After the 2004 national election: What next for the people?

Max Lane, Visiting Fellow, Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, Murdoch WA, Australia, m.lane@murdoch.edu.au

Elwin Tobing's article The Elections: Substance or Babble? in The Jakarta Post, Feb. 25, presented a critique of the political elite's approach to the general elections that went to the central question. He stated: "Less than six weeks away from the elections, the people still have no idea what the political parties are offering to improve the nation".

This is exactly true, especially for the large parties already in the parliament that dominate media coverage and have the greatest access to funds. These are the parties which represent the different factions of the political elite.

Of course, the Indonesian people can easily identify what policies these parties are offering in terms of ongoing policies, separate from the question of addressing the ten questions that Tobing raises.

These parties offer more of what the Megawati Soekarnoputri government and House of Representatives have been implementing over the last five years.

The essence of these policies can be found in the neo-liberal recipes embedded in the various Letters of Intent with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), symbolized most tragically for the Indonesian people by the abolition of price subsidies, the privatization of water and the opening of the agricultural market to unplanned and uncontrolled rice, sugar, tobacco, and soybean imports; a continuation of the elitist social policies of the New Order, symbolized most of all by penggusuran (evictions) and the continuation of a form of political activity, most symbolized by money politics, including corruption.

These are the basic policies of all the major political parties. These are all unpopular policies with the mass of the people, which explains the fall in popularity of all the major parties and a general cynicism about the elections.

This cynicism and alienation, combined with the aggressive use of money politics and appeals to cultural aliran loyalties over the next few weeks, will probably ensure that most of the mainstream parties retain a representation in parliament similar to that which exists now.

In other words, the Indonesian people can expect more of exactly the same in terms of the policies likely to be continued by any parliamentary majority.

But while government policy may not change, there will be further changes in the political situation itself. First, it is possible that several of the smaller parties, who currently present themselves as critics of the dominant parties may win some seats in parliament, even if only small in number. These include the pro-neoliberal but anti-corruption and pro political liberalism parties, such as The New Indonesia Alliance Party (PIB) led by Syahrir.

There are other smaller parties such as this that may win one or two seats. Then there are the, perhaps, social democratically inclined vanguard Party of Rachmawati Soekarnoputri, the Freedom Bull National Party (PNBK) of Eros Jarot and the Social Democratic Labor Party of Mochtar Pakpahan.

However small their representation may be, they may introduce a new style of criticism, or even opposition, into the parliament. This is also still very much to be tested as these parties are new and most are either direct or indirect off-shoots of parties or institutions that developed under the influence of the political culture that dominated in the New Order.

Additional factors that may effect the kind of opposition in the next parliament include the recruitment into the National Awakening Party (PKB), of some long-term NGO liberal democrats. The most well known is probably Nursyahbani Katjasungkana, the former chairperson of the Indonesian Women's Coalition.

The PKB, headed by Abdurrahman Wahid, is the closest of the political elite's parties to a liberal opposition party, but its fear of mass campaigning has meant that its base has not grown too far beyond its traditional support base among rural Moslem clerics, belonging to the Nahdlatul Ulama.

Another factor which may provide a greater voice for a policy based opposition may be, perhaps, a greater presence of people from outside the political elite's organizations in the new upper house, the Council of regional Representatives.

The possibility of a small and unpredictable policy-based liberal democratic or social democratic opposition representation in the parliament only really has significance, however, because of its possible interplay with the more significant opposition that is bound to grow quickly after the parliamentary and presidential elections.

The elections of an overwhelmingly itu-itu saja (same old person) parliament and government which will continue the same failing policies as the current Megawati government and the Akbar Tandjung-Amien Rais parliament is sure to quickly generate deep frustration.

This will be exacerbated when the new government and parliament, sure -- it thinks -- of four certain years of power implements all the most brutal of the IMF austerity policies, such as price rises of fuel, electricity, water, telephones etc and further opens the economy to unplanned and uncontrolled imports. There will be no holding back on a new round of money politics.

Social frustration will deepen and spread rapidly as people search for new solutions. In this situation the extra- parliamentary social movements will grow again. Even now, the High Court decision to acquit Akbar Tanjung of corruption has began the process of restarting the student movement.

Extra-parliamentary social and political protest movements were the main force driving for change in Indonesia since 1989 and were the main factor that ensured that the fall of Soeharto was associated with reformasi and not just a quiet changing of the guard. We can expect the same process to begin again, at the very latest, in 2005, although anger at now decent presidential candidates could see it explode evening 2004.