An insider goes against the tide in examining the Indonesian Army
TNI AD -- Dahulu, Sekarang dan Masa Depan
(The Indonesian Army -- The Past, Today and the
Future)
By Saurip Kadi
PT Pustaka Utama Grafiti, 2000
116 pp
Rp 16,000
JAKARTA (JP): At a glance, the size of this book belies its title; a 116-page book on the Indonesian Army's past, present and future is too small for this important institution.
Closer inspection, however, shows that the title is a misnomer; it should have read something along the lines of "The Army's wall of shame" during the New Order government. Euphemism has crept into the Army, too.
The true "wall of shame" is only 30 percent of the book, authored by a top ranking officer, Maj. Gen. Saurip Kadi, in describing 38 cases from 1974 to 2000. It is certainly only the tip of the iceberg, considering the Army's 30-year rule and the fact that activities in the economic sector are not touched upon.
With respect to news, the Army is known for secrecy verging on an almost total blackout of any reports considered belittling to its image. When generals made slips of the tongue, they went so far as to deny their tape-recorded quotes. When a military plane crashed, it required persuasion to let the press report the accident.
It led to a joke among reporters that the Indonesian armed forces were the most invincible troops on earth.
It was at a time when the press was muzzled, legislators were coopted and the adjudicative arm compromised. The latter two, unfortunately, remain so.
The appearance of the book, following several books on similar topics, is nevertheless interesting, especially because it was written by the former territorial assistant of the Army chief at a time when the Army's image is at its lowest ebb and the nation is in shambles.
Saurip's "undisciplined" action of writing the book was not without cost. He was almost shown the door, but was subsequently assigned to the Army's Kartika Eka Paksi foundation.
Why the book exists at all is a fascinating guessing game.
Is this an illegitimate or legitimate child of political euphoria? Or a political move from a general caught in a power struggle? A plea of an honest soldier frustrated by his rotten institution? An effort to redeem the institution? A voice of conscience?
Reformist forces may be tempted to regard it as the latter, for it will kindle some hope in this most powerful institution. Finding the answer may take some time.
What is certain is that its publication came about in rather unfortunate circumstances.
The Army, which has suffered a severe image problem, now appears more confident in its power, judging from its resoluteness in dealing with both Acehnese and Papuan separatists at the moment.
The armed forces' representation in the House of Representatives and People's Consultative Council (MPR) through 2009 has been assured in an MPR decree.
Even so, parents of the victims of violence throughout the country, including Jakarta, are still trying to find justice.
They have exhausted all avenues, visiting various institutions, including Army Headquarters, but still there are no answers.
The reform movement seems to be stillborn and almost nothing has moved toward genuine political reform. Saurip's work, therefore, runs the risk of being dismissed as the trifling deviation of a renegade soldier. For the Army, it is business as usual.
The book seems hastily prepared; the listing of numerous human rights violations could have been expanded and given appropriate context.
Saurip's ideas about what the Army should do in the future are not entirely new either. Granted, his book is not a scholarly work and the author appears to have had no pretense of making one.
The thrust of the book is former president Soeharto's abuse of the armed forces (ABRI, which became TNI after separation with the police force last year) to keep his hold on power. The fact that Soeharto was himself a general is somehow overlooked.
However, Saurip does acknowledge that ABRI was a privileged class in society for three decades.
Saurip seems to believe that TNI could become professional soldiers while retaining their territorial command structure. There is no hint that the structure should be revamped, as the popular view holds, a discrepancy which causes confusion.
Saurip also asserts that Indonesia does not recognize what he calls the "western concept" of civilian supremacy; Indonesia only recognizes people's supremacy. Readers are left to ponder the difference between civilians and the people.
He obviously regards himself to be in the reformist camp in the Army, which implies that the Army as an institution is not to blame. The blame lies with the status quo supporters, whom he described as the "problematic" group.
His best idea is his suggestion to set up a military truth commission to try alleged violators of human rights. This is the most advanced idea on the issue from a general so far, because the military trials have been considered a farce by the public.
For a general whose milieu involves lavish living, feudalism and authority, his attempt to communicate with the public through a book is encouraging to say the least.
Yet he is swimming against the tide, an immensely strong tide, attested by his fall from an important position.
When will people know the measure of the iceberg is hard to tell. Unfortunately, they may never know.
-- Harry Bhaskara