Anti-Americanism in East Asia

Jusuf Wanandi, Member, Board of Trustees, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta

At a Conference in Wye River, Maryland, a few days before Sept. 11, 2002, someone asked why anti-American sentiment is on the rise. It has indeed been on the rise since the end of the Cold War, not just since Sept. 11, 2001.

To put this question in perspective, I pointed out that in general, goodwill toward the U.S. is still very high, especially in East Asia. Although the U.S. is hegemonic, it has been benevolent. It has not occupied nor exploited other countries through blatant colonialism. Moreover, over the past 50 years it has staunchly supported global governance with rules and institutions. In many instances it has fostered peace and stability and it has contributed to global economic growth and rising world income, while looking after its own economic interests.

However, new developments in the 1990s created some ambivalence toward the U.S., including among its friends and allies. It is important for the U.S. to recognize this declining support and to take proper action before it becomes a major impediment to U.S. interests and policies.

East Asia's positive attitude toward the U.S. started to change when the U.S. neglected the region after the end of the Cold War. During the first term of the Clinton administration, the U.S. economy was its top priority, and U.S. public opinion wanted an immediate "peace dividend" after decades of high defense spending. It was only at the end of Clinton's first term that the defense alliance between Japan and the U.S. was reinvigorated, and that the U.S. recommitted to a military presence in East Asia. This presence is critical, because unlike Europe after the Cold War, the strategic outlook of East Asia remains uncertain.

The relationship with China was stabilized only at the end of Clinton's first term. It followed a turbulent period as a result of a lack of strategy toward China; instead U.S. policy was the result of clashing political, economic, strategic and human rights interests.

For Southeast Asia, the critical factor was the financial crisis of 1997 that began in Thailand and subsequently hit other countries in the region. Contrary to U.S. policy toward South Korea at the end of 1997, the U.S. was not willing to be directly involved in efforts to assist Thailand. It was felt by the Thais and other Southeast Asians that we were of much less strategic value than South Korea. Furthermore, U.S. resistance toward the establishment of an Asian Fund, which could assist the region in future crises and act as an early warning system, was not well- received in the region.

Perhaps the most significant development concerns the Muslims of Southeast Asia, who have serious difficulties adjusting to U.S. post-Cold War policies and to globalization. Particularly the increased violence in the Middle East, centering on the Israel-Palestine conflict, and the increased tilt of U.S. policies against the Palestinians bewildered them. The end of the Cold War, globalization and advances in information technology have allowed Muslims in Southeast Asia to identify themselves more with the Palestinians. Every day, they see on television Muslims there being oppressed, defeated and humiliated.

U.S. policy toward Saddam Hussein, who Muslims in Southeast Asia do not consider a real Muslim leader, at first did not generate much negative reaction. But moderate leaders will need a political cover, such as UN Security Council authorization, to offset the influence of the radical Muslims among their masses, if and when an attack on Iraq becomes unavoidable. They realize that there is real hatred among some of the radicals. It would also help if evidence proving that Saddam is a real threat could be provided and allies support was forthcoming.

And some movement on the Israel-Palestine conflict could be very helpful indeed. Because for Muslims, U.S. policies in the Middle East are much more important. They feel confused, betrayed and at times outraged. U.S. policies are seen as too one-sided, full of inconsistencies, double standards and capriciousness. Efforts by U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia Ralph Boyce to meet regularly with Muslim leaders are of critical importance to create the necessary balance.

In other countries of East Asia, including in China, South Korea and even Japan, public opinion is generally ambivalent -- sometimes even inimical -- to certain U.S. policies. On the other hand, governments and leaders in East Asia, including China, are unwilling to damage bilateral relations with the U.S. The Europeans are comparatively much more perplexed and hurt, and worried and opposed to U.S. policies that tend to ignore global rules and institutions.

If given enough political cover, East Asian governments and leaders can overcome pressure from the public and cooperate to fight America's war on global terrorism. For Muslim leaders in particular this would only be possible if the U.S. showed some balance in the Israel-Palestine conflict. This means that there needs to be real changes in some U.S. policies, attitudes and public diplomacy.

U.S. policy needs to show real concern about the plight of others and be willing to listen. It has to be more consistent, have less double standards, be less arrogant and have more credible and well-thought-out policies on global governance. Differences with allies and friends need to be adequately explained. Leadership is important and public education is imperative.