Analysis of chaos in regent elections

Analysis of chaos in regent elections

The election of regents is one important feature of autonomy.
But chaos colored the election recently in Sampang on Madura,
East Java, and earlier in several other regencies, such as Malang
and Mojokerto.Pratikno of Gadjah Mada University, who has
conducted intensive research into regional autonomy, says local
politicians must share the blame.

Question: President Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) requested that
the inauguration of Sampang's elected regent Fadhilah Budiono be
delayed until his suspected involvement in a number of corruption
cases, as alleged by the National Awakening Party (PKB, founded
by Gus Dur) is investigated.

East Java Governor Imam Utomo has set up a team to collect
facts on the allegations. Isn't this a form of intervention from
the central government in the local administration?

Answer: This kind of intervention in these times can still be
excused on the grounds that we are still in the middle of a
transition of national scale.

But such intervention must be limited; it must not become a
bad precedent. Continuous intervention in fundamental issues
touching on local politics, such as in regional elections, could
spark deeper conflict between the central and local levels.

In this case, the central government was too late. Well before
the regent's election, it should have made sure that the election
would not violate the law (on regional autonomy) and that it
could be conducted in a democratic manner.

But the government only intervened after the election of
Fadhilah Budiono as regent for the second time was over.

The government's intervention could instead trigger even
sharper conflict among political elements in Sampang (represented
by different political parties supporting respective candidates).

Such intervention could become a bad precedent, because if one
group in a locality loses in the election of a regent or
governor, the losing group could try to mobilize the masses to
demand intervention again from the central government.

Imagine how busy Jakarta would be if it had to be involved in
such matters. Regional autonomy is both decentralization and a
management model in which the central government must save its
energy by not getting involved in local politics. Remember, we
have 360 regencies.

So how should the conflict in Sampang be settled?

The only way is through the court. First, to prove the
validity of the regent's election. Second, to prove allegations
that Fadhilah is involved in corruption.

But I'm sure that PKB does not fully trust legal proceedings,
which would take time, while the courts have long been believed
to have been coopted by those in power. Meanwhile, he is
supported by the Golkar Party, who perfectly represents the old
powers in Sampang. It wasn't surprising that Fadhilah responded
to the allegations, just saying, "So, sue me."

Are the cases of Sampang and other regencies unique to East
Java?

Sampang is not a merely local case. It occurred with the
backdrop of similar problems on a national scale ...

Firstly, I think the Sampang case happened because of legal
uncertainty and public distrust in the law. If the courts had
public credibility, PKB would not have needed to raise
accusations because Fadhilah would not have been able to escape
the law.

And legal uncertainty is clearly a national problem.

Secondly, the Sampang case also reflects transitional
politics, in this case the tension between new and old
politicians.

In Sampang, new politicians are represented by PKB and the old
ones are those in the United Development Party (PPP), Golkar and
others.
What about local factors?

Even "local" factors were a national phenomena. In this case,
the degree of autonomy of local politicians, including that
regarding the regent's election.

This is, of course, a consequence of the new regional autonomy
law. In the case of Sampang, with the autonomy, members of the
local legislature barely heeded public aspirations, leading to
the disappointment of many people.

Their autonomy enabled the local politicians to arrange deals
on two levels: within their parties and among individuals.

This is why a party winning the elections in one area -- even
one that has gained 50 percent of votes -- often finds it
difficult to make their candidate a regent (or governor), because
of the space open to members of one party to conduct individual
political deals.

This leads to the possibility of "money politics", superiors'
instructions and so on, or the electing of a person based on
pragmatic considerations -- to get money to prepare for the next
election.

Another factor is the absence of a rule that a party member
must be the candidate for regent.

Often candidates from big parties are those who are unknown in
their localities, or someone with a vague track record.

This has happened in many areas.

In Bantul (Yogyakarta), for instance, Regent Idham Samawi is
not a party man, neither is his deputy, who is an Air Force
officer with credentials merely consisting of a Yogyakarta
identity card.

