An integrative negotiation between govt and GAM

An integrative negotiation between govt and GAM

Bantarto Bandoro, Editor, 'The Indonesian Quarterly',
Center for Strategic and International Studies, bandoro@csis.or.id

The conflict in the restive province of Aceh has reportedly
killed more than 10,000 people in the past 26 years, with fresh
killings occurring almost daily. Ceasefires have been agreed on
but never kept. A series of talks between Jakarta and the Free
Aceh Movement (GAM) has also been initiated, but has so far
failed to reduce violence.

The development in Aceh is moving towards unprecedented danger
as the central government considers declaring a civil emergency
or even martial law to end the war.

In an apparent hardening of the government's position
Coordinating Minister for Political, Social and Security Affairs
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono declared the separatist GAM movement as
terrorists, signaling a fundamental shift from the government's
diplomatic approach.

The idea that civil emergency or martial law be imposed in
Aceh has created strong opposition from all quarters in Aceh.

For Acehnese, imposing such an idea would only drag them away
from a final political solution. Besides, it would also refresh
in their memories the launching of the 10-year military operation
beginning in 1989.

The imposition of a state of emergency may cause GAM to
increase its attacks, triggering anarchy. A state of emergency
would be disastrous and would mean further military operations,
more casualties and even greater resentment.

Aware of the adverse impact of Jakarta on the Acehnese, many
have urged the two sides to the only option: Return to the
negotiating table. Intermittent dialog between the government and
GAM have not led to lasting agreements.

A meeting between the two sides was held in Geneva on Feb. 2
during which it was agreed that political solutions were to be
discussed. In their last meeting in May both sides agreed to work
with all speed toward an agreement to cease hostilities with an
adequate mechanism for accountability of the parties to such an
agreement.

Both also agreed that the autonomy package would be a starting
point for negotiations on political settlement. But the situation
in Aceh has hindered the enforcement of the agreement.

The armed conflict in Aceh has clearly revealed that the
conflict is between Jakarta and GAM. The conflict between the two
sides is an expensive business because both have to consume
enormous amounts of time, energy and even money. From the
perspective of distributive justice, the Acehnese have become
distressed, frustrated and angry, because they perceive they are
not receiving a fair slice of something they value.

Although GAM does not represent Acehnese in general, its
military maneuvers have triggered the launching of a massive
military operation. This has worsened the situation, creating an
image that for the government, despite the agreement reached,
military action is still the predominant tool.

What is perhaps needed is for the government and GAM to seek
an integrative negotiation that would eventually lead both sides
towards recognizing each others interests. Integrative
negotiation is a constructive, problem solving process, the goals
of which maximize the interests of the government and GAM while
protecting their relationship.

Integrative negotiation does recognize differences in interest
and position. But the government and GAM must not focus on their
positions only. It may be difficult to persuade GAM to change
positions in demanding a totally independent state as they have
been fighting for this for more than two decades. But perhaps
through intensive contact and dialog involving all components in
Aceh, including GAM, GAM's demand can be pressed to a point
where they would agree to accept the maximum offered by the
government. Besides, the goal both sides have decided to pursue
should be to direct the talks toward underlying concerns, needs,
fears and interests.

What is needed in such a framework is to rebuild trust that
has been the basis of previous talks between the two sides. If
the current situation forced the government and GAM to have
another round of talks, then both have to recognize the need not
to achieve goals at the expense of the other, meaning that both
parties see that it is in their best interests to secure whatever
agreement reached and to help others achieve their goals. Both
must recognize the fact that the prime problem in Aceh is not the
war and how to achieve things in the future through armed
contacts, but the absence of distributive justice.

Indonesia's chief negotiator for Aceh, Wiryono, urged the
government not to give up hope on the negotiations, meaning that
the government, despite the growing tension in Aceh, could not
distance itself from the current situation in the province.
Thus, the key word the government of Indonesia and GAM should now
adhere to, thus creating an image that both are serious about
solving the problem politically, is negotiation.

This is a peaceful procedure which reconciles and or
compromises differences that have distanced both sides from each
other. But the perpetuation of peaceful procedure will mostly
depend on the good faith and flexibility both sides can
demonstrate. The rejection by the majority of Acehnese of civil
emergency or martial law, and strong opposition from certain
human rights groups, could be instrumental in drawing GAM and the
central government to the negotiating table.

If negotiation indeed comes into being, many will see this as
a continuation of a process that would shape future agreements
between the government and GAM, an agreement that hopefully
enables both sides to end a decades-old feud, and that enables
people in Aceh, including GAM and the Indonesian Military (TNI),
to live and work together harmoniously.

In short, an integrative negotiation must not detach itself
from the stands both have agreed to during previous talks. Most
importantly is the cessation of hostilities.