America rethinks its Southeast Asia policy
Morton Abramowitz and Stephen Bosworth, Washington, D.C.
The United States needs a longer-term approach to Southeast Asia. This means getting a better perspective on China's role in the region. It also means serious cooperation to help improve governance in the region, particularly to help make Indonesia and Vietnam dynamic, successful states. That would enormously strengthen the areas regional stability, cohesion, and independence.
Since the end of the cold war the U.S. has paid attention to Southeast Asia mostly when there is trouble. America's initial lack of attention to the region contributed to the financial crisis of 1997 which went on to ravage much of Asia and threaten global economic stability. The U.S. is still paying the costs of that episode in Asian public opinion.
Only after 9/11 did the United States discover jihadism in the area. The disastrous tsunami once again rekindled American attention and U.S. assistance was prompt, large, and enormously welcomed. While the U.S. ability to respond to crises in Southeast Asia is important, it is not an alternative to a coherent policy.
The current U.S. approach to the area has been spasmodic: some counter-terrorism effort here, a bit of development financing there, an occasional presidential visit, and frequent statements about the glories of ASEAN, while pursuing a few bilateral free trade agreements on the side. Increasingly some now argue that growing Chinese influence in the region threatens American interests and that the U.S. should somehow be doing more. The Pentagon is more fixated on China's growing military capabilities and its impact on Taiwan and Asian security in general.
U.S. policy is not commensurate with its interests in a changing Southeast Asia, an area of half a billion people. Central among them is commerce. In 2003 U.S. total trade with ASEAN was US$130 billion and investment reached some $90 billion.
The large Muslim population of the region is another focal point of American interest. The pockets of Islamic extremism are still small, but they have produced acts of violence and interwoven networks of terrorism. The U.S. has a fundamental interest in stable effective states in Southeast Asia that can stop extremist violence and generally strengthen the region.
Part of the difficulty in coming up with a cogent approach to the region is that the region is such a mixed bag. Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia have become dynamic and largely successful states. Indonesia and the Philippines have struggled to establish effective governments. Vietnam is on the ascent but has a long way to go and needs plenty of external support. Burma, Laos, and Cambodia remain more or less trapped in backwardness.
Given the varied nature of the region it is not surprising that outside governments view ASEAN, the area's one big institutional creation, as a central point of engagement. In its nearly four decades of existence ASEAN has reduced the likelihood of conflict among its members and created a growing web of economic and security cooperation. ASEAN has become a cornerstone for wider Asian economic cooperation, including China, Japan and South Korea.
Much has been made of China's growing involvement in the area, and the notion that the Chinese "are cleaning the American clock" in terms of influence in the area has gained currency in some American quarters. That may be overdrawn but China is indeed a rapidly expanding presence in the area. Trade and investment flows with China are increasingly important to all the economies of the area.
Some countries fear Chinese productivity and dread a 'hollowing out' of their manufacturing sectors. But most also see major opportunities as Chinas demand for their raw materials and agricultural products grows exponentially. China is bringing new dynamism to Southeast Asian economies.
China, however, remains distrusted in the area, notably in Indonesia and Vietnam. There are also serious abrasions including continuing contention over claims to resources in the South China Sea among China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei. Probably most important, Southeast Asian countries do not want to feel left alone with China.
In fact, the U.S. remains a significant if receding presence in the area. America's open markets and investment remain important to economic progress. Southeast Asian countries respect U.S. military might, though some fear the U.S. may be too quick to use it. The American image in this heavily Islamic area is problematic. There is much criticism of the United States' allegedly unquestioning support of Israel and in particular the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Yet most countries are still prepared to cooperate with the U.S.
Advancing American interests in Southeast Asia requires more than simply wooing ASEAN, although that is desirable and inexpensive. To deal with terrorism, the U.S. government needs to further enhance intelligence and law enforcement cooperation and in some cases military to military cooperation with states of the area. To foster economic growth and commerce, the private sector requires a framework of good working relations among governments.
Moreover what the United States needs to recognize clearly is that all its interests -- counter-terrorism especially and any concerns about China -- are best served by the evolution of strong, effective governments in the region. Over the longer term the best antidotes to jihadism are good governance, education, and economic progress.
If ASEAN is to prosper it requires strong member countries, particularly the larger ones that have real weight in the region and have both the fiber not to be intimidated by China but also the realism to deal cooperatively with Beijing.
Two countries especially important in this regard--Indonesia and Vietnam--deserve concerted U.S. attention and more support: the former if only because it is the world's largest and most secular oriented Muslim country, and Vietnam because of its size, location and potential.
Indonesia has had a series of weak governments since the fall of Soeharto in 1998, and it is not clear whether last year's impressive election will change that. The new government's ability to deal with the tsunami's devastation is an important test of its effectiveness. So will their handling of Aceh rebellion. U.S. relations are still troubled over the past conduct of Indonesia's military. All that needs sorting out and the U.S.-Indonesian relationship needs to move on, resumption of the IMET program is a start.
Vietnam's eighty million people are coming out of their shell and want to be part of the world. That should help change its authoritarian and repressive government, which recognizes the need for domestic change but moves cautiously.
Despite all the problems of governance in both countries the United States, as well as major Asian allies like Japan, should seriously commit itself to finding cooperative ways to assist them in expanding economic growth and producing modern, effective, and open states.
Morton Abramowitz is Senior Fellow at The Century Foundation and Stephen Bosworth is Dean of The Fletcher School at Tufts University. Both served as American ambassadors in East Asia and are preparing a book on America and East Asia.