This an example of what is happening these days in various
regions.

Is money behind this phenomenon?

Money would be the most logical explanation. Because if a
candidate was a leading kiyai (religious scholar) or some other
locally popular informal figure, we could gauge that he became a
candidate because of his large public following.

So if we want to maintain this way of electing regents
(through the regional legislature), we need tighter screening of
candidates so that political parties and legislature members do
not abuse public trust.

Actually, in a proportional system of elections, the candidate
should be someone who is widely known and who has contributed
much to a political party, because voters have placed their trust
in the party.

In a parliamentary system, such as in Australia, the chair of
the winning political party becomes prime minister.

This reflects a form of appreciation of voters by a party.

What about the reelection of Fadhilah as Sampang regent?

His case is too obvious. His problem is that he was the former
regent from the New Order era, which, of course, has a big
problem with "cleanness" (from corruption and other forms of
power abuse).

Was there any regent during the New Order period who was free
of corruption? So Fadhilah's election was sure to invite
protests. We still remember charges of human rights abuses during
the 1997 election in Sampang during the rule of Fadhilah.

Does the Sampang case reflect ideological conflict between the
followers of the defunct modernist Muslim organization Syarikat
Islam (SI) and the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), given
that the area used to be a base of SI?

I don't think so ... The Sampang case is more a reflection of
the battle of old and new politicians with opposing interests.
PPP tends to side with Golkar, both being "old" parties with many
similar interests.

Coalition between PPP and PKB has been more difficult even
though they're both based on Islamic followers, precisely because
of the "old and new players" factor.

Another explanation is that among new and old politicians,
there is a different political culture; a different spirit, a
different tolerance toward (negative) bureaucratic practices and
so forth.

So although there is a lot of ideological difference between
PPP and Golkar, they were both raised in a relatively similar
political culture of the New Order and can, therefore, cooperate.

And I don't think it's only PPP which is actively seeking
support in the Sampang regent election, but Fadilah himself,
using his old (network). Fadilah could surely be the most
aggressive figure to mobilize support from everyone, including
from PPP.

PPP tends to lean toward Golkar ... the latter is in need of a
"friend."

Golkar has great interest in saving itself from its "historic
burden", such as the riots prior to the 1997 elections in Sampang
caused by the government which imposed the victory of Golkar.

So PPP would support the party dependent on its support,
making its bargaining position higher. In this context, PPP
decided to support Golkar with (the possibility of a big, future)
compensation because of PPP's significant support of Golkar.

Is the Sampang case a reminder of the importance of direct
elections of a regent or governor?

I think direct elections would first mean cutting the (length
of the) process. A shorter process would mean narrower space for
negotiations which turn out to be the "buying and selling" of
votes.

With direct elections, political parties would not arbitrarily
nominate a candidate because the last say would be with
legislature members but with the voters.

So, political parties would compete each other to nominate the
most popular candidate in the eyes of the public.

However, direct elections have the tendency to neglect a
candidate's technocratic or managerial skills -- while such
technical skills are needed for a regent.

Along North Java, there would be no choice for political
parties in direct elections but to nominate highly popular kiyai.

Regions outside Java would nominate the most influential local
leaders. This (need for technical skills) must be balanced by
creating a new position under the regent, say a district manager.

Maybe this wouldn't be such a problem among highly educated
societies.

Wouldn't direct elections trigger conflict, particularly when
political parties mobilize mass support for their respective
candidates?

Yes, but we can't wait for democracy until people are
culturally ready. Everyone is ready after a few experiments. So
what we can do is to design a system in which potential for
conflicts are reduced, like having campaigns without the
mobilization of masses.

Another way would be to have nominees from a number of
parties. So party A and other parties could jointly nominate a
number of candidates, and their supporters would have less reason
to fight.

But direct elections wouldn't mean an end to bribes, not at
all ...(Asip A. Hasani)