Anti-Americanism in East Asia

Anti-Americanism in East Asia

Jusuf Wanandi, Member, Board of Trustees, Centre for Strategic
and International Studies, Jakarta

At a Conference in Wye River, Maryland, a few days before
Sept. 11, 2002, someone asked why anti-American sentiment is on
the rise. It has indeed been on the rise since the end of the
Cold War, not just since Sept. 11, 2001.

To put this question in perspective, I pointed out that in
general, goodwill toward the U.S. is still very high, especially
in East Asia. Although the U.S. is hegemonic, it has been
benevolent. It has not occupied nor exploited other countries
through blatant colonialism. Moreover, over the past 50 years it
has staunchly supported global governance with rules and
institutions. In many instances it has fostered peace and
stability and it has contributed to global economic growth and
rising world income, while looking after its own economic
interests.

However, new developments in the 1990s created some
ambivalence toward the U.S., including among its friends and
allies. It is important for the U.S. to recognize this declining
support and to take proper action before it becomes a major
impediment to U.S. interests and policies.

East Asia's positive attitude toward the U.S. started to
change when the U.S. neglected the region after the end of the
Cold War. During the first term of the Clinton administration,
the U.S. economy was its top priority, and U.S. public opinion
wanted an immediate "peace dividend" after decades of high
defense spending. It was only at the end of Clinton's first term
that the defense alliance between Japan and the U.S. was
reinvigorated, and that the U.S. recommitted to a military
presence in East Asia. This presence is critical, because unlike
Europe after the Cold War, the strategic outlook of East Asia
remains uncertain.

The relationship with China was stabilized only at the end of
Clinton's first term. It followed a turbulent period as a result
of a lack of strategy toward China; instead U.S. policy was the
result of clashing political, economic, strategic and human
rights interests.

For Southeast Asia, the critical factor was the financial
crisis of 1997 that began in Thailand and subsequently hit other
countries in the region. Contrary to U.S. policy toward South
Korea at the end of 1997, the U.S. was not willing to be directly
involved in efforts to assist Thailand. It was felt by the Thais
and other Southeast Asians that we were of much less strategic
value than South Korea. Furthermore, U.S. resistance toward the
establishment of an Asian Fund, which could assist the region in
future crises and act as an early warning system, was not well-
received in the region.

Perhaps the most significant development concerns the Muslims
of Southeast Asia, who have serious difficulties adjusting to
U.S. post-Cold War policies and to globalization. Particularly
the increased violence in the Middle East, centering on the
Israel-Palestine conflict, and the increased tilt of U.S.
policies against the Palestinians bewildered them. The end of
the Cold War, globalization and advances in information
technology have allowed Muslims in Southeast Asia to identify
themselves more with the Palestinians. Every day, they see on
television Muslims there being oppressed, defeated and
humiliated.

U.S. policy toward Saddam Hussein, who Muslims in Southeast
Asia do not consider a real Muslim leader, at first did not
generate much negative reaction. But moderate leaders will need
a political cover, such as UN Security Council authorization, to
offset the influence of the radical Muslims among their masses,
if and when an attack on Iraq becomes unavoidable. They realize
that there is real hatred among some of the radicals. It would
also help if evidence proving that Saddam is a real threat could
be provided and allies support was forthcoming.

And some movement on the Israel-Palestine conflict could be
very helpful indeed. Because for Muslims, U.S. policies in the
Middle East are much more important. They feel confused, betrayed
and at times outraged. U.S. policies are seen as too one-sided,
full of inconsistencies, double standards and capriciousness.
Efforts by U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia Ralph Boyce to meet
regularly with Muslim leaders are of critical importance to
create the necessary balance.

In other countries of East Asia, including in China, South
Korea and even Japan, public opinion is generally ambivalent --
sometimes even inimical -- to certain U.S. policies. On the other
hand, governments and leaders in East Asia, including China, are
unwilling to damage bilateral relations with the U.S. The
Europeans are comparatively much more perplexed and hurt, and
worried and opposed to U.S. policies that tend to ignore global
rules and institutions.

If given enough political cover, East Asian governments and
leaders can overcome pressure from the public and cooperate to
fight America's war on global terrorism. For Muslim leaders in
particular this would only be possible if the U.S. showed some
balance in the Israel-Palestine conflict. This means that there
needs to be real changes in some U.S. policies, attitudes and
public diplomacy.

U.S. policy needs to show real concern about the plight of
others and be willing to listen. It has to be more consistent,
have less double standards, be less arrogant and have more
credible and well-thought-out policies on global governance.
Differences with allies and friends need to be adequately
explained. Leadership is important and public education is
imperative.