Anticipating conflicts during direct regional elections

Anticipating conflicts during direct regional elections

Didik Supriyanto, Jakarta

Entering 2005, the nation will again be facing a new political
phase with the direct elections of regional heads (pilkada) as a
follow-up to the coming into force of Law No.32/2004 on regional
administrations in October 2004.

This is indeed a very difficult choice. On the one hand, Law
No.32/2004 -- particularly (pilkada) provisions -- obviously
contains various weaknesses so that as a legal basis for the
elections it is very vulnerable. On the other hand, direct
regional elections have become an inevitable political demand,
not only to respect local people's rights but also to reduce
corruption and the manipulation of aspirations so far practiced.

Under such dilemmatic conditions, the momentum of success in
carrying out the most complicated legislative election and the
first direct presidential election in Indonesia recently should
serve as motivation to ensure the orderly and peaceful
implementation of pilkada.

All relevant circles should now anticipate the worst prospects
that could arise from the 2005 pilkada, in view of the first
experience in the direct elections of regional heads and the
limitations inherent in the new law. Attention should be paid to,
among other things, the possibility of violence-laden conflicts
between supporters -- in notoriously clash-prone regions and in
hitherto normal areas.

First, unlike presidential elections, pilkada involve all the
resources and popular emotions of a region because the only seat
packed with the greatest regional power and most concrete
influence on regional people is being fought for. The emotional
bonds between candidates and supporters are so strong that
political rationality could be lost. Unsurprisingly, local
political tensions and even clashes have previously marked
indirect elections in regional council buildings. What happens
when pilkada take place outdoors?

Second, Law No.32/2004 rules out the participation of
independent candidates. In fact, every region always has non-
partisans with broad bases of followers so that unless they are
accommodated by political parties for nomination, tendencies for
turmoil will be high. There is the likelihood of political
parties fielding independent candidates, but the pragmatism of
local elite parties prior to regional elections, characterized by
money politics and facilities as rewards, renders the chances of
independent nominees as slimmer.

Third, parties are each obsessed with becoming a single power
so that in nominating their pairs of candidates they do not
consider the prevailing political polarization. For instance, the
pairs chosen only come from one party, one ethnic group and or
one religion, making other communities feel that their existence
is threatened. Eventually, these communities, fearing the
imminent monolithic regime, may be encouraged to resort to force
in order to maintain their political presence. Or conversely,
with their dominant position, the pair emerging from the same
entity can act arbitrarily.

Fourth, rivalry between "regional sons" and "settlers" will
strengthen as parties remain completely insensitive to this
vulnerable issue. A combination of figures originating in both
generations is indeed ideal. However, it is in no way simple to
convince dominant political parties in regions to prioritize
couples that are acceptable to all communities.

Fifth, with the many drawbacks of Law No.32/2004, its
stipulations are not only confusing to political parties and
their candidates but they also make it difficult for election law
enforcers to take stern action. If they fail to immediately
penalize violators of pilkada rules, this situation will invite
other infringements that may entail chaos and violence.

Ways and means to anticipate and quell the rise of threats
include: First, Law No.32/2004, with special reference to pilkada
provisions and all their shortcomings, should be promptly
communicated to regions, notably those planning to hold direct
elections in 2005. The law's weaknesses should be specified to
enable regional people to face any disappointing prospects. Up to
the present, several local people have been rallying support
without being aware that their candidacy will have to be
processed through political parties.

Second, the government regulation on pilkada to implement Law
No.32/2004 should in the best possible way offset these
limitations. But there should also be an explanation to make
regional citizens aware that the government regulation will also
contain weak points as it elucidates a law with many deficient
parts. In this manner, those interested in pilkada can make
preparations for any undesirable development.

Third, pilkada organizational units have to be speedily
prepared. Regional General Election Commissions (KPUD) have been
set up, but they are not yet experienced in holding direct
elections of regional heads, while also authorized to make
pilkada technical rules. Besides, regional councils should also
form supervisory committees because they will execute the
election control function and at the same time anticipate
potential conflicts in the capacity of election dispute
settlement units.

Fourth, all competent agencies should, without delay, map out
social weaknesses in regions preparing for their 2005 pilkada.
This is important to arrange joint measures at an early stage in
anticipation of possible open conflicts between political
backers. The police should be fully aware that, unlike
legislative and presidential elections, pilkada will not be held
simultaneously so that proper mapping and arrangements are needed
to handle any violence, and rioting likely to prevail in areas
busily engaged in direct elections.

Fifth, it is necessary to promote discussions or workshops
involving party leaders, community figures, influential
educators, police officers, regional officials and other
authorities. These dialogs should deal with concrete steps to
face the likelihood of clashes between ardent followers. The
involvement of local figures is crucial because they will not
only have the opportunity to reveal their problems and seek
solutions, but also be bound by the solutions jointly adopted.

The writer is deputy chief editor of detik.com and chairman of
the Association for General Elections and Democracy.