America rethinks its Southeast Asia policy
America rethinks its Southeast Asia policy
Morton Abramowitz and Stephen Bosworth, Washington, D.C.
The United States needs a longer-term approach to Southeast
Asia. This means getting a better perspective on China's role in
the region. It also means serious cooperation to help improve
governance in the region, particularly to help make Indonesia and
Vietnam dynamic, successful states. That would enormously
strengthen the areas regional stability, cohesion, and
independence.
Since the end of the cold war the U.S. has paid attention to
Southeast Asia mostly when there is trouble. America's initial
lack of attention to the region contributed to the financial
crisis of 1997 which went on to ravage much of Asia and threaten
global economic stability. The U.S. is still paying the costs of
that episode in Asian public opinion.
Only after 9/11 did the United States discover jihadism in
the area. The disastrous tsunami once again rekindled American
attention and U.S. assistance was prompt, large, and enormously
welcomed. While the U.S. ability to respond to crises in
Southeast Asia is important, it is not an alternative to a
coherent policy.
The current U.S. approach to the area has been spasmodic: some
counter-terrorism effort here, a bit of development financing
there, an occasional presidential visit, and frequent statements
about the glories of ASEAN, while pursuing a few bilateral free
trade agreements on the side. Increasingly some now argue that
growing Chinese influence in the region threatens American
interests and that the U.S. should somehow be doing more. The
Pentagon is more fixated on China's growing military capabilities
and its impact on Taiwan and Asian security in general.
U.S. policy is not commensurate with its interests in a
changing Southeast Asia, an area of half a billion people.
Central among them is commerce. In 2003 U.S. total trade with
ASEAN was US$130 billion and investment reached some $90 billion.
The large Muslim population of the region is another focal
point of American interest. The pockets of Islamic extremism are
still small, but they have produced acts of violence and
interwoven networks of terrorism. The U.S. has a fundamental
interest in stable effective states in Southeast Asia that can
stop extremist violence and generally strengthen the region.
Part of the difficulty in coming up with a cogent approach to
the region is that the region is such a mixed bag. Thailand,
Singapore, and Malaysia have become dynamic and largely
successful states. Indonesia and the Philippines have struggled
to establish effective governments. Vietnam is on the ascent but
has a long way to go and needs plenty of external support. Burma,
Laos, and Cambodia remain more or less trapped in backwardness.
Given the varied nature of the region it is not surprising
that outside governments view ASEAN, the area's one big
institutional creation, as a central point of engagement. In its
nearly four decades of existence ASEAN has reduced the likelihood
of conflict among its members and created a growing web of
economic and security cooperation. ASEAN has become a cornerstone
for wider Asian economic cooperation, including China, Japan and
South Korea.
Much has been made of China's growing involvement in the area,
and the notion that the Chinese "are cleaning the American clock"
in terms of influence in the area has gained currency in some
American quarters. That may be overdrawn but China is indeed a
rapidly expanding presence in the area. Trade and investment
flows with China are increasingly important to all the economies
of the area.
Some countries fear Chinese productivity and dread a
'hollowing out' of their manufacturing sectors. But most also see
major opportunities as Chinas demand for their raw materials and
agricultural products grows exponentially. China is bringing new
dynamism to Southeast Asian economies.
China, however, remains distrusted in the area, notably in
Indonesia and Vietnam. There are also serious abrasions including
continuing contention over claims to resources in the South China
Sea among China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan and
Brunei. Probably most important, Southeast Asian countries do not
want to feel left alone with China.
In fact, the U.S. remains a significant if receding presence
in the area. America's open markets and investment remain
important to economic progress. Southeast Asian countries respect
U.S. military might, though some fear the U.S. may be too quick
to use it. The American image in this heavily Islamic area is
problematic. There is much criticism of the United States'
allegedly unquestioning support of Israel and in particular the
U.S. invasion of Iraq. Yet most countries are still prepared to
cooperate with the U.S.
Advancing American interests in Southeast Asia requires more
than simply wooing ASEAN, although that is desirable and
inexpensive. To deal with terrorism, the U.S. government needs to
further enhance intelligence and law enforcement cooperation and
in some cases military to military cooperation with states of the
area. To foster economic growth and commerce, the private sector
requires a framework of good working relations among governments.
Moreover what the United States needs to recognize clearly is
that all its interests -- counter-terrorism especially and any
concerns about China -- are best served by the evolution of
strong, effective governments in the region. Over the longer term
the best antidotes to jihadism are good governance, education,
and economic progress.
If ASEAN is to prosper it requires strong member countries,
particularly the larger ones that have real weight in the region
and have both the fiber not to be intimidated by China but also
the realism to deal cooperatively with Beijing.
Two countries especially important in this regard--Indonesia
and Vietnam--deserve concerted U.S. attention and more support:
the former if only because it is the world's largest and most
secular oriented Muslim country, and Vietnam because of its size,
location and potential.
Indonesia has had a series of weak governments since the fall
of Soeharto in 1998, and it is not clear whether last year's
impressive election will change that. The new government's
ability to deal with the tsunami's devastation is an important
test of its effectiveness. So will their handling of Aceh
rebellion. U.S. relations are still troubled over the past
conduct of Indonesia's military. All that needs sorting out and
the U.S.-Indonesian relationship needs to move on, resumption of
the IMET program is a start.
Vietnam's eighty million people are coming out of their shell
and want to be part of the world. That should help change its
authoritarian and repressive government, which recognizes the
need for domestic change but moves cautiously.
Despite all the problems of governance in both countries the
United States, as well as major Asian allies like Japan, should
seriously commit itself to finding cooperative ways to assist
them in expanding economic growth and producing modern,
effective, and open states.
Morton Abramowitz is Senior Fellow at The Century Foundation
and Stephen Bosworth is Dean of The Fletcher School at Tufts
University. Both served as American ambassadors in East Asia and
are preparing a book on America and East Asia.