An insider goes against the tide in examining the Indonesian Army
An insider goes against the tide in examining the Indonesian Army
TNI AD -- Dahulu, Sekarang dan Masa Depan
(The Indonesian Army -- The Past, Today and the
Future)
By Saurip Kadi
PT Pustaka Utama Grafiti, 2000
116 pp
Rp 16,000
JAKARTA (JP): At a glance, the size of this book belies its
title; a 116-page book on the Indonesian Army's past, present and
future is too small for this important institution.
Closer inspection, however, shows that the title is a
misnomer; it should have read something along the lines of "The
Army's wall of shame" during the New Order government. Euphemism
has crept into the Army, too.
The true "wall of shame" is only 30 percent of the book,
authored by a top ranking officer, Maj. Gen. Saurip Kadi, in
describing 38 cases from 1974 to 2000. It is certainly only the
tip of the iceberg, considering the Army's 30-year rule and the
fact that activities in the economic sector are not touched upon.
With respect to news, the Army is known for secrecy verging on
an almost total blackout of any reports considered belittling to
its image. When generals made slips of the tongue, they went so
far as to deny their tape-recorded quotes. When a military plane
crashed, it required persuasion to let the press report the
accident.
It led to a joke among reporters that the Indonesian armed
forces were the most invincible troops on earth.
It was at a time when the press was muzzled, legislators were
coopted and the adjudicative arm compromised. The latter two,
unfortunately, remain so.
The appearance of the book, following several books on similar
topics, is nevertheless interesting, especially because it was
written by the former territorial assistant of the Army chief at
a time when the Army's image is at its lowest ebb and the nation
is in shambles.
Saurip's "undisciplined" action of writing the book was not
without cost. He was almost shown the door, but was subsequently
assigned to the Army's Kartika Eka Paksi foundation.
Why the book exists at all is a fascinating guessing game.
Is this an illegitimate or legitimate child of political
euphoria? Or a political move from a general caught in a power
struggle? A plea of an honest soldier frustrated by his rotten
institution? An effort to redeem the institution? A voice of
conscience?
Reformist forces may be tempted to regard it as the latter,
for it will kindle some hope in this most powerful institution.
Finding the answer may take some time.
What is certain is that its publication came about in rather
unfortunate circumstances.
The Army, which has suffered a severe image problem, now
appears more confident in its power, judging from its
resoluteness in dealing with both Acehnese and Papuan separatists
at the moment.
The armed forces' representation in the House of
Representatives and People's Consultative Council (MPR) through
2009 has been assured in an MPR decree.
Even so, parents of the victims of violence throughout the
country, including Jakarta, are still trying to find justice.
They have exhausted all avenues, visiting various
institutions, including Army Headquarters, but still there are no
answers.
The reform movement seems to be stillborn and almost nothing
has moved toward genuine political reform. Saurip's work,
therefore, runs the risk of being dismissed as the trifling
deviation of a renegade soldier. For the Army, it is business as
usual.
The book seems hastily prepared; the listing of numerous human
rights violations could have been expanded and given appropriate
context.
Saurip's ideas about what the Army should do in the future are
not entirely new either. Granted, his book is not a scholarly
work and the author appears to have had no pretense of making
one.
The thrust of the book is former president Soeharto's abuse of
the armed forces (ABRI, which became TNI after separation with
the police force last year) to keep his hold on power. The fact
that Soeharto was himself a general is somehow overlooked.
However, Saurip does acknowledge that ABRI was a privileged
class in society for three decades.
Saurip seems to believe that TNI could become professional
soldiers while retaining their territorial command structure.
There is no hint that the structure should be revamped, as the
popular view holds, a discrepancy which causes confusion.
Saurip also asserts that Indonesia does not recognize what he
calls the "western concept" of civilian supremacy; Indonesia only
recognizes people's supremacy. Readers are left to ponder the
difference between civilians and the people.
He obviously regards himself to be in the reformist camp in
the Army, which implies that the Army as an institution is not to
blame. The blame lies with the status quo supporters, whom he
described as the "problematic" group.
His best idea is his suggestion to set up a military truth
commission to try alleged violators of human rights. This is the
most advanced idea on the issue from a general so far, because
the military trials have been considered a farce by the public.
For a general whose milieu involves lavish living, feudalism
and authority, his attempt to communicate with the public through
a book is encouraging to say the least.
Yet he is swimming against the tide, an immensely strong tide,
attested by his fall from an important position.
When will people know the measure of the iceberg is hard to
tell. Unfortunately, they may never know.
-- Harry Bhaskara