Antiterror squad: Necessity or project-driven

Imanuddin Razak, Jakarta

Jakartans had just commemorated the 1st anniversary of the JW Marriott Hotel blast in Kuningan business and residential area in South Jakarta last month, when the capital was shaken by another similarly motivated bomb blast near the site of the former on Sept. 9.

Many condemned the Indonesian authorities' failure to anticipate such an attack, and blamed the deadly blast on their inability to take necessary preemptive measures, although a number of foreign governments had issued warnings weeks before.

The government's announcement on Wednesday of its plan to set up a military-backed antiterror task force, which will fall under the auspices of the National Intelligence Agency (BIN) chief, who will coordinate intelligence work between the National Police's antiterror squad, Army's Special Forces (Kopassus), the Navy's Special Forces (Denjaka) and the Air Force's Special Forces (Bravo), was an instant reply to such a demand.

Legally and strategic-wise, there is nothing wrong with the establishment of such a task force, as it complies with the 2003 law on antiterrorism and the 2002 presidential instruction on BIN and is meant to coordinate the work of all intelligence bodies in the country to deal with terror acts.

Controversy, however, surrounds the National Police's long- term plan to establish antiterror squads nationwide, which was announced earlier -- days after the Marriott blast anniversary.

The controversial plan was announced just as the police had inaugurated the city police's 75-member antiterror detachment, dubbed Detachment 88 or Den88.

Though the city police cannot solely be blamed for the latest blast, its failure to anticipate the Kuningan blast in the presence of the newborn Den88, has drawn big questions regarding the capability of the antiterror squad, whose members have been recruited from among the police's top officers, to handle such a bomb attack.

The police's antiterror squad is controversial as it will perform tasks already carried out by a number of internal police units. Members of the new squad are trained for the prevention of terrorist attacks -- in intelligence, investigation and crisis management.

The police already have their own counterterrorism task force, known as Gegana, while for intelligence activities, the police indeed have the tasks covered by their Intelligence and Security Directorate (Ditintelpam). The police force also have their own bomb squad to deal with bomb threats and explosions.

And, should the police persist to establish antiterror squads in provinces across the archipelago, the planned number of personnel for the squads would exceed each of those of the three forces of the Indonesian Military (TNI), an unexpected factor that may heighten tension between the police force and its former "big brother" the TNI.

The police force used to be under the same roof as the TNI before they "parted ways" on July 1, 2000.

Once established, police squads nationwide would boast more than double the number of personnel registered with the Army's Special Forces antiterror squads. Many more, also, than the Navy's counterterrorism operations Kesatuan Gurita (Octopus Squad) of over 250 men and the Air Force's Satgas Atbara (Counterterrorism task Force) of about the same number.

Equally controversial is the funding for the establishment of the squads.

While top police officers have chosen to remain tightlipped over the issue, The Associated Press recently confirmed that the detachment had been funded by the United States and trained by U.S. military officers.

"The academy is funded by Washington and is staffed by Americans. It teaches hostage rescue, crime scene investigation and bomb disposal," AP said.

The establishment of the antiterror squads is controversial as the squads' presence proves to be effective in the aftermath of an attack, but not as an early warning system, which an intelligence body should be capable of.

The ineffectiveness of such an antiterror squad to anticipate a bomb attack was indirectly revealed by the police themselves, who recently announced that they had received reports of the whereabouts of the two most-wanted Malaysian bombing suspects -- Dr. Azahari bin Husin and Noordin Moh. Top -- at a rented house in Cengkareng, West Jakarta, days before the Kuningan blast.

If this is the case, the Japan-originated Koban system would likely be the appropriate "formula" to meet the demand for an early warning system, rather than the antiterror squad.

The Koban system is currently on trial at the Bekasi Police.

Koban are essentially one-room depots, which were introduced for the first time in 1881 in Japan, to protect officers from the elements. Koban are open around the clock, with police officers working in three shifts, to fight crime and offer assistance. Police duties include patrolling the neighborhood, handling lost and found property, giving street directions, directing traffic and providing help for lost children.

To add to the concept's success story, a Japanese police officer attached to the Bekasi Police helping with the preparation and establishment of Koban in Bekasi, said the concept, to be applied at neighborhood unit (RW) levels, had successfully minimized the crime rate in Japan's big cities.

Koban have also been adopted by Singapore, Fiji and Brazil.

With police officers in uniforms in the neighborhoods, it is expected that the hideouts of crime suspects, like Azahari and Noordin, could be immediately detected and the repetition of such a deadly blast could be prevented.

However, the presence of police officers in the neighborhood should not bring a new problem -- creating anxiety among the people -- as citizens experienced when officers of the military's Babinsa were stationed at subdistrict levels in the past.

There must be clear guidelines and regulations for police officers in performing their tasks in neighborhoods.

And to be frank, the police need Koban as a system as it is more suitable to perform preemptive measures, rather than establishing antiterror squads nationwide, which are more post- crime oriented.

Police can retain the already established squads, but they should not necessarily exist in all provinces, and the number of their personnel should be a few hundred only. The squads could not be considered "special forces" anymore, should they have thousands of personnel.

Imanuddin Razak is a staff writer for The Jakarta Post. He can be reached at iman@thejakartapost.com