrastructure may be in better condition than analysts had previously thought. The use of Hungarian airspace by allied troops has resulted in all of the country's aircraft being equipped with NATO-compatible IFF technology. Hungary also made available to the Alliance a 450-strong engineering battalion for service with IFOR and SFOR. By 2005, reform and modernization programs are expected to allow Hungary to deploy as many as three NATO-compatible rapid-reaction brigades.

Poland provided transport units and sent medical teams to Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War. Warsaw also dispatched an airborne battalion to Bosnia -- as part of the multinational Nordic Brigade -- and has a battalion serving with the UN Disengagement Observer Force in Syria. In 1997, Poland has made at least two brigades and a field hospital unit available to NATO, and plans to have two more brigades ready to conduct peace- support operations by 2000. Observers believe that Polish infrastructure is generally adequate to support the Alliance's rapid-reaction corps.

All three states are full and eager participants of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP) program. Hungary does not fund its PFP activities from its military budget -- a sign of its commitment -- and Poland has become a favored location for armored training by UK troops.

In 1997, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland participated in at least 17 PFP exercises involving the U.S., as well as numerous multilateral and bilateral exercises with other NATO members. In addition, all three countries are participating in the PFP Planning and Review Process (PARP). The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have pledged that by 1999 they will have met most, if not all, of the 41 Interoperability Objectives established by PARP.

Although the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have all dramatically reduced the number of military personnel serving in their armed forces, each country still faces two very difficult tasks. The first is to decrease the overall ratio of senior to junior officers and to raise the percentage and quality of non- commissioned officers (NCOs). The surplus of senior officers and lack of trained NCOs is a by-product of the Cold War, when top- heavy command structures were responsible for implementing fixed battle plans.

The technology and tactics now being adopted by the Alliance require a higher number of experienced junior and non- commissioned officers. To improve the officer ratios and the competence of NCOs, in 1994 Hungary introduced mandatory retirement at 55 years of age. This led to a 25 percent reduction in existing officers in 1995, with an additional ten generals retiring in 1996. Eventually, it is hoping to achieve an NCO to officer ratio of 3:1.

The issue is more sensitive for the Poles, but they are committed to making the necessary changes. In order to promote new officers, Poland is offering retirement after 15 years, with 40 percent pay, to current serving officers. Warsaw's objective is to increase the junior to senior officer ratio from the 1997 level of 1:1 to 7:3 by 2012.

In 1996, the Czech Republic began to reduce its current 2:1 ratio of officers to NCOs. Prague believes that force reductions will release $1.4-2.7 billion for military modernization and training.

The second objective is to increase the ratio of professional soldiers to conscripts. Hungary and Poland both plan a 60 percent professional army; the Czech Republic is aiming for 50 percent. In all three cases, the increased ratio does not represent a dramatic rise in the total number of professionals in the armed forces. This is because all significant reductions in military personnel since 1985 have occurred among conscripts. Although the unit cost for each soldier will rise, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland will all have highly professional forces available for NATO operations.

NATO now estimates that the price of enlargement will be little more than $1.3 billion. This calculation is far less than Washington's original new-member cost evaluation of $10-13 billion, which was based on a continuing assumption of the Russian threat, and inadequate knowledge about the state of the infrastructure in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. The combination of economic growth and commitments to allocate a specific percentage of their GDP to defense suggests that new members will have the resources necessary to meet the current cost estimates for enlarging the Western Alliance.

Nevertheless, the issue of procurement by the new allies of modern combat aircraft and medium- to high-altitude air-defense systems still needs to be addressed. Neither NATO nor the U.S. has costed these acquisitions into their estimates. This hardware is expensive, and it is not yet clear how this need will be satisfied over the next decade.

While financing plans are developed and resources found to permit these acquisitions, it is likely that NATO's aerial and air-defense forces will become more adept at forward projection. However, by the end of the next decade another approach will have to be found.

One possibility is that as current allies introduce new aircraft and air-defense systems over the next ten years, those being replaced could be transferred to new NATO member-states. This would assure the deployment of NATO-compatible systems and will complement the restructured forces of new allies at a reasonable cost.

Window A: The technology and tactics now being adopted by the Alliance require a higher number of experienced junior and non- commissioned officers.

Window B: Nevertheless, the issue of procurement by the new allies of modern combat aircraft and medium- to high-altitude air-defense systems still needs to be addressed.