Antonie Dake: Drawing a line under a critical moment in history

Sabam Siagian & Meidyatama Suryodiningrat, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

Few events in Indonesian history produce as much emotion as those surrounding the Sept. 30 to Oct. 1, 1965, slaughter of several high-ranking military officers in what the New Order defined as part of a failed coup by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).

Despite numerous books on the subject, the proceedings of that night and the ensuing political upheaval remain weighed in political subjectivity and vague recollections.

Two generations later, Indonesians have still not reconciled themselves with this turning point of history.

It is a sad fact, as lamentable as the great characters who saw their place in history defined by this intriguing turn of events.

It is of no surprise that a month after Antonie Dake launched his book, Sukarno File -- A Chronology of a Downfall, newspapers here were still publishing opinion pieces and even emotional letters to their editor concerning the book.

Published in proficient Bahasa Indonesia, the 500-plus page book is a damning account of Sukarno's role in the incident.

The book breaks no new ground. Its strength, however, lies not in its ability to shock. Its potency stems from the straightforward presentation to recount in linear fashion a story saturated in political and personal bias.

It is history at its most primal. In Dake's own words: "Separate the search for the truth from a moral judgment".

"I didn't want to be caught in the crossfire of the usual cliches," the Dutchman said.

Dake concedes that for many Indonesians, especially those who were alive at the time, it is still difficult to fully accept the facts surrounding the matter. This, in turn, creates challenges for historians "to separate the search of what happened, from the blame game".

However, given the overwhelming evidence presently available, Dake dismisses those who would claim that the events of that night, 40 years ago, are still "shrouded in mystery".

"You don't have to agree with all the details, but you can now say that the glue of the whole matter is really the role of Sukarno".

Frustrated historian

Born in Amsterdam, Dake has an ideal background as an historian. He obtained a law degree from Amsterdam University and then went on to do a masters at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in the United States. His doctorate thesis, In the Spirit of the Red Banteng: Indonesian Communism between Moscow and Peking, was initially banned from circulation here during the Soeharto years.

He also served as a civil servant in the mid-1950s at the Common Market office in Brussels (now the European Community) and then honed his sense of observation as journalist for over a decade.

What led him to "rehash" his personal records and produce yet another volume on the events of 1965?

In a word: Frustration.

"For 30 years (since the release of In the Spirit) we did not get any further," Dake said, explaining his decision to put pen to paper seven years ago and begin the writing of this book.

For those who were too young to remember -- or not even born -- Sukarno File portrays events in a most uncomplicated and straightforward manner.

Like those watching a film documentary, readers are given a front-row seat on history. Dake's talent, like any good movie director, is that even with limited knowledge of circumstances audiences can still benefit from the story.

It recounts how a moody and unstable President Sukarno became increasingly paranoid in his arrogance and desperation, thus creating a situation that he eventually could no longer control.

"In the end, Sukarno was no longer the master of his own plot," Dake explained.

"He got into a plot that was eventually hijacked by Aidit".

Despite his indictment, Dake insists that the great Indonesian leader was not a man out for blood.

"People ask me, 'did he want to kill the generals?' No, that was not in his character, but he was weak the moment he could have prevented it," he explained.

"Here was a man who, compared with what he was like in his earlier years, had clearly degenerated physically and mentally."

Neither did Dake believe that the generals -- as some have suggested -- were plotting against Sukarno, thus making a showdown inevitable.

"I have found no indication that they were even inclined to do so ... Look at the way they were so unprotected (on the night they were kidnapped). If they were busy with some plot of their own, surely you would expect them to have been better protected," Dake argues.

For conspiracy theorists, and those keen to place Soeharto in some frame of blame, the book is astonishingly light. Despite devoting a whole chapter to the role of Soeharto, Dake concludes that if there were inconvertible evidence of his culpability it would have surfaced by now.

What Soeharto did stimulate was a backlash of antipathy toward the PKI, a sentiment he masterfully manipulated to ride into power.

The lesson of history

It is here -- and not necessarily in the details of what was written at length in the book -- that we find the essence of Dake's message.

It is the skeleton in Indonesia's closet -- the grimmest part of this nation's history, which it has never been able to admit, for fear of being wrong.

"The 'solution' of the book opens ways to rehabilitation and reintegration".

"The role of PKI, blown up by Soeharto, to the point that Sukarno was not even mentioned ... In hindsight we now know that it was the leadership of the Communist Party, not the rank and file communists, who were responsible".

"You can't really say the members of the PKI -- the three million members -- are guilty. They has been punished enough, I would say," Dake argued.

Despite Dake's best intentions, the polemic surrounding 1965 will not disappear anytime soon. But Dake's body of work provides a catharsis for Indonesia's next generation to come to terms with their forefathers' history.

"We need to draw a line beneath it, because that means the entire matter has been put behind us," the 77-year-old historian remarked.

The particulars of history are certain to be lost on future Indonesians to come. But the lessons of 1965, as presented in Dake's book, are an echoing reminder of what an English philosopher warned of as "the hunger for power after power that ceases only in death."

It is a case-study of a once-great man -- a leader who could not handle power and fame, and became a tragic, sad figure. He is not the only one in history, there are many more, but he is Indonesia's example.

History's postscript also leaves us with the greatest of ironies: The lesson, unlearned, eventually led to the fall from power of the very man who replaced Sukarno.

History repeats itself endlessly.