... and more changes needed

... and more changes needed

JAKARTA (JP): The need to introduce changes is widely accepted
and the current House of Representatives (DPR) has already made
the first tentative steps by removing one whole wing of
confusion/conflict in management by determining that the KPU may
not include people with partisan interests.

The process of selecting new KPU members is now in train with
the government completing its duty of providing the DPR with 22
names of potential members. The DPR will then select 11 of these
people to be the new commissioners.

More substantial changes to electoral management are still to
be made.

As noted above, one pathway of confusion, that is from the
parties, has now been removed, with the parties now liberated
from having to help manage the elections. The second pathway of
confusion, that is the government, remains unchanged.

The new KPU will still oversee staff that are not fully
accountable to it. Indeed the leaders of that secretariat will
continue to be accountable professionally to the government, not
the KPU.

Straightening out the lines of accountability (chains of
command) at the national level should be followed down to the
polling station level. The national leaders of the KPU should
know what is happening at the lowest levels. They should also be
able to receive feedback about how their policies are operating
locally. This could not happen last year.

To be fully effective, an independent and nonpartisan KPU must
have the power to exercise authority over political players,
including candidates, parties, monitors, voters and party
sympathizers. To do so requires a strong and clear legal base of
authority for the KPU to operate. This must also include clear
bounds of authority.

As an attempt to establish a KPU that is truly independent
both in its membership as well as in its structure, I would
suggest a significantly simplified alternative structure (in
Diagram II) for an improved KPU for the future.

First of all, there should be a clear chain of command within
the structure of the entire election process from the central
level to the polling station to avoid dualism/conflict/confusion
of responsibility from a structural as well as personnel or
professional point of view.

Second, the election commission at the national level is
called the General Election Commission (KPU Pusat) and at
provincial, district/city, subdistrict, village level, as the
provincial level KPU (KPU Daerah), district/town level election
committee (panitia pemilu kabupaten/kota), subdistrict committee
(panitia pemilu kecamatan) and village level committee (panitia
pemilu desa) respectively. The village committees would oversee
polling stations within their boundaries.

Third, secretariats at each level are fully responsible to the
KPU, Provincial Election Commission (KPUD) and committees in
their areas.

Fourth, membership of the KPU is made up of 11 nonpartisan
academics, intellectuals and religious figures who have no
political affiliation to any political party or connection with
the government bureaucracy.

Fifth, while candidates for KPU membership may be nominated by
the president, they should be based on recommendations from the
society and selected by the Supreme Court, as the latter is the
highest judicial office which is free from any party or
government interests. The selection process can be based on
standards of performance (criteria) which are determined by the
DPR.

Sixth, membership of the provincial KPU should consist of nine
people nominated by the governor, selected by the High Court
based on standards of performance determined by the provincial
level DPR.

Seventh, membership of the KPU at the district/town level
should consist of five people, nominated by the district head
based on standards of performance determined by the district
level DPR.

Eighth, the personnel of the secretariat of the KPU at each
level should come from nonparty people, who may be seconded from
the local governments, based on consultations between the
KPU/committees and local government. This is to ensure local
government operations are not disrupted during the election
process.

The organizational structure and mechanism of the election
commission described above should ideally be implemented within a
district election system for the DPR, with the district/city
representing the basis for establishing electoral districts.

However, to provide equal voting rights to all citizens, small
administrative districts will need to be consolidated to produce
electoral districts of similar population size, while large
districts will need to be divided into several districts.

Furthermore, there should be additional funds for the KPU
secretariat as they are not civil servants.

While the next elections are not scheduled until 2004, the
time to begin developing an improved electoral system and a more
professional and competent election management system is now.

If we wait until too late, we will as usual fall into the trap
of emergency and short term measures which lack a strong basis
for producing a good outcome.

The other trap in delaying consideration of these changes is,
of course, that those who benefit from the current system will be
in the happy position of saying that there is no time to make the
proper changes and that the people (sic!) won't be ready for the
changes.

For the first time in our history we now have an opportunity
as a society to begin to really think carefully about the kind of
electoral system that best suits our societies dynamics.

This must also be considered against a background of an
expected emergence of a House of Regions to complement the House
of Representatives to create a genuine bicameral parliamentary
system.

This is a profoundly important and historic development, and
one which provides a further opportunity for fixing up our
current and eccentric electoral system.