Analysis of the new antiterror regulation
Bayu Wicaksono, Civil Society Alliance for Democracy (YAPPIKA), Jakarta
Following the tragedy in Bali, Minister of Defense Matori Abdul Djalil proposed that the bill on the eradication of terrorism be turned into a government regulation in lieu of a law. This regulation consists of two parts, Regulation No. 1/2002 on the eradication of terrorism and Regulation No. 2/2002 on its enforcement regarding the events of Oct. 12.
It is clear from these two government regulations that much of the substance has been taken from the bill on antiterrorism, reflecting the rush in which the regulation was made -- or maybe also the slowness of legislators that led to its issuance.
These regulations were indeed designed as a breakthrough to enable fast action, which security forces can use as a resort to prevent terrorist acts. The question is whether the regulation, made retroactive, may really enabl our intelligence force to work faster. And is a retroactive regulation a violation of human rights?
Although the two regulations have been issued for a good purpose, their ratification fails to touch the real crux of the matter in relation to the eradication of terrorism and its network at home. The regulation does not define clearly what a terrorist is. Article 3 says, "This government regulation in lieu of a law is applicable to anyone committing or intending to commit terrorism in the territory of the Republic of Indonesia and/or other countries ..."
Meanwhile, Article 6 reads, "Anyone intentionally using violence or a threat of violence to bring about an atmosphere of terror or fear against people broadly and to cause victims to fall en masse, by means of seizing the freedom or the loss of souls and assets of other people, or result in damage to or destruction of strategic vital objects or environment or public or international facilities, shall be subject to capital punishment" or a life term of up to 20 years.
The articles clearly give much room for interpretation and can target anyone labeled as a terrorist, including separatist groups -- which harks of past practices in the security forces targeting anyone labeled as potentially subversive.
Further, Article 26 states that to obtain sufficient preliminary evidence, an investigator may use every intelligence report. Second, it is after the process of examination by the chairperson or deputy chairperson of a district court that a statement must be made to the effect that sufficient preliminary evidence has been obtained. This shows the powerfulness of Indonesian intelligence in its position to make someone a defendant. An intelligence report may be used as preliminary evidence in court that someone has committed acts of terror.
This provision, apart from being dangerous, may also lead to an abuse of power. Basically, when someone is labeled a terrorist, this label will stay with him over a long period even if he is finally discharged for a lack of evidence. What if the report is wrong and inaccurate?
Meanwhile, our intelligence agencies must be made effective by introducing basic changes, for example by setting a standard of intelligence recruitment suiting international standards. In other words, we must question who will and can sit in intelligence agencies. Who will command intelligence agencies must be clear. Besides, it must also be clear what these intelligence agencies will be used for. Another important job is to map out organizations assumed to be part of an international terrorist network.
Indeed, because Indonesia has no "experience" in dealing with terrorism of the scale shown in the Bali bomb blast, this country should be more open in receiving offers for assistance. Tardiness and an inability to arrest the perpetrators will lead to more pressure of the international community on Indonesia, a situation making it more difficult for the country to get itself out of the crisis.