After Aceh peace deal: Learning from past mistakes

After Aceh peace deal: Learning from past mistakes

Kiki Syahnakri, Former Army Deputy Chief-of-staff, Jakarta

All the parties involved in the recent signing of the peace
deal between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement
(GAM) deserve sincere appreciation, especially given the
protracted conflict in Aceh and the vast loss of life and
material damage there.

The question of Aceh has eroded the nation's reputation and
tarnished the image of its military (TNI) and police, the forces
assigned to maintain security, law and order to ensure national
integrity and act as the vanguard of the state's sovereignty.

Yet we must also criticize the policies and process toward the
signing of the treaty. Prior to the signing of the peace deal
preconditions that would suit the government's terms were needed,
and there were principles in terms of security, politics and
diplomacy that we had to continue to uphold.

We cannot leave the framework of the unitary state of the
republic, which includes Aceh; and there must be assurances that
GAM also has good intentions and agrees that the solution to the
issue must be made within this framework.

Dozens of times AGAM, GAM's military wing, has violated the
peace deal by intercepting members of our military/police or
undertaking other forms of military action against them. Credible
sources have revealed that GAM held a secret meeting between Jan.
3 and Jan. 5 in Nisam district, North Aceh.

Among the decisions reached were that GAM would lay down its
arms only after the military had done likewise under the
supervision of the United Nations; and that GAM would immediately
set up a civilian government in Aceh to replace the Indonesian
government at the village and district levels.

GAM also decided it would recruit young people from all parts
of Aceh to reinforce its troops. It would also intensify tax
collection and replace personnel considered to have not lived up
to expectations. Then, GAM members who had surrendered and NGO
members who were not in favor of GAM must be kidnapped. Finally,
it was decided that GAM's administrative structure must be
improved.

The meeting, also attended by a number of leading ulema,
voiced the resolve that once the peace deal could remain in
force, "the republic's personnel" would be wiped out from Aceh.
If this information is fully or partly correct, authorities are
right to say that the peace deal needs reviewing, and that
Indonesia would even withdraw from the deal if necessary.

In East Timor, back in 1985, then independence leader Xanana
Gusmao diverted the focus of his struggle from an armed front to
political diplomacy -- he moved from jungle to city.

The independence movement Fretilin/CNRT adopted a clandestine
method to develop resistance in the towns across East Timor and
even beyond. Despite heavy pressure from the TNI and the police,
this method worked well and Xanana -- regardless of the
complexity of the problem as a result of Indonesia's failed
approaches and policies and the presence of an international
conspiracy -- successfully turned East Timor into a new state.

East Timor was able to gain independence through clandestine
methods even under strong pressure from Indonesia, so how could
GAM be given the golden opportunity to carry out its actions
openly and freely right in front of us?

A senior Indonesian diplomat has proudly claimed that we have
successfully made GAM shift from armed resistance to diplomacy.
But this is exactly what GAM desires. It would be much easier for
GAM to consolidate itself and mobilize support, establish
communications and so forth in the present situation.

In this post-peace deal situation GAM will likely open up
three fronts -- the armed front, the political front and the
diplomatic front -- to increase support from the Acehnese and the
world. By then, GAM will enjoy wider access to the Acehnese and
the international community. The access enjoyed by the TNI and
police would, on the other hand, be narrower.

Also, GAM would likely mobilize popular power through appeals
and intimidation so that people would join rallies, instigate
rioting in opposition to the government and drive out of Aceh the
locally stationed and dispatched security apparatus of the TNI
and police.

Then the measures planned by the Joint Security Committee --
confidence building steps, the demilitarization of GAM,
rehabilitation/economic assistance and so forth -- would never be
realized and peace would not be achieved.

What is GAM and how must we cope with it? This is the same as
questioning the problem of Aceh itself. The question of Aceh may
be construed as an armed rebellion likely to reoccur. Aceh has
become a national issue placing the state (the people and
government, including TNI) in confrontation with GAM as an armed
separatist group.

From the view of international humanitarian law, GAM is an
armed grouped undertaking an armed rebellion. It is organized
militarily and takes up arms to resist the authorities and
terrorize the people. It may thus be categorized as a combatant.

The question of Aceh is the fruit of the government's failure
to implement development in an integrated manner. Hence Aceh has
not seen the fruits of welfare, justice and democracy. This has
led to disobedience, insurgency and armed rebellion, with wide,
primoridal-based support. In this process, foreign intervention
cannot be avoided.

The only way an armed rebellion with a guerrilla pattern can
be dealt with is by combining diplomacy and military operations,
plus integrated rehabilitation measures to "win the hearts and
minds of the people". An armed movement will fail or be weakened
if the people take sides with authorities.

So, the combined results of cooperation and coordination
between the regional and central government, the TNI and the
police, non-governmental organizations and the local community is
a must. Mere diplomatic negotiations will not last or will even
be doomed to failure; meaning our interests cannot be
accommodated if military activities or security operations are
not employed to strengthen our bargaining position at the
negotiating table.

Yet if we only adopt the security approach, we will never
arrive at a final settlement and new problems will crop up.

Even if the plan drawn up by the JSC can be put into practice
to achieve lasting peace in Aceh within the unitary republic,
this does not mean an immediate end to the problem.

The aspiration nurtured by GAM for independence will gain
strength again if the government fails to bring prosperity,
justice and democracy to the region.

Let's learn from East Timor. Indonesia's funds were largely
spent on building infrastructure, many of which locals did not
need. Schools were built without prior survey so that in some
places there are schools with very few or no students at all.

Given Aceh's potential, sectors directly linked with the
improvement of the standard of living such as agriculture,
plantations and cattle breeding, can be developed.

If the funds of over Rp 6 trillion allocated for Aceh in the
2002 budget year is used well, it would be very effective in
supporting efforts to solve the problem. This budget would not
fund military operations but regional development.

Another lesson from East Timor is that we must work to reduce
and avoid issues that can be exploited and exposed by GAM and its
sympathizers as violations of Acehnese human rights.

A truly professional military and police will thus be needed.
They must master the law and be proficient in applying it. They
must know exactly who they must shoot, arrest or kill.

Aceh's situation following the signing of the peace pact is a
test for this country to see whether we can properly manage
conflicts and retain our integrity -- or whether our conflict
management will be a bad precedent that threatens the existence
of our nation state.