... and more changes needed

JAKARTA (JP): The need to introduce changes is widely accepted and the current House of Representatives (DPR) has already made the first tentative steps by removing one whole wing of confusion/conflict in management by determining that the KPU may not include people with partisan interests.

The process of selecting new KPU members is now in train with the government completing its duty of providing the DPR with 22 names of potential members. The DPR will then select 11 of these people to be the new commissioners.

More substantial changes to electoral management are still to be made.

As noted above, one pathway of confusion, that is from the parties, has now been removed, with the parties now liberated from having to help manage the elections. The second pathway of confusion, that is the government, remains unchanged.

The new KPU will still oversee staff that are not fully accountable to it. Indeed the leaders of that secretariat will continue to be accountable professionally to the government, not the KPU.

Straightening out the lines of accountability (chains of command) at the national level should be followed down to the polling station level. The national leaders of the KPU should know what is happening at the lowest levels. They should also be able to receive feedback about how their policies are operating locally. This could not happen last year.

To be fully effective, an independent and nonpartisan KPU must have the power to exercise authority over political players, including candidates, parties, monitors, voters and party sympathizers. To do so requires a strong and clear legal base of authority for the KPU to operate. This must also include clear bounds of authority.

As an attempt to establish a KPU that is truly independent both in its membership as well as in its structure, I would suggest a significantly simplified alternative structure (in Diagram II) for an improved KPU for the future.

First of all, there should be a clear chain of command within the structure of the entire election process from the central level to the polling station to avoid dualism/conflict/confusion of responsibility from a structural as well as personnel or professional point of view.

Second, the election commission at the national level is called the General Election Commission (KPU Pusat) and at provincial, district/city, subdistrict, village level, as the provincial level KPU (KPU Daerah), district/town level election committee (panitia pemilu kabupaten/kota), subdistrict committee (panitia pemilu kecamatan) and village level committee (panitia pemilu desa) respectively. The village committees would oversee polling stations within their boundaries.

Third, secretariats at each level are fully responsible to the KPU, Provincial Election Commission (KPUD) and committees in their areas.

Fourth, membership of the KPU is made up of 11 nonpartisan academics, intellectuals and religious figures who have no political affiliation to any political party or connection with the government bureaucracy.

Fifth, while candidates for KPU membership may be nominated by the president, they should be based on recommendations from the society and selected by the Supreme Court, as the latter is the highest judicial office which is free from any party or government interests. The selection process can be based on standards of performance (criteria) which are determined by the DPR.

Sixth, membership of the provincial KPU should consist of nine people nominated by the governor, selected by the High Court based on standards of performance determined by the provincial level DPR.

Seventh, membership of the KPU at the district/town level should consist of five people, nominated by the district head based on standards of performance determined by the district level DPR.

Eighth, the personnel of the secretariat of the KPU at each level should come from nonparty people, who may be seconded from the local governments, based on consultations between the KPU/committees and local government. This is to ensure local government operations are not disrupted during the election process.

The organizational structure and mechanism of the election commission described above should ideally be implemented within a district election system for the DPR, with the district/city representing the basis for establishing electoral districts.

However, to provide equal voting rights to all citizens, small administrative districts will need to be consolidated to produce electoral districts of similar population size, while large districts will need to be divided into several districts.

Furthermore, there should be additional funds for the KPU secretariat as they are not civil servants.

While the next elections are not scheduled until 2004, the time to begin developing an improved electoral system and a more professional and competent election management system is now.

If we wait until too late, we will as usual fall into the trap of emergency and short term measures which lack a strong basis for producing a good outcome.

The other trap in delaying consideration of these changes is, of course, that those who benefit from the current system will be in the happy position of saying that there is no time to make the proper changes and that the people (sic!) won't be ready for the changes.

For the first time in our history we now have an opportunity as a society to begin to really think carefully about the kind of electoral system that best suits our societies dynamics.

This must also be considered against a background of an expected emergence of a House of Regions to complement the House of Representatives to create a genuine bicameral parliamentary system.

This is a profoundly important and historic development, and one which provides a further opportunity for fixing up our current and eccentric electoral system.