Ailing Pakistan faces its worst crisis ever

By Brahma Chellaney

NEW DELHI (JP): Pakistan is now beginning to look the "moth- eaten" state that its founder, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, foresaw. Its economy is crumbling, its fragile democracy is under siege, and its internal order has started to disintegrate. And the irony is that this country has recently declared itself a nuclear-weapons state.

Pakistan has been through many crises in its history but never has it been plagued by such widespread disenchantment and lack of confidence among its citizens about its future as today. The present crisis of state there has direct implications for the country from which it was carved out, India.

Pakistan is looking dangerously like a failing state. Its institutions have corroded to such an extent that some appear on the brink of collapse. The elected government confronts rising popular discontent and disdain for politicians, the judiciary is tainted, and even the military, described by some Pakistanis as their country's "best political party", has got increasingly involved in making money at the cost of professional competence.

The deteriorating internal order reflects the "Afghanization" of the country that has been the principal backer of the Taliban. Weapons of mass destruction in the hands of such an ailing state are inimical to regional security.

Pakistan's political future appears uncertain. The beleaguered Nawaz Sharif government, in an effort to deflect public ire, plans to introduce new Islamic shariah laws. Islam, however, has failed to serve as a unifying force in Pakistan. The very survival of Sharif's government, with more than two-thirds majority in the National Assembly, is at stake.

However, with the opposition in disarray and Benazir Bhutto disgraced by disclosures about her fat Swiss bank deposits, there appears no political alternative, save for the military taking over the reins of power again.

But when the military can pull the political strings from behind and make money on the quiet, why would it like to bear the burden of running an insolvent state?

Yet, many Pakistani analysts believe the country is headed for a political change.

The foreign-debt crisis is going to further weaken Prime Minister Sharif's position. With a funding gap of at least US$4.5 billion in balance of payments, a debt-servicing default looms large.

Pakistan's debt obligation over the next one month alone totals several hundred million dollars. Islamabad has again turned to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirate, which bailed it out when economic sanctions were first imposed. But these two countries (the only other friends of the Taliban) do not have large lending capacities to continue to aid Pakistan: The 1991 Gulf War depleted their coffers and unveiled an era of lower oil prices that has undermined their economies.

Pakistan's new borrowing can only come on stiff terms. Even if it gets $1.5 billion from the Jeddah-based Islamic Development Bank and other Islamic institutions, it still needs a separate bailout package from the IMF, which is set to impose politically tough conditions on it. Islamabad now confronts a debt trap, borrowing money to service older debt.

At the root of Pakistan's problems is its national-identity crisis arising from a failure to retain its founding zeal. It was founded as a state for the subcontinent's Moslems. But the two- religion, two-nation theory collapsed in 1971 when East Pakistan seceded to become Bangladesh with Indian military support.

Now there are more Moslems in India than in Pakistan. Half a century after being created as a separate nation-state, Pakistan is still groping for a national identity.

Pakistan wants to define its national identity in adversarial terms to India, and Kashmir is the only instrument it has -- one which it exploits to the hilt. Kashmir has been the glue holding Pakistan together. Islamabad can ill-afford to reach a settlement on Kashmir, particularly one that seeks to turn the present line of control into the de jure border.

Today, Pakistan is in such economic and political mess that its autonomy in decision-making is rapidly eroding. It is at the mercy of external creditors and highly susceptible to external pressure. One sign of that came last week when Nawaz Sharif received a telephone call from another besieged head of government -- U.S. President Bill Clinton -- not to compare notes on their political woes but to get instructions on what Islamabad should do.

The promptness with which Pakistan found a suspect in the East Africa embassy bombings contrasts sharply with its failure to find anyone in the shooting of four Americans last November, the shooting of two Iranians last February, and other killings on its soil. Its role in the U.S. missile attacks on Afghan terrorist bases also reflected its eroding decision-making autonomy.

Pakistan was told beforehand about the strikes so that it would not mistake the overflying missiles for an Indian attack, but it could do nothing but accept the attacks carried out from its exclusive economic zone on extremists working in close liaison with it.

That Pakistan will sign the nuclear Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is a foregone conclusion. It has no other choice. It has laid the ground for unilaterally acceding to the treaty by delinking its position from India's.

When Pakistan signs the CTBT, its fast-eroding autonomy in decision-making will become bare. The Americans, however, are hoping to insulate its political impact in Pakistan by getting India to announce its intent to sign the treaty at about the same time. That task may not prove easy.

The U.S. influence over Pakistan raises the question whether such leverage is good or bad for India. At a time when Pakistan has started to unmistakably look like a sick state and things there threaten to fall apart, U.S. ability to influence Pakistani conduct and policy should not necessarily work against India's interests.

The recent Tomahawk strikes on Afghan terrorist bases were an example of how U.S. and Indian interests converge on containing Islamic extremism and maintaining stability in a troubled part of the world. Washington, however, would have done well to share with India its assessment of the damage to those terrorist bases since they involved elements active in Kashmir.

A crumbling, nuclear-armed Pakistan where central political authority is chipping away will be a serious threat to India. This is not to argue that India should seek to protect Pakistan's political integrity. But a decomposing Pakistan where renegade elements in the military and outside are asserting themselves will create major security problems for India.

Today, an ailing Pakistan sits next door to the civil wars in Afghanistan and Tajikistan and to an ambitious Iran which has massed more than a quarter million troops along the Afghan border and is threatening to teach the murderous Taliban bands ruling Afghanistan a lesson.

It is obvious that this going to be a very troubled corner of the world. It could force India to affix its attention northwestwards, as it has done through much of its long history.

By forcing Sharif's hand on nuclear testing, India has played no mean role in exacerbating Pakistan's national crisis. With its tested Chinese nuclear-warhead designs, Islamabad, unlike India, had no technical imperatives to test. It tested solely for political reasons. Had Pakistan decided not to be a copycat, it would have become the West's darling and not faced the predicament today.

India has to draw the appropriate lessons from Pakistan's plight, including the importance of economic strength in national autonomy, and ensure it does not become a rotting state itself.

The writer is professor of security studies at the independent, privately-funded Center for Policy Research in New Delhi.