After Geneva, what next?

After Geneva, what next?

It is obvious that many politicians in Jakarta are not content
to let the ink dry on the joint understanding which the
government signed with the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Geneva
last week. Although it is not due to come into effect until June
2, the agreement has already been widely denounced by many in
Jakarta as a sellout and a major diplomatic blunder on the part
of President Abdurrahman Wahid's administration.

Critics, led by People's Consultative Assembly speaker Amien
Rais, say the agreement, and the venue chosen for the signing,
could pave the way for the internationalization of the Aceh
conflict. This, they argue, is an open invitation to foreign
intervention into what has essentially been a domestic issue
until now.

They also questioned the advisability of allowing an official
as senior as the ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva to
sign on the government's behalf. The gesture, they contend, has
given legitimacy to the armed group which has been fighting for a
separate Aceh state for the last 20 years or so.

While there is no doubt that some of the criticism is valid,
it is also true that the government's hands were tied. This is an
aspect which critics conveniently choose to ignore as they rail
against the government. With no signs of the violence ending, the
government dealt with few options left to restore peace in Aceh.
The joint understanding, with all its political implications, is
probably the best course of action under the circumstances.

The military option, the path chosen for the last 25 years,
has not only failed but also compounded the conflict. The
Indonesian Military (TNI), rather than GAM, has now become public
enemy number one in many parts of Aceh. GAM has grown stronger,
both politically and militarily, and it is difficult for the
government to dismiss it simply as a security disturbance group
as was the policy during the past 25 years. GAM is a reality as a
force representing the aspirations of the local people. GAM may
not speak for all the Acehnese, but it is strong enough that it
should be included in any settlement to the problem.

The Geneva agreement is only recognition of GAM's existence,
power and influence in Aceh. If peace in Aceh is the ultimate
objective of this whole exercise, rather than the pride and self-
concern of people in Jakarta, then the agreement is a major
breakthrough. Anyone who says that GAM has scored a psychological
and diplomatic victory in the Aceh conflict is overlooking that
GAM has also won most of the ground battles.

Rather than wasting so much time and energy to put down the
Geneva agreement and nurse their wounded egos, Jakarta
politicians should give their wholehearted support to the
agreement and its implementation. After all, most people in Aceh,
even those who do not necessarily share GAM's separatist cause,
appear to have endorsed the peace agreement.

The interests of the people of Aceh must come first in any
policy or agreement made by Jakarta. The joint understanding
meets that criteria, despite the political implications for
Jakarta. The "humanitarian pause" called for in the agreement
will at least bring a long-overdue respite from the violence
which has wreaked havoc in Aceh since the mid-1970s.

The government must now look beyond the joint understanding. A
respite, even in the name of a humanitarian cause, cannot be
sustained for long unless there is a political solution, or at
least the prospect of one in the near future.

Politically, the government and GAM are still a gulf apart,
evident in the way each interprets the agreement. GAM is resolute
in its demand for a separate state, while the government is
equally adamant that the subject is not up for negotiation. If
both sides remain stubborn in their positions, the humanitarian
pause is unlikely to last long and fighting will soon break out
again. This calls for give-and-take from both sides.

One solution that has been proposed by this newspaper is to
allow GAM to become a regional political party; the very reason
why it took up arms was because it had no legitimate political
outlet to channel its aspirations.

In its fixation to maintain national unity, Jakarta has
forbidden parties to run along regional lines. The 1999 law on
political parties still requires that all political parties must
be headquartered in Jakarta.

This comes across as odd for a country which claims to profess
democracy. Since 1999, the country has seen political parties
formed along sectarian, ethnic and class lines, all of which are
equally, if not more, divisive than parties based on regional
lines. Yet, national unity seems to have remained intact even as
the multitude of new parties -- Islamic parties, Christian
parties, Chinese parties, workers parties -- contested the 1999
general election using strikingly divisive platforms.

That experience alone should give Indonesia enough confidence
to allow political parties representing regional aspirations. It
would once and for all placate the regional discontent that
exists not only in Aceh and Irian Jaya, but also in many other
provinces, in a democratic and therefore nonviolent fashion.