America forgets lesson of Vietnam

The Nation, Asia News Network, Bangkok

U.S. defense officials created an uproar in the Philippines last week when they leaked a plan to send 1,700 elite American troops to the southern island of Jolo to help Manila fight the Abu Sayyaf rebel group. The plan is controversial because the Philippine constitution bans foreign troops from taking part in domestic combat operations. Memories of America's colonial rule of the archipelago and its long support of the dictatorial Marcos regime add another level of sensitivity to the issue.

Philippine government officials responded to the "leak" by insisting they would not allow the constitution to be violated, adding that the terms of engagement in Jolo would be similar to those imposed on U.S. troops during last year's anti-terror exercises on Basilan island, another Abu Sayyaf lair.

Whatever the Philippine constitution "technically" says, most analysts believe both sides will find the legal space needed for U.S. troops to serve actively in the Philippines if Washington and Manila so desire. And both Philippine President Gloria Arroyo and U.S. President George Bush seem to believe there would be gains, even if only symbolic, in taking joint action in Jolo.

For Washington, having U.S. soldiers take on a guerrilla group linked to Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network sends a message to other countries in Southeast Asia that the U.S. is prepared to engage militarily if they don't crack down on terrorists.

Washington has made no secret of its irritation at the slowness with which several ASEAN countries, most notably Thailand and Indonesia, have pursued terror suspects.

Arroyo's troubled government sees hunting down the Muslim Abu Sayyaf as a political winner in the mostly Catholic country. Most Filipinos also believe anybody who is backed by the U.S. can't lose.

If U.S. forces do eventually participate in combat operations it would represent a major shift in policy by both the American and Philippine governments and mark a new phase in the war on terror in Asia.

As the Bali bombings showed last year, there is a very real threat to Southeast Asia's security from terrorist organizations. Jemaah Islamyiah, the group allegedly responsible for the Bali carnage, has been linked to Abu Sayyaf and the two are reported to share a goal of building a pan-Islamic Asian state that includes parts of Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and the Philippines.

The Abu Sayyaf, however, are as much a kidnapping gang as they are a religious movement. The group gained international notoriety in 2000 when it seized 21 mostly foreign hostages from the neighboring Malaysian dive resort of Sipadan and hid them in the Jolo jungles. Its fighters, while numbering only about 300 or 400, have proved effective combatants, causing heavy casualties in its engagements with the Philippine army.

Still, why the national army can't handle the problem itself is a bit of a mystery.

One of the lessons America was supposed to have learned from the Vietnam War and other mid-20th century conflicts was that it is usually best to use indigenous forces -- if properly trained and equipped -- against a threat like local Islamist guerrillas: They know the languages, the terrain and the culture.

If the indigenous forces are so corrupt or can't build local support to help them, it suggests a larger problem exists than can be remedied by foreign soldiers. Manila should accept American training and technological help. But before it agrees to allow a broader role for U.S. soldiers, it needs to look a little closer at its own approach to the Abu Sayyaf problem.