An unholy alliance: Golkar with Cak Nur candidacy

An unholy alliance: Golkar with Cak Nur candidacy

Meidyatama Suryodiningrat
Analyst
Jakarta

News of the affirmation by Nurcholish Madjid, better known as Cak
Nur, that he would enter the Golkar Party convention process in a
bid to secure a presidential nomination has been met with
incredulity, trepidation and abhorrence.

Incredulity over the tactical soundness of the decision to
compete in the convention without sufficient political cover.
Trepidation that the man bestowed the title guru bangsa (the
"nation's scholar") is forsaking his piety for political
opportunism. And abhorrence that he would sanctify a party
regarded as a vestige of the New Order's co-optation.

Irrespective of whether or not he has the qualities to make a
good president, there is no doubting Cak Nur's attractiveness to
voters. Indonesian voters are sick of common politicians' deeds:
Broken promises, conniving opportunism and blatant corruption.
Cak Nur has few, if any, such skeletons in his cupboard. Thus,
while people may not naturally gravitate toward him in a
demonstrative outburst of emotion, the fact that he is the only
nonpolitician among the current rank of presidential hopefuls
makes Cak Nur very, very appealing to voters.

On paper, the duet of Cak Nur and Golkar are an irresistible
combination. It fulfills the two decisive factors needed for any
nominee to defeat the incumbent in a presidential race: popular
appeal and a political machine to turn that support into actual
votes.

But things are not as perfect as they may seem. Ironically,
this marriage could spell doom in a zero-sum game for either.

Let us first look at Golkar.

When the convention party system was first introduced earlier
this year as a means to filter potential presidential nominees,
the move was nothing short of brilliant. The party was not only
introducing a revolutionary democratic process that broke the
dogmatic culture of iconizing party leadership, but, more
importantly, the process would generate bona fide grassroots
support and deflect attention away from the scandal dogging party
chairman Akbar Tandjung.

Despite being convicted twice in the Bulog scandal, Akbar's
position in the party remains strong. Inside the party, Akbar's
foes are divided and cannot muster the needed resistance from
regional branches to challenge their chairman.

Instead of weakening, there is a clear sign that the pro-Akbar
camp has consolidated its control of not only the party but also
the convention process. If the Supreme Court were to exonerate
him within the next nine months, Akbar might run for the
presidency.

To the dismay of "reform"-minded party members, the convention
system has been convoluted to serve Akbar's self-preservation
rather than longer-term party interests.

Worse still, there is fear among some party insiders that
Golkar's final shortlist of candidates may be omitted altogether
from a Golkar ticket and instead be offered as a running mate to
the incumbent president. In essence, barring a Supreme Court
decision confirming Akbar's conviction or an unlikely internal
party coup, the pro-Akbar camp looks very much in control of the
party's immediate future.

In steps Cak Nur.

No one really knows the reason for his decision to go to
Golkar so early on (he wasn't required to announce his intention
to compete in the convention until the end of July). But the move
is clearly uncharacteristic of him, particularly as the decision
disregards the advice of many of his longtime associates.

Maybe Cak Nur started to believe his own propaganda, falling
victim to the "big lie". Or perhaps he came to the conclusion, to
quote Milton, that "it is better to rule in hell, than serve in
heaven."

Whatever the reasons, the move looks like a tactical gamble
that seems devoid of strategic thinking.

Frankly speaking, despite his worldly wisdom, Cak Nur lacks
the political shrewdness to compete in the ruthless world of
Golkar politics. Worse still, his immediate circle of aides are
individuals who have even less experience in the Machiavellian
art of realpolitik. His team comprises men of good intention, but
they do not measure up to the sentinels in Golkar's coliseum.
Furthermore, it is also clear that Cak Nur is deficient in terms
of "spending" power, compared with other Golkar hopefuls.

There is a lurking suspicion that Cak Nur may end up becoming
leverage in an internal party struggle, that his standing as an
attractive potential candidate for Golkar in the election is
being used as a pawn to secure support for one faction of the
party against another. Notice how, apart from one senior Golkar
figure who has been instrumental in prodding Cak Nur this past
month, Golkar's senior rank and file have not flocked to Cak
Nur's side.

Given this set of circumstances, two scenarios could emerge
over the next 10 months.

If, by some small miracle, Cak Nur survives the convention
process and is named on Golkar's presidential ticket in February,
then a major party realignment would have occurred, moving away
from the prevailing pro-Akbar configuration in the party's
executive board. At present this scenario seems the farthest,
given the acrimony Cak Nur would have to first endure for it to
happen. Only a Supreme Court ruling would hasten and facilitate
this outcome.

As a Golkar outsider who has not cultivated internal party
alliances, Cak Nur, in order to survive, would have to make
compromises in order to shore up the needed backing for his
nomination. Compromises that in the end could water down his own,
lauded reform platform.

The second scenario is defeat for Cak Nur. Under such a script
the political constellation of the Golkar elite would remain
unchanged. But the party may have to pay a price for discarding a
man whom many respect so dearly, especially if Cak Nur is
discarded in a humiliating way as part of the convention process.
Golkar's image would be severely tarnished as it became obvious
that the convention system could not accommodate a truly "good
man" and his reform agenda in the process.

This is where Cak Nur may be banking on hedging his political
misfortune. He could make it quite clear that Golkar runs the
risk of alienating voters if he is dumped from the process. The
ensuing wave of compassion could evolve into electoral advocacy
that he could then trade to the highest bidder from another
political party.

The writer is also managing editor for Van Zorge, Heffernan &
Associates.