Analysis of the new antiterror regulation

Analysis of the new antiterror regulation

Bayu Wicaksono, Civil Society Alliance for Democracy (YAPPIKA),
Jakarta

Following the tragedy in Bali, Minister of Defense Matori
Abdul Djalil proposed that the bill on the eradication of
terrorism be turned into a government regulation in lieu of a
law. This regulation consists of two parts, Regulation No. 1/2002
on the eradication of terrorism and Regulation No. 2/2002 on its
enforcement regarding the events of Oct. 12.

It is clear from these two government regulations that much of
the substance has been taken from the bill on antiterrorism,
reflecting the rush in which the regulation was made -- or maybe
also the slowness of legislators that led to its issuance.

These regulations were indeed designed as a breakthrough to
enable fast action, which security forces can use as a resort to
prevent terrorist acts. The question is whether the regulation,
made retroactive, may really enabl our intelligence force to work
faster. And is a retroactive regulation a violation of human
rights?

Although the two regulations have been issued for a good
purpose, their ratification fails to touch the real crux of the
matter in relation to the eradication of terrorism and its
network at home. The regulation does not define clearly what a
terrorist is. Article 3 says, "This government regulation in lieu
of a law is applicable to anyone committing or intending to
commit terrorism in the territory of the Republic of Indonesia
and/or other countries ..."

Meanwhile, Article 6 reads, "Anyone intentionally using
violence or a threat of violence to bring about an atmosphere of
terror or fear against people broadly and to cause victims to
fall en masse, by means of seizing the freedom or the loss of
souls and assets of other people, or result in damage to or
destruction of strategic vital objects or environment or public
or international facilities, shall be subject to capital
punishment" or a life term of up to 20 years.

The articles clearly give much room for interpretation and can
target anyone labeled as a terrorist, including separatist groups
-- which harks of past practices in the security forces targeting
anyone labeled as potentially subversive.

Further, Article 26 states that to obtain sufficient
preliminary evidence, an investigator may use every intelligence
report. Second, it is after the process of examination by the
chairperson or deputy chairperson of a district court that a
statement must be made to the effect that sufficient preliminary
evidence has been obtained. This shows the powerfulness of
Indonesian intelligence in its position to make someone a
defendant. An intelligence report may be used as preliminary
evidence in court that someone has committed acts of terror.

This provision, apart from being dangerous, may also lead to
an abuse of power. Basically, when someone is labeled a
terrorist, this label will stay with him over a long period even
if he is finally discharged for a lack of evidence. What if the
report is wrong and inaccurate?

Meanwhile, our intelligence agencies must be made effective by
introducing basic changes, for example by setting a standard of
intelligence recruitment suiting international standards. In
other words, we must question who will and can sit in
intelligence agencies. Who will command intelligence agencies
must be clear. Besides, it must also be clear what these
intelligence agencies will be used for. Another important job is
to map out organizations assumed to be part of an international
terrorist network.

Indeed, because Indonesia has no "experience" in dealing with
terrorism of the scale shown in the Bali bomb blast, this country
should be more open in receiving offers for assistance. Tardiness
and an inability to arrest the perpetrators will lead to more
pressure of the international community on Indonesia, a situation
making it more difficult for the country to get itself out of the
crisis